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Diotima's Speech

Συμπόσιον

Synthesis of the whole speech

The readings taken together

Socrates declines to answer Agathon in his own voice and reports what Diotima of Mantinea once taught him, beginning with the refutation she gave his younger self. She first breaks the either/or of beautiful and ugly, using right opinion as the model of an intermediate, and places Love between god and mortal as a great daimōn that carries messages between the two realms. The myth of Poros and Penia explains this middle nature: Love is needy, resourceful, and a philosopher who stands between wisdom and ignorance. Diotima then turns from Love's nature to his use. Love is of the good being one's own always, and its work is birth in beauty, in body and in soul, which is the only share of immortality open to mortals. She supports this from animal parenthood, from the constant replacement of body, soul and knowledge, from the love of honour, and from the spiritual offspring of poets and lawgivers. In the higher mysteries she describes an ordered ascent from one beautiful body to beauty itself: eternal, unmixed and single in form, the vision of which alone lets a person beget true virtue and become dear to the gods. Socrates closes by professing himself persuaded and urging all to honour Love, and the revellers' knocking cuts off Aristophanes' reply.

  1. Socrates presents his refutation of Agathon as one he once suffered from Diotima. She denies that what is not beautiful must be ugly, taking right opinion, which lies between wisdom and ignorance, as her model of an intermediate.201d, 201e, 202a, 202b
  2. From the premise that the gods are happy and possess good and beautiful things, Diotima concludes that Love, who lacks them, is no god. He is not mortal either: he is a great δαίμων, a middle kind that interprets between gods and humans and binds the whole together.202c, 202d, 202e, 203a
  3. The myth of Poros (Resource) and Penia (Poverty) accounts for Love's double nature, needy and inventive, dying and reviving. It makes him a lover of wisdom who stands between the wise and the ignorant. Socrates' error was to take Love for the beloved when Love belongs to the lover.203b, 203c, 203d, 203e, 204a, 204b, 204c
  4. Diotima substitutes the good for the beautiful and arrives at love as the wish for the good to be one's own always. She explains ordinary usage through the analogy of ποίησις (making, poetry): one species of love has taken the name of the whole, and she rejects the claim that love seeks its other half.204d, 204e, 205a, 205b, 205c, 205d, 205e, 206a
  5. Love's work is τόκος ἐν καλῷ, birth in beauty, in body and soul. Beauty presides over this birth, and generation is the mortal's way of sharing in what is everlasting, so love is also of immortality.206b, 206c, 206d, 206e, 207a
  6. The self-sacrifice of animals for their young, and the constant loss and replacement of hair, flesh, character and even knowledge, show that every mortal thing persists by leaving something new in place of the old.207b, 207c, 207d, 207e, 208a, 208b
  7. The love of honour and undying fame confirms the thesis. Those pregnant in soul beget wisdom and virtue, above all the ordering of cities, and their offspring are more beautiful and more immortal than bodily children, as the works of Homer, Lycurgus and Solon show.208c, 208d, 208e, 209a, 209b, 209c, 209d, 209e
  8. In the final mysteries the rightly guided lover climbs from one body to all bodies, to souls, practices and laws, and to kinds of knowledge. At last he suddenly sees the beautiful itself, eternal and unmixed, and begets true virtue there. Socrates closes by commending Love as humanity's best fellow-worker.210a, 210b, 210c, 210d, 210e, 211a, 211b, 211c, 211d, 211e, 212a, 212b, 212c
  • Love is an intermediate. He is neither beautiful nor ugly, neither god nor mortal, neither wise nor ignorant, and the argument works by denying that whatever lacks one extreme must have the other.

    AI translationJowettLambBurgesChambryCousinFicino (Latin)SchleiermacherShelleySydenham–Taylor

  • The daimonic middle joins the realms it stands between, carrying human prayers upward and divine commands downward.

    Hermias· AI EnglishTaylor (notes)BridgesAI translationJowettChambrySchleiermacher

  • Love is finally defined as desire for the good to be one's own always. Since mortal goods pass away, this desire issues in generation, which is the mortal's only way to share in immortality.

    AI translationLambBurgesChambryCousinFicino (Latin)SchleiermacherShelleySydenham–TaylorFicino, De amore· AI English

  • The ascent proceeds in a fixed order, from particular and bodily beauty to more general and less bodily beauty, and ends in a beauty that is unmixed and unaffected by the things that share in it.

    AI translationJowettLambChambryCousinSchleiermacherPlotinus I.6PicoCastiglioneBury

  • Diotima's teaching is framed in the language of the mysteries, with lesser rites leading to a final vision.

    Sydenham (note)BuryBurgesCousinLambSydenham–Taylor

  • What the figure of Diotima as Socrates' teacher signifies.

    • Castiglione Takes it at face value as proof that a woman opened love's highest mysteries to Socrates.201d
    • Jowett (introduction) Treats it as a literary device that lets Socrates correct Agathon politely and keep his profession of ignorance.201d, 201e
    • Bury Calls Diotima fictitious and reads her names, the 'mantic' Mantinea and Zeus-honoured Diotima, as marking the doctrine as revelation.201d, 202e
  • What Penia, Love's mother, and the birth myth stand for.

    • Plotinus III.5· AI English Penia is matter, which is in need of everything, and Love is the soul's activity toward the good, born of lack.203b, 203c, 203d
    • Leone Ebreo· AI English Penia is the potency of matter desiring perfection, and the myth concerns the universal love of the whole world.203b, 203c, 203e
    • Pico Penia is the indigence of the formless first created Mind, which receives the Ideas.203b, 203c
    • Bury Penia personifies mortal nature, the anti-divine side of Love. He allows that the equation with matter is not far astray and treats details like Zeus's garden as literary ornament.203b, 203c
    • Proclus The gods are unbegotten, so the birth is a symbolic veil for procession from a cause.203c
  • Whether love's generative work is literal pregnancy and birth, or fertility and desire, and whether beauty is the medium of birth or a partner begotten upon.

    • AI translation Keeps literal pregnancy and 'giving birth in beauty', with beauty as the setting of the birth.206b, 206c, 208e
    • Lamb Keeps pregnancy but makes the act begetting 'on a beautiful thing', a beautiful partner.206b, 206c, 209b
    • Burges Turns pregnancy into yearning and has the lover breed 'upon a beautiful thing'.206b, 206c, 206d, 208e, 209b
    • Chambry Renders the state as fertility ('féconds') and the setting as 'dans la beauté'.206b, 206c, 208e
    • Sydenham–Taylor Speaks of seeds of generation and of generating 'upon the beautiful', a male generative act.206b, 206c, 208e
  • What the ascent is and what the beautiful itself finally is.

    • Bury An intellectual training in dialectic, in which νοῦς identifies and generalises the one in the many.210a, 210b, 210c
    • Sydenham (note) A mystery initiation in three degrees: purgation, illumination and intuition.209e, 210a
    • Plotinus I.6 The soul's rise to Absolute Beauty, pure and unmixed with flesh, ending in the demand to become godlike.210c, 211b, 211d, 211e, 212a
    • Ficino, De amore· AI English A Christian-Platonist ascent from the body's beauty to God's beauty, loved as light and truth.210a, 210e, 211a, 211d
    • Castiglione A courtly lover's escape from one body into a universal concept and so to the sovereign heavenly beauty.210a, 210b, 211a, 211b
  • Whether the good that love wants is to be owned, to be present, or to come to be one's own.

    • Jowett Ownership and acquisition: love is 'of the everlasting possession of the good'.204e, 205a, 206a, 207a
    • Ficino (Latin) Presence: the good is to be always present to oneself ('adesse sibi').204d, 204e, 206a, 207a
    • Cousin Appropriation and willing: love wants to take the good for itself and possess it always.204d, 204e, 206a
    • AI translation Keeps the verbs of becoming and belonging: the good things are to 'become his' and to be 'one's own always'.204d, 204e, 206a, 207a
  • When Diotima swaps the good for the beautiful, does she treat them as one object of love or as parallel cases, and does καλόν keep the sense of goodness that the Bridges note finds in ḥusn?
  • Is the immortality gained through bodily children, qualified by ὡς οἴονται ('as they think'), an illusion or only a lesser share, and which kind of immortality is the 'possession' Socrates names at the close?
  • Do the words εἶδος and ἰδέα, and the kinship of beauties along the ascent, already point to a single Form of beauty before the final vision?
  • Does Jowett's objection hold, that love need not lack what it desires, and if it does, how much of the argument that makes Love a needy intermediate survives?

AI synthesis (Claude), built from the syntheses of each Stephanus section; every point names its sources. Public sources only. Each passage's own synthesis is under its translation in the reader.

  1. 201d
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    And now I shall let you be. But the account of Love that I once heard from a woman of Mantinea, Diotima, who was wise in these matters and in many others too (it was she who, when the Athenians once offered sacrifice before the plague, won them a ten-year postponement of the disease; and she it was who taught me the things of love), that account, as she gave it, I shall try to go through for you, starting from what Agathon and I have agreed, on my own, as best I can. Now, Agathon, as you laid it out, one must go through

    And now, taking my leave of you, I will rehearse a tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantineia, a woman wise in this and in many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years.

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Readers through the ages · 3
    1. Baldassare Castiglione (tr. Hoby) Book IV, Giuliano's reply · on 201d

    2. Benjamin Jowett on Socrates and Diotima · on 201d–201e

    3. R. G. Bury § iv (B) 1, Diotima · on 201d–202e

    Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
  2. 201e
    ,,.,.,,·,.
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    ,;·,,;

    first who Love is and of what kind, and then his works. It seems easiest to me to go through it the way the stranger once did when she questioned me. For I too said to her much the same sort of thing that Agathon was just now saying to me: that Love was a great god, and was of beautiful things; and she refuted me with the very arguments I used on him, that by my own account he was neither beautiful nor good. 'What do you mean, Diotima?' I said. 'Is Love ugly, then, and bad?' And she said: 'Hush! Do you think that whatever is not beautiful must be ugly?'

    She was my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can. As you, Agathon, suggested, I must speak first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works. First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, Love was neither fair nor good. 'What do you mean, Diotima,' I said, 'is love then evil and foul?' 'Hush,' she cried; 'must that be foul which is not fair?'

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Readers through the ages · 2
    1. Benjamin Jowett on Diotima's dialectic · on 201e–204b

    Also on this section: Benjamin Jowett, on Socrates and Diotima (from 201d)

    Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
  3. 202a
    .
    ,;;
    ;
    ,,—;——;—,.
    ,,.

    'Certainly.' 'And whatever is not wise, ignorant? Have you not noticed that there is something between wisdom and ignorance?' 'What is that?' 'Holding right opinion without being able to give an account of it: do you not know,' she said, 'that this is neither knowing (for how could a thing without an account be knowledge?) nor ignorance (for how could what hits upon what is be ignorance?)? Right opinion, surely, is something of this kind, between understanding and ignorance.' 'True,' said I.

    'Certainly,' I said. 'And is that which is not wise, ignorant? do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?' 'And what may that be?' I said. 'Right opinion,' she replied; 'which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.' 'Quite true,' I replied.

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
  4. 202b

    μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, μηδὲ ὃ μὴ ἀγαθόν, κακόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ καλόν, μηδέν τι μᾶλλον οἴου δεῖν αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι, ἀλλά τι μεταξύ, ἔφη, τούτοιν.

    καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁμολογεῖταί γε παρὰ πάντων μέγας θεὸς εἶναι.

    τῶν μὴ εἰδότων, ἔφη, πάντων λέγεις, ἢ καὶ τῶν εἰδότων;

    συμπάντων μὲν οὖν.

    καὶ ἣ γελάσασα καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

    'Then do not insist that what is not beautiful is ugly, or that what is not good is bad. So too with Love: since you yourself agree that he is not good or beautiful, do not suppose for that reason that he must be ugly and bad, but something between the two,' she said. 'And yet,' said I, 'everyone agrees that he is a great god.' 'Everyone who does not know, do you mean,' she said, 'or those who know as well?' 'All of them together.' And she laughed and said: 'And how, Socrates,

    'Do not then insist,' she said, 'that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.' 'Well,' I said, 'Love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.' 'By those who know or by those who do not know?' 'By all.' 'And how, Socrates,' she said with a smile, 'can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?' 'And who are they?' I said. 'You and I are two of them,' she replied.

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
  5. 202c

    ὁμολογοῖτο μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἵ φασιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θεὸν εἶναι;

    τίνες οὗτοι; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.

    εἷς μέν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δʼ ἐγώ.

    κἀγὼ εἶπον, πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφην, λέγεις;

    καὶ ἥ, ῥᾳδίως, ἔφη. λέγε γάρ μοι, οὐ πάντας θεοὺς φῂς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ καλούς; ἢ τολμήσαις ἄν τινα μὴ φάναι καλόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεῶν εἶναι;

    μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφην.

    εὐδαίμονας δὲ δὴ λέγεις οὐ τοὺς τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κεκτημένους;

    πάνυ γε.

    could he be agreed to be a great god by those who say he is not even a god?' 'Who are these?' said I. 'You are one,' she said, 'and I am another.' And I said, 'How can you say that?' And she: 'Easily. Tell me: do you not say that all the gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you dare to say that any of the gods is not beautiful and happy?' 'By Zeus, not I,' said I. 'And by the happy you mean those who possess good things and beautiful things?' 'Certainly.'

    'How can that be?' I said. 'It is quite intelligible,' she replied; 'for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair--of course you would--would you dare to say that any god was not?' 'Certainly not,' I replied. 'And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?'

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
  6. 202d

    ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἔρωτά γε ὡμολόγηκας διʼ ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν.

    ὡμολόγηκα γάρ.

    πῶς ἂν οὖν θεὸς εἴη ὅ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄμοιρος;

    οὐδαμῶς, ὥς γʼ ἔοικεν.

    ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ σὺ ἔρωτα οὐ θεὸν νομίζεις;

    τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφην, εἴη ὁ Ἔρως; θνητός;

    ἥκιστά γε.

    ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

    ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, ἔφη, μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου.

    τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίμα;

    δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον

    'But you have agreed that Love, through lack of good and beautiful things, desires the very things he lacks.' 'Yes, I have agreed.' 'How then could one who has no share in beautiful and good things be a god?' 'In no way, it seems.' 'You see, then,' she said, 'that you too do not consider Love a god?' 'What then,' said I, 'would Love be? A mortal?' 'Not in the least.' 'But what, then?' 'As in the cases before,' she said, 'something between mortal and immortal.' 'What, Diotima?' 'A great daimōn, Socrates. For all that is daimonic

    'Yes.' 'And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?' 'Yes, I did.' 'But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?' 'Impossible.' 'Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.' 'What then is Love?'

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Readers through the ages · 3
    1. Hermias of Alexandria ed. Couvreur p. 12 · on 202d–202e

    2. Thomas Taylor note on 'a great daemon' · on 202d–203a

    3. Proclus (tr. Taylor) I.26 (Taylor's chapter numbers) · on 202d–203e

    Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 2 differ
  7. 202e

    μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ.

    τίνα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον;

    ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρʼ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὂν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι. διὰ τούτου καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τελετὰς

    is between god and mortal.' 'With what power?' said I. 'Interpreting and ferrying across to the gods what comes from human beings, and to human beings what comes from the gods: from the one side their prayers and sacrifices, from the other their commands and the returns for sacrifices. Being in the middle of both, it fills up the space between, so that the whole is bound together with itself. Through it passes all divination, and the art of the priests who deal with sacrifices and rites

    I asked; 'Is he mortal?' 'No.' 'What then?' 'As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two.' 'What is he, Diotima?' 'He is a great spirit (daimon), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.' 'And what,' I said, 'is his power?' 'He interprets,' she replied, 'between gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their way.

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Readers through the ages · 6
    1. Hermias of Alexandria ed. Couvreur p. 66 · on 202e–203a

    2. Marsilio Ficino VI.3 · on 202e–203a

    Also on this section: Hermias of Alexandria, ed. Couvreur p. 12 (from 202d) · Thomas Taylor, note on 'a great daemon' (from 202d) · Proclus (tr. Taylor), I.26 (Taylor's chapter numbers) (from 202d) · R. G. Bury, § iv (B) 1, Diotima (from 201d)

    Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
  8. 203a

    καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδὰς καὶ τὴν μαντείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν. θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καθεύδουσι· καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς δαιμόνιος ἀνήρ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ περὶ τέχνας ἢ χειρουργίας τινὰς βάναυσος. οὗτοι δὴ οἱ δαίμονες πολλοὶ καὶ παντοδαποί εἰσιν, εἷς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ Ἔρως.

    πατρὸς δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τίνος ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός;

    and incantations, and all soothsaying and sorcery. God does not mingle with human being; it is through this that all converse and dialogue of gods with human beings takes place, waking and sleeping. The one who is wise in such things is a daimonic man; the one wise in anything else, in arts or handicrafts, is a mere artisan. These daimons are many and of every kind, and one of them is Love.' 'And who is his father,' said I, 'and his mother?'

    For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and converse of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love.' 'And who,' I said, 'was his father, and who his mother?'

    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

    Readers through the ages · 3

      Also on this section: Hermias of Alexandria, ed. Couvreur p. 66 (from 202e) · Marsilio Ficino, VI.3 (from 202e) · Thomas Taylor, note on 'a great daemon' (from 202d)

      Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
    1. 203b

      μακρότερον μέν, ἔφη, διηγήσασθαι· ὅμως δέ σοι ἐρῶ. ὅτε γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, ἡστιῶντο οἱ θεοὶ οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Μήτιδος ὑὸς Πόρος. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα οἷον δὴ εὐωχίας οὔσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας. ὁ οὖν Πόρος μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος—οἶνος γὰρ οὔπω ἦν—εἰς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κῆπον εἰσελθὼν βεβαρημένος ηὗδεν. ἡ οὖν Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς ἀπορίαν παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου, κατακλίνεταί

      'It is rather a long story to tell,' she said, 'but still I will tell you. When Aphrodite was born, the gods held a feast, among them Poros (Resource), the son of Mētis (Cunning). When they had dined, Penia (Poverty) came to beg, as you would expect where there is feasting, and she stood about the doors. Now Poros, drunk on nectar (for there was no wine yet), went into the garden of Zeus and, weighed down, fell asleep. So Penia, plotting, because of her own lack of resource, to have a child by Poros, lies down

      'The tale,' she said, 'will take time; nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty, who is the son of Metis or Discretion, was one of the guests. When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep, and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant.

      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

      Readers through the ages · 9
      1. Plotinus III.5.9 · on 203b–203c

      2. Plotinus (tr. MacKenna) III.5.2 · on 203b

      3. Marsilio Ficino VI.7 · on 203b–203c

      4. Thomas Taylor notes on Plenty, nectar, the garden, sleep · on 203b–203c

      5. Proclus (tr. Taylor) I.27 (Taylor's chapter numbers) · on 203b–203c

      6. Leone Ebreo Dialogue III, fol. 96r · on 203b–203c

      7. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (tr. Stanley) Book II, ch. 10 · on 203b–203c

      8. R. G. Bury § iv (B) 2, Diotima's allegory · on 203b–203c

      9. R. G. Bury § iv (B) 2, the garden of Zeus · on 203b

      Synthesis of the readings · 6 agree · 4 differ
    2. 203c

      τε παρʼ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκύησε τὸν ἔρωτα. διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρως, γεννηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνης γενεθλίοις, καὶ ἅμα φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὔσης. ἅτε οὖν Πόρου καὶ Πενίας ὑὸς ὢν ὁ Ἔρως ἐν τοιαύτῃ τύχῃ καθέστηκεν. πρῶτον μὲν πένης ἀεί ἐστι, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ ἁπαλός τε καὶ καλός, οἷον οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἀλλὰ σκληρὸς

      beside him and conceived Love. That is why Love has become the follower and attendant of Aphrodite, having been begotten at her birthday feast, and why he is by nature a lover of the beautiful, Aphrodite being beautiful. So, as the son of Poros and Penia, Love has been set in this kind of lot. First, he is always poor, and far from tender and beautiful, as most people think; he is hard

      And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes.

      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

      Readers through the ages · 11
      1. Plotinus III.5.9 (end) · on 203c–203e

      2. Marsilio Ficino VI.9 · on 203c–203d

      3. Leone Ebreo Dialogue III, fol. 95r · on 203c–204b

      4. Leone Ebreo Dialogue III, fol. 95v · on 203c

      Also on this section: Plotinus, III.5.9 (from 203b) · Marsilio Ficino, VI.7 (from 203b) · Thomas Taylor, notes on Plenty, nectar, the garden, sleep (from 203b) · Proclus (tr. Taylor), I.27 (Taylor's chapter numbers) (from 203b) · Leone Ebreo, Dialogue III, fol. 96r (from 203b) · Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (tr. Stanley), Book II, ch. 10 (from 203b) · R. G. Bury, § iv (B) 2, Diotima's allegory (from 203b)

      Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
    3. 203d

      καὶ αὐχμηρὸς καὶ ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ἄοικος, χαμαιπετὴς ἀεὶ ὢν καὶ ἄστρωτος, ἐπὶ θύραις καὶ ἐν ὁδοῖς ὑπαίθριος κοιμώμενος, τὴν τῆς μητρὸς φύσιν ἔχων, ἀεὶ ἐνδείᾳ σύνοικος. κατὰ δὲ αὖ τὸν πατέρα ἐπίβουλός ἐστι τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀνδρεῖος ὢν καὶ ἴτης καὶ σύντονος, θηρευτὴς δεινός, ἀεί τινας πλέκων μηχανάς, καὶ φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητὴς καὶ πόριμος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής· καὶ οὔτε ὡς

      and parched, barefoot and homeless, always lying on the ground without bedding, sleeping in the open at doors and on the roads, having his mother's nature, always dwelling with need. But after his father he schemes after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, forward and intense, a formidable hunter, always weaving some contrivance, desirous of understanding and resourceful, philosophising all through his life, a formidable enchanter, poisoner and sophist. He is by nature neither

      In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is rough and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses, taking his rest; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father too, whom he also partly resembles, he is always plotting against the fair and good; he is bold, enterprising, strong, a mighty hunter, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, fertile in resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist.

      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

      Readers through the ages · 4
      1. Hermias of Alexandria ed. Couvreur p. 72 · on 203d

      Also on this section: Plotinus, III.5.9 (end) (from 203c) · Marsilio Ficino, VI.9 (from 203c) · Leone Ebreo, Dialogue III, fol. 95r (from 203c)

      Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
    4. 203e

      ἀθάνατος πέφυκεν οὔτε ὡς θνητός, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας θάλλει τε καὶ ζῇ, ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ, τοτὲ δὲ ἀποθνῄσκει, πάλιν δὲ ἀναβιώσκεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποριζόμενον ἀεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ, ὥστε οὔτε ἀπορεῖ Ἔρως ποτὲ οὔτε πλουτεῖ, σοφίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν.

      immortal nor mortal, but on the same day he now flourishes and lives, when he is in resource, and now dies, and comes back to life again through his father's nature; but what he procures is always flowing away, so that Love is never at a loss nor rich, and again he is in the middle between wisdom and ignorance.

      He is by nature neither mortal nor immortal, but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out, and so he is never in want and never in wealth; and, further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge.

      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

      Readers through the ages · 5
      1. Proclus (tr. Taylor) I.23 (Taylor's chapter numbers) · on 203e–204a

      2. R. G. Bury § iv (B) 2, the ebb and flow of Eros · on 203e–207d

      Also on this section: Plotinus, III.5.9 (end) (from 203c) · Proclus (tr. Taylor), I.26 (Taylor's chapter numbers) (from 202d) · Leone Ebreo, Dialogue III, fol. 95r (from 203c)

      Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
    5. 204a

      ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι—ἔστι γάρ—οὐδʼ εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδʼ αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν. οὔκουν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι.

      τίνες οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφοὶ μήτε οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;

      For this is how it is. None of the gods philosophises or desires to become wise, for he is wise already; nor, if anyone else is wise, does he philosophise. Nor, again, do the ignorant philosophise or desire to become wise. For this is exactly what is so hard about ignorance: that one who is not beautiful and good, nor intelligent, seems to himself to be quite enough. The one who does not think himself in need does not desire what he does not think he lacks.' 'Who, then, Diotima,' said I, 'are those who philosophise, if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?'

      The truth of the matter is this: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want.' 'But who then, Diotima,' I said, 'are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?'

      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

      Readers through the ages · 2

        Also on this section: Proclus (tr. Taylor), I.23 (Taylor's chapter numbers) (from 203e) · Leone Ebreo, Dialogue III, fol. 95r (from 203c)

        Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
      1. 204b

        δῆλον δή, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἤδη καὶ παιδί, ὅτι οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ὧν ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ Ἔρως. ἔστιν γὰρ δὴ τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἔρως δʼ ἐστὶν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλόν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲ ὄντα μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις· πατρὸς μὲν γὰρ σοφοῦ ἐστι καὶ εὐπόρου, μητρὸς δὲ οὐ σοφῆς καὶ ἀπόρου. ἡ μὲν οὖν φύσις τοῦ δαίμονος, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, αὕτη· ὃν δὲ σὺ ᾠήθης ἔρωτα

        'By now it is plain even to a child,' she said, 'that they are those between the two, and Love will be one of them. For wisdom is among the most beautiful things, and Love is love of the beautiful; so Love must be a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, and, being a philosopher, be between wise and ignorant. The cause of this in him too is his birth: he has a wise and resourceful father, and a mother who is not wise and without resource. This, then, dear Socrates, is the nature of the daimōn. As for what you thought Love

        'A child may answer that question,' she replied; 'they are those who are in a mean between the two; Love is one of them. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too his birth is the cause; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit Love.

        Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

        Readers through the ages · 3
        1. Proclus (tr. Taylor) I.24 (Taylor's chapter numbers) · on 204b–204c

        Also on this section: Leone Ebreo, Dialogue III, fol. 95r (from 203c) · Benjamin Jowett, on Diotima's dialectic (from 201e)

        Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
      2. 204c

        εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθες. ᾠήθης δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τεκμαιρομένῃ ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, τὸ ἐρώμενον ἔρωτα εἶναι, οὐ τὸ ἐρῶν· διὰ ταῦτά σοι οἶμαι πάγκαλος ἐφαίνετο ὁ Ἔρως. καὶ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐραστὸν τὸ τῷ ὄντι καλὸν καὶ ἁβρὸν καὶ τέλεον καὶ μακαριστόν· τὸ δέ γε ἐρῶν ἄλλην ἰδέαν τοιαύτην ἔχον, οἵαν ἐγὼ διῆλθον.

        καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, εἶεν δή, ὦ ξένη, καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις· τοιοῦτος ὢν ὁ Ἔρως τίνα χρείαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

        to be, it is no wonder that you thought so. You thought, as I judge from what you say, that Love was the beloved, not the lover; that, I think, is why Love appeared all-beautiful to you. For what is lovable is what is truly beautiful and delicate and perfect and blessed; but what loves has another form, such as I have described.' And I said: 'Very well, stranger, for you speak well. If Love is such as this, what use is he to human beings?'

        The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful. For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed; but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described.' I said, 'O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?'

        Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

        Readers through the ages · 1

          Also on this section: Proclus (tr. Taylor), I.24 (Taylor's chapter numbers) (from 204b)

          Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
        1. 204d

          τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειράσομαί σε διδάξαι. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτος καὶ οὕτω γεγονὼς ὁ Ἔρως, ἔστι δὲ τῶν καλῶν, ὡς σὺ φῄς. εἰ δέ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Διοτίμα; ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον· ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν· τί ἐρᾷ;

          καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι γενέσθαι αὑτῷ.

          ἀλλʼ ἔτι ποθεῖ, ἔφη, ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἐρώτησιν τοιάνδε· τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τὰ καλά;

          οὐ πάνυ ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρώτησιν προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.

          'That is what I will try to teach you next, Socrates,' she said. 'Love is of this kind and was born in this way, and he is of beautiful things, as you say. But suppose someone asked us: "Why is Love of beautiful things, Socrates and Diotima?" Or more clearly, thus: the one who loves beautiful things loves; what does he love?' And I said: 'That they become his.' 'But the answer still calls for a question like this,' she said: 'What will he have, the one to whom the beautiful things come?' I said I was not at all able any longer to answer this question readily.

          'That, Socrates,' she replied, 'I will attempt to unfold: of his nature and birth I have already spoken; and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful. But some one will say: Of the beautiful in what, Socrates and Diotima?--or rather let me put the question more clearly, and ask: When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?' I answered her 'That the beautiful may be his.' 'Still,' she said, 'the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?' 'To what you have asked,' I replied, 'I have no answer ready.' 'Then,' she said, 'let me put the word "good" in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more:

          Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

          Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
        2. 204e

          ἀλλʼ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μεταβαλὼν ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρώμενος πυνθάνοιτο· φέρε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τί ἐρᾷ;

          γενέσθαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αὑτῷ.

          καὶ τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τἀγαθά;

          τοῦτʼ εὐπορώτερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαίμων ἔσται.

          'Well,' she said, 'suppose someone changed the question and asked, using "good" in place of "beautiful": "Come, Socrates, the one who loves good things loves; what does he love?"' 'That they become his,' said I. 'And what will he have, the one to whom the good things come?' 'This I can answer more readily,' said I: 'he will be happy.'

          If he who loves loves the good, what is it then that he loves?' 'The possession of the good,' I said. 'And what does he gain who possesses the good?' 'Happiness,' I replied; 'there is less difficulty in answering that question.'

          Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

          Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
        3. 205a

          κτήσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες, καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος; ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις.

          ἀληθῆ λέγεις, εἶπον ἐγώ.

          ταύτην δὴ τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον πότερα κοινὸν οἴει εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἀεί, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

          οὕτως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων.

          τί δὴ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάντας ἐρᾶν φαμεν,

          'Yes,' she said, 'for by the possession of good things the happy are happy, and there is no further need to ask, "And why does the one who wishes to be happy wish it?" The answer seems to have reached its end.' 'What you say is true,' I said. 'Now this wishing and this love: do you think it is common to all human beings, and that all wish the good things to be theirs always? Or how do you put it?' 'So,' said I: 'it is common to all.' 'Why then, Socrates,' she said, 'do we not say that all love,

          'Yes,' she said, 'the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final.' 'You are right.' I said. 'And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?--what say you?'

          Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

          Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
        4. 205b

          εἴπερ γε πάντες τῶν αὐτῶν ἐρῶσι καὶ ἀεί, ἀλλά τινάς φαμεν ἐρᾶν, τοὺς δʼ οὔ;

          θαυμάζω, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτός.

          ἀλλὰ μὴ θαύμαζʼ, ἔφη· ἀφελόντες γὰρ ἄρα τοῦ ἔρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιτιθέντες ὄνομα, ἔρωτα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις καταχρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν.

          ὥσπερ τί; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.

          ὥσπερ τόδε. οἶσθʼ ὅτι ποίησίς ἐστί τι πολύ· ἡ γάρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι ὁτῳοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι

          if indeed all love the same things and always, but say that some love and others do not?' 'I wonder at it myself,' said I. 'Do not wonder,' she said. 'For we have taken a certain kind of love apart and name it, giving it the name of the whole, "love", while for the others we misuse other names.' 'Such as what?' said I. 'Such as this. You know that making (poiēsis) is something manifold: for whatever is the cause of anything whatever passing from not-being into being is all

          'All men,' I replied; 'the desire is common to all.' 'Why, then,' she rejoined, 'are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things.' 'I myself wonder,' I said, 'why this is.' 'There is nothing to wonder at,' she replied; 'the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names.' 'Give an illustration,' I said. She answered me as follows: 'There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold.

          Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

          Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
        5. 205c

          ποίησις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί.

          ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

          ἀλλʼ ὅμως, ἦ δʼ ἥ, οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐ καλοῦνται ποιηταὶ ἀλλὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ἀπὸ δὲ πάσης τῆς ποιήσεως ἓν μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῷ τοῦ ὅλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται. ποίησις γὰρ τοῦτο μόνον καλεῖται, καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ποιήσεως ποιηταί.

          ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφην.

          making, so that the works done under all the arts are makings, and their craftsmen are all makers (poiētai).' 'True.' 'But all the same,' she said, 'you know that they are not called makers but have other names; and from the whole of making one part has been marked off, the part to do with music and metre, and is called by the name of the whole. For this alone is called poetry (poiēsis), and those who have this part of making are called poets.' 'True,' said I.

          All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers.' 'Very true.' 'Still,' she said, 'you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; only that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest, and is concerned with music and metre, is termed poetry, and they who possess poetry in this sense of the word are called poets.' 'Very true,' I said. 'And the same holds of love.

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          Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 2 differ
        6. 205d

          οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα. τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὁ "μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς ἔρως "παντί· ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν ἄλλῃ τρεπόμενοι πολλαχῇ ἐπʼ αὐτόν, ἢ κατὰ χρηματισμὸν ἢ κατὰ φιλογυμναστίαν ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οὔτε ἐρᾶν καλοῦνται οὔτε ἐρασταί, οἱ δὲ κατὰ ἕν τι εἶδος ἰόντες τε καὶ ἐσπουδακότες τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα ἴσχουσιν, ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐρασταί.

          κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγειν.

          καὶ λέγεται μέν γέ τις, ἔφη, λόγος, ὡς οἳ ἂν τὸ ἥμισυ

          'So it is with love too. In its sum, every desire of good things and of being happy is, for everyone, "the greatest and wily love". But those who turn to it in many other ways, in money-making or love of athletics or philosophy, are not said to love nor called lovers; while those who go after one particular kind of it and are in earnest about it take the name of the whole: love, and loving, and lovers.' 'It may be that you speak the truth,' said I. 'And there is a story told,' she said, 'that those who seek their other half

          For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love; but they who are drawn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers--the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose affection takes one form only--they alone are said to love, or to be lovers.' 'I dare say,' I replied, 'that you are right.'

          Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

          Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
        7. 205e

          ἑαυτῶν ζητῶσιν, οὗτοι ἐρῶσιν· ὁ δʼ ἐμὸς λόγος οὔτε ἡμίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἐπεὶ αὑτῶν γε καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμνεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ τὰ ἑαυτῶν πονηρὰ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἑαυτῶν οἶμαι ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον καλεῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον· ὡς οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ

          are the ones who love. But my account says that love is neither of a half nor of a whole, unless, my friend, it happens somehow to be good; since people are willing to have their own feet and hands cut off if they think these belonging to them are bad. For it is not, I think, what is their own that each cherishes, unless someone calls the good his own and belonging to himself, and the bad alien. For there is nothing else that

          'Yes,' she added, 'and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half; but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love not what is their own, unless perchance there be some one who calls what belongs to him the good, and what belongs to another the evil. For there is nothing which men love but the good. Is there anything?' 'Certainly, I should say, that there is nothing.'

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          Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
        8. 206a

          ἐρῶσιν ἅνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν;

          μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.

          ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦ δʼ ἥ, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν ἐστι λέγειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τἀγαθοῦ ἐρῶσιν;

          ναί, ἔφην.

          τί δέ; οὐ προσθετέον, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτοῖς ἐρῶσιν;

          προσθετέον.

          ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ οὐ μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι;

          καὶ τοῦτο προσθετέον.

          ἔστιν ἄρα συλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί.

          ἀληθέστατα, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις.

          people love than the good. Or do you think there is?' 'By Zeus, not I,' said I. 'So then,' she said, 'can one simply say that people love the good?' 'Yes,' I said. 'Well? Must we not add,' she said, 'that they love the good to be theirs?' 'We must add it.' 'And not only to be theirs,' she said, 'but to be theirs always?' 'This too must be added.' 'Love, then, in sum,' she said, 'is of the good being one's own always.' 'Most true,' said I.

          'Then,' she said, 'the simple truth is, that men love the good.' 'Yes,' I said. 'To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?' 'Yes, that must be added.' 'And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That must be added too.' 'Then love,' she said, 'may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That is most true.'

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        9. 206b

          ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο ὁ ἔρως ἐστὶν ἀεί, ἦ δʼ ἥ, τῶν τίνα τρόπον διωκόντων αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τίνι πράξει ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ἡ σύντασις ἔρως ἂν καλοῖτο; τί τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἔργον; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

          οὐ μεντἂν σέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σὲ αὐτὰ ταῦτα μαθησόμενος.

          ἀλλὰ ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ. ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τόκος ἐν καλῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν.

          μαντείας, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δεῖται ὅτι ποτε λέγεις, καὶ οὐ μανθάνω.

          'Since love is always this,' she said, 'in what way, and in what activity, is the eagerness and straining of those who pursue it called love? What is this work in fact? Can you say?' 'If I could, Diotima,' said I, 'I would not be admiring you for your wisdom and coming to you to learn these very things.' 'Then I will tell you,' she said. 'It is giving birth in beauty, both in body and in soul.' 'It needs divination,' said I, 'to tell what you mean, and I do not understand.'

          'Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,' she said, 'what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? and what is the object which they have in view? Answer me.' 'Nay, Diotima,' I replied, 'if I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to learn from you about this very matter.' 'Well,' she said, 'I will teach you:--The object which they have in view is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul.' 'I do not understand you,' I said; 'the oracle requires an explanation.' 'I will make my meaning clearer,' she replied.

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          Readers through the ages · 1
          1. R. G. Bury note on 206B · on 206b

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        10. 206c

          ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, ἦ δʼ ἥ, σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. κυοῦσιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συνουσία τόκος ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζῴῳ ἀθάνατον ἔνεστιν, ἡ κύησις καὶ ἡ γέννησις. τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

          'Then I will say it more clearly,' she said. 'All human beings are pregnant, Socrates, both in body and in soul, and when they reach a certain age our nature desires to give birth. It cannot give birth in what is ugly, but in the beautiful. (The union of man and woman is a giving birth.) This is a divine thing, and in the living creature, mortal as it is, this is present as something immortal: conception and begetting. These cannot happen in what is out of tune.

          'I mean to say, that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation--procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be.

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          1. R. G. Bury note on 206C · on 206c

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        11. 206d

          ἀνάρμοστον δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν παντὶ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁρμόττον. μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια ἡ Καλλονή ἐστι τῇ γενέσει. διὰ ταῦτα ὅταν μὲν καλῷ προσπελάζῃ τὸ κυοῦν, ἵλεών τε γίγνεται καὶ εὐφραινόμενον διαχεῖται καὶ τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ· ὅταν δὲ αἰσχρῷ, σκυθρωπόν τε καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειρᾶται καὶ ἀποτρέπεται καὶ ἀνείλλεται καὶ οὐ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ἴσχον τὸ κύημα χαλεπῶς φέρει. ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντί τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἡ πτοίησις γέγονε

          And the ugly is out of tune with all that is divine, while the beautiful is in tune with it. So Beauty (Kallonē) is the Fate and the Eileithyia, the goddess of childbirth, for generation. For this reason, when what is pregnant draws near to something beautiful, it becomes gracious, and melting with gladness it gives birth and begets; but when it draws near to something ugly, it becomes sullen and pained, curls up, turns away, shrinks back and does not beget, but holding in what it has conceived it bears it with difficulty. Hence for one who is pregnant and already swelling there is great excitement

          But the deformed is always inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore, when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit: at the sight of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the reason why, when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only.' 'What then?' 'The love of generation and of birth in beauty.' 'Yes,' I said. 'Yes, indeed,' she replied. 'But why of generation?'

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        12. 206e

          περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὠδῖνος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. ἔστιν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὡς σὺ οἴει.

          ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

          τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ.

          εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.

          πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι ἀειγενές ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον ὡς θνητῷ ἡ γέννησις. ἀθανασίας

          about the beautiful, because it releases the one who has it from great labour-pains. For love, Socrates,' she said, 'is not of the beautiful, as you think.' 'What then?' 'Of begetting and giving birth in the beautiful.' 'Very well,' said I. 'Quite so,' she said. 'And why of begetting? Because begetting is everlasting and immortal, as far as anything can be for a mortal. And it is necessary

          'Because to the mortal creature, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality,' she replied;

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          Readers through the ages · 1
          1. Marsilio Ficino VI, on the use of love, 'ex eius definitione' · on 206e–208b

          Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
        13. 207a

          δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιθυμεῖν μετὰ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι.

          ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα ἐδίδασκέ με, ὁπότε περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγους ποιοῖτο, καί ποτε ἤρετο τί οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, αἴτιον εἶναι τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα τὰ θηρία ἐπειδὰν γεννᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πεζὰ καὶ τὰ πτηνά, νοσοῦντά τε

          to desire immortality along with the good, from what has been agreed, if love is of the good being one's own always. From this account, then, love must be of immortality as well.' All this she taught me whenever she spoke about the things of love. And once she asked: 'What do you think, Socrates, is the cause of this love and desire? Or do you not perceive how terribly all animals are affected when they desire to beget, those that go on foot and those that fly, all of them sick

          'and if, as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good: Wherefore love is of immortality.' All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And I remember her once saying to me, 'What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire?

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          Readers through the ages · 1

            Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI, on the use of love, 'ex eius definitione' (from 206e)

            Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
          1. 207b

            πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τὸ συμμιγῆναι ἀλλήλοις, ἔπειτα περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἕτοιμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ διαμάχεσθαι τὰ ἀσθενέστατα τοῖς ἰσχυροτάτοις καὶ ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν, καὶ αὐτὰ τῷ λιμῷ παρατεινόμενα ὥστʼ ἐκεῖνα ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιοῦντα. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους, ἔφη, οἴοιτʼ ἄν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν· τὰ δὲ θηρία τίς αἰτία οὕτως ἐρωτικῶς

            and lovesick, first about mingling with one another, then about the rearing of what is born; and how for these they are ready to fight, the weakest against the strongest, and to die for them, and are themselves racked with hunger so as to rear them, and do anything else? One might suppose,' she said, 'that human beings do this from reasoning; but what is the cause of the beasts being so lovingly

            See you not how all animals, birds, as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; whereto is added the care of offspring, on whose behalf the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their young.

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          2. 207c

            διατίθεσθαι; ἔχεις λέγειν;

            καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην· ἣ δʼ εἶπεν, Διανοῇ οὖν δεινός ποτε γενήσεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτικά, ἐὰν ταῦτα μὴ ἐννοῇς;

            ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά τοι, ὦ Διοτίμα, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, παρὰ σὲ ἥκω, γνοὺς ὅτι διδασκάλων δέομαι. ἀλλά μοι λέγε καὶ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά.

            εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πιστεύεις ἐκείνου εἶναι φύσει τὸν ἔρωτα, οὗ πολλάκις ὡμολογήκαμεν, μὴ θαύμαζε. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ

            disposed? Can you say?' And again I said that I did not know. And she said: 'Do you think, then, that you will ever become formidable in the things of love, if you do not think about these?' 'But that is exactly why, Diotima, as I said just now, I have come to you, knowing that I need teachers. So tell me the cause of these things and of the rest that have to do with love.' 'If then,' she said, 'you trust that love is by nature of that which we have often agreed on, do not wonder. For here

            Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?' Again I replied that I did not know. She said to me: 'And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?' 'But I have told you already, Diotima, that my ignorance is the reason why I come to you; for I am conscious that I want a teacher; tell me then the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love.'

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          3. 207d

            τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγον ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀεί τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος. δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι ἀεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων ζῆν καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό—οἷον ἐκ παιδαρίου ὁ αὐτὸς λέγεται ἕως ἂν πρεσβύτης γένηται· οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ

            on the same account as there, mortal nature seeks, as far as it can, to be always and to be immortal. And it can do this only in this way, by generation, because it always leaves behind another, new, in place of the old. For even in the time in which each single living thing is said to live and to be the same (as a man is said to be the same from boyhood until he becomes old), though he never has the same things in himself he is still called the same, but he is always becoming new and losing others, in his hair and flesh and bones and

            'Marvel not,' she said, 'if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have several times acknowledged; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old.

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            Readers through the ages · 2

              Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI, on the use of love, 'ex eius definitione' (from 206e) · R. G. Bury, § iv (B) 2, the ebb and flow of Eros (from 203e)

              Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
            1. 207e

              αἷμα καὶ σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἤθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίαι, ἡδοναί, λῦπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται. πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι

              blood and his whole body. And not only in the body but also in the soul: ways, character, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, none of these is ever present the same in each person, but some come to be and others perish. And stranger still than these: our pieces of knowledge too

              Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation--hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, and what is still more surprising to us mortals, not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change.

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              Readers through the ages · 1

                Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI, on the use of love, 'ex eius definitione' (from 206e)

                Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
              1. 208a

                μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοί ἐσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταὐτὸν πάσχει. ὃ γὰρ καλεῖται μελετᾶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης μνήμην σῴζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ

                not only do some come to be and others perish for us, so that we are never the same even in our knowledge, but each single piece of knowledge undergoes the same. For what is called studying (meletē) exists because knowledge goes out: forgetting is the going-out of knowledge, and study, putting a new memory in place of the one that is leaving, preserves the knowledge, so that it seems to be the same. For in this way everything mortal is preserved: not by being always entirely the same, like the

                For what is implied in the word "recollection," but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind--unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another?

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                Readers through the ages · 1

                  Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI, on the use of love, 'ex eius definitione' (from 206e)

                  Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
                1. 208b

                  θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν. ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει, καὶ σῶμα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἀθάνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ. μὴ οὖν θαύμαζε εἰ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἀποβλάστημα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾷ· ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ αὕτη ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἕπεται.

                  καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας τὸν λόγον ἐθαύμασά τε καὶ εἶπον εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα, ταῦτα ὡς ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχει;

                  divine, but by what departs and grows old leaving behind another new thing such as it was. By this device, Socrates,' she said, 'the mortal partakes of immortality, both body and all the rest; the immortal does so in another way. So do not wonder if everything by nature honours its own offshoot: it is for the sake of immortality that this eagerness and this love attend on everything.' And when I heard the account I was amazed and said: 'Well, most wise Diotima, is this truly so?'

                  And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality.'

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                  Readers through the ages · 2
                  1. R. G. Bury note on 208B · on 208b

                  Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI, on the use of love, 'ex eius definitione' (from 206e)

                  Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
                2. 208c

                  καὶ ἥ, ὥσπερ οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί, εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεί γε καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζοις ἂν τῆς ἀλογίας περὶ ἃ ἐγὼ εἴρηκα εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς, ἐνθυμηθεὶς ὡς δεινῶς διάκεινται ἔρωτι τοῦ ὀνομαστοὶ γενέσθαι "καὶ κλέος ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀθάνατον καταθέσθαι ", καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου κινδύνους τε κινδυνεύειν ἕτοιμοί εἰσι πάντας ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν

                  And she, like the accomplished sophists, said: 'Know it well, Socrates. Since if you are willing to look at the love of honour among human beings, you would wonder at its unreason, unless you take to heart what I have said, and consider how terribly they are affected by the love of becoming renowned "and laying up immortal glory for all time"; and for this they are ready to run every risk, even more than for their

                  I was astonished at her words, and said: 'Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?' And she answered with all the authority of an accomplished sophist: 'Of that, Socrates, you may be assured;--think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run risks of all kinds greater far than they would have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die, for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal.

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                3. 208d

                  παίδων, καὶ χρήματα ἀναλίσκειν καὶ πόνους πονεῖν οὑστινασοῦν καὶ ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν. ἐπεὶ οἴει σύ, ἔφη, Ἄλκηστιν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἄν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα Πατρόκλῳ ἐπαποθανεῖν, ἢ προαποθανεῖν τὸν ὑμέτερον Κόδρον ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας τῶν παίδων, μὴ οἰομένους ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς πέρι ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι, ἣν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ οἶμαι ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσιν, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀμείνους

                  children, and to spend money and toil at any labour whatever, and to die for it. For do you suppose,' she said, 'that Alcestis would have died for Admetus, or Achilles have died after Patroclus, or your own Codrus have died before his time for the kingship of his children, if they had not thought that there would be an immortal memory of their excellence, which we still have now? Far from it,' she said. 'I think it is for immortal excellence and such glorious fame that all do everything, and the better they are,

                  Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal? Nay,' she said, 'I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.

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                  Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                4. 208e

                  ὦσι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀθανάτου ἐρῶσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐγκύμονες, ἔφη, κατὰ τὰ σώματα ὄντες πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον τρέπονται καὶ ταύτῃ ἐρωτικοί εἰσιν, διὰ παιδογονίας ἀθανασίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ὡς οἴονται, αὑτοῖς εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον πάντα ποριζόμενοι· οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν

                  the more so; for they love the immortal. Those, then, who are pregnant in body,' she said, 'turn rather to women and are lovers in this way, procuring for themselves by the begetting of children immortality and remembrance and happiness, as they think, for all time to come. But those who are pregnant in

                  'Those who are pregnant in the body only, betake themselves to women and beget children--this is the character of their love; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and giving them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future.

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
                5. 209a

                  ψυχήν—εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, οἳ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κυοῦσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἃ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν· τί οὖν προσήκει; φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν—ὧν δή εἰσι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πάντες γεννήτορες καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅσοι λέγονται εὑρετικοὶ εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακόσμησις, ᾗ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη—τούτων δʼ αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ

                  soul (for there are those,' she said, 'who conceive in their souls even more than in their bodies, the things it befits soul to conceive and bring forth; and what befits it? Understanding and the rest of excellence; of these all the poets are begetters, and those craftsmen who are said to be inventive; but by far the greatest and most beautiful part of understanding,' she said, 'is the ordering of cities and households, whose name is moderation and justice) when one of these, again, from

                  But souls which are pregnant--for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies--conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions?--wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice.

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 3 differ
                6. 209b

                  νέου ἐγκύμων ᾖ τὴν ψυχήν, ᾔθεος ὢν καὶ ἡκούσης τῆς ἡλικίας, τίκτειν τε καὶ γεννᾶν ἤδη ἐπιθυμῇ, ζητεῖ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ οὗτος περιιὼν τὸ καλὸν ἐν ᾧ ἂν γεννήσειεν· ἐν τῷ γὰρ αἰσχρῷ οὐδέποτε γεννήσει. τά τε οὖν σώματα τὰ καλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἀσπάζεται ἅτε κυῶν, καὶ ἂν ἐντύχῃ ψυχῇ καλῇ καὶ γενναίᾳ καὶ εὐφυεῖ, πάνυ δὴ ἀσπάζεται τὸ συναμφότερον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ οἷον χρὴ εἶναι

                  youth is pregnant in soul, being unwed, and the age has come, and he now desires to give birth and beget, he too, I think, goes about seeking the beautiful in which he might beget; for in the ugly he will never beget. So, being pregnant, he welcomes beautiful bodies rather than ugly ones; and if he meets a soul that is beautiful and noble and well-formed, he welcomes the two together very much, and with this person he at once has an abundance of words about excellence, and about what the good man ought to be

                  And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate.

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
                7. 209c

                  τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἃ ἐπιτηδεύειν, καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ παιδεύειν. ἁπτόμενος γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ὁμιλῶν αὐτῷ, ἃ πάλαι ἐκύει τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ, καὶ παρὼν καὶ ἀπὼν μεμνημένος, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν συνεκτρέφει κοινῇ μετʼ ἐκείνου, ὥστε πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν τῆς τῶν παίδων πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἴσχουσι καὶ φιλίαν βεβαιοτέραν, ἅτε καλλιόνων καὶ ἀθανατωτέρων παίδων κεκοινωνηκότες. καὶ πᾶς ἂν δέξαιτο ἑαυτῷ τοιούτους παῖδας μᾶλλον γεγονέναι ἢ τοὺς

                  and what he should practise, and he undertakes to educate him. For in touching the beautiful, I think, and keeping company with it, he brings forth and begets what he had long been carrying, remembering it whether present or absent, and he rears what is begotten in common with the other, so that such people have a much greater partnership with each other than that of children, and a firmer friendship, since they have shared in more beautiful and more immortal children. And everyone would rather have such children born to him than

                  He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring--for in deformity he will beget nothing--and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal.

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
                8. 209d

                  ἀνθρωπίνους, καὶ εἰς Ὅμηρον ἀποβλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ζηλῶν, οἷα ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν, ἃ ἐκείνοις ἀθάνατον κλέος καὶ μνήμην παρέχεται αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἔφη, οἵους Λυκοῦργος παῖδας κατελίπετο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι σωτῆρας τῆς Λακεδαίμονος καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. τίμιος δὲ παρʼ ὑμῖν καὶ Σόλων διὰ τὴν τῶν νόμων γέννησιν, καὶ ἄλλοι

                  human ones, and looking at Homer and Hesiod and the other good poets he envies them, for the offspring they leave behind, which provide them with immortal glory and remembrance, being such themselves; or, if you like,' she said, 'the children Lycurgus left behind in Lacedaemon, saviours of Lacedaemon and, one might say, of Greece. Solon too is honoured among you for his begetting of the laws, and other

                  Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say?

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
                9. 209e

                  ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις, πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα, γεννήσαντες παντοίαν ἀρετήν· ὧν καὶ ἱερὰ πολλὰ ἤδη γέγονε διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους παῖδας, διὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους οὐδενός πω.

                  ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ

                  men elsewhere in many places, among Greeks and barbarians, who have displayed many beautiful works, begetting excellence of every kind; many shrines have been raised to them for such children, but for human children to no one yet. Into these things of love, Socrates, perhaps even you

                  There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind; and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children.

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Readers through the ages · 1
                  1. Floyer Sydenham on 'the final and epoptic mysteries' · on 209e–210a

                  Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                10. 210a

                  μυηθείης· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ, οὐκ οἶδʼ εἰ οἷός τʼ ἂν εἴης. ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω· πειρῶ δὲ ἕπεσθαι, ἂν οἷός τε ᾖς. δεῖ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄρχεσθαι μὲν νέον ὄντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος, ἑνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν λόγους καλούς, ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι ὅτι τὸ κάλλος

                  might be initiated; but the final and highest mysteries (the epoptic), for whose sake these too exist, if one goes about them rightly, I do not know whether you would be able for them. Still, I will speak,' she said, 'and spare no eagerness; and you try to follow, if you can. The one who goes rightly to this matter must begin, while young, by going to beautiful bodies; and first, if the guide guides him rightly, he must love one body and there beget beautiful words; then he must understand that the beauty

                  'These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms; and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only--out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another; and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is and the same!

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Readers through the ages · 6
                  1. Marsilio Ficino VI.15 · on 210a

                  2. Plotinus I.6.1 · on 210a–210c

                  3. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (tr. Stanley) Book III, the six degrees · on 210a–211c

                  4. Baldassare Castiglione (tr. Hoby) Book IV, the stair of love · on 210a–210b

                  5. R. G. Bury § iv (B) 3(a), the final mysteries · on 210a–210c

                  Also on this section: Floyer Sydenham, on 'the final and epoptic mysteries' (from 209e)

                  Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                11. 210b

                  τὸ ἐπὶ ὁτῳοῦν σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ δεῖ διώκειν τὸ ἐπʼ εἴδει καλόν, πολλὴ ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἕν τε καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος· τοῦτο δʼ ἐννοήσαντα καταστῆναι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐραστήν, ἑνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὴς ὢν τὴν ψυχήν τις κἂν σμικρὸν ἄνθος

                  in any one body is sister to that in another body, and that if one must pursue beauty of form, it is great folly not to regard the beauty in all bodies as one and the same; and having understood this, he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and relax this intense love of one, looking down on it and thinking it small. After this he must consider the beauty in souls more precious than that in the body, so that if someone is decent in soul even if he has little bloom,

                  And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form.

                  Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                  Readers through the ages · 5
                  1. Plotinus I.6.9 · on 210b–212a

                  Also on this section: Plotinus, I.6.1 (from 210a) · Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (tr. Stanley), Book III, the six degrees (from 210a) · Baldassare Castiglione (tr. Hoby), Book IV, the stair of love (from 210a) · R. G. Bury, § iv (B) 3(a), the final mysteries (from 210a)

                  Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
                12. 210c

                  ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν λόγους τοιούτους καὶ ζητεῖν, οἵτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὖ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν καὶ τοῦτʼ ἰδεῖν ὅτι πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συγγενές ἐστιν, ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὸν σμικρόν τι ἡγήσηται εἶναι· μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν, ἵνα ἴδῃ αὖ ἐπιστημῶν κάλλος, καὶ βλέπων πρὸς

                  it is enough for him, and he loves him and cares for him and gives birth to and seeks such words as will make the young better; so that he is compelled, in turn, to behold the beauty in practices and laws, and to see that all of it is akin to itself, so that he will think the beauty of the body a small thing. After the practices he must be led to the kinds of knowledge, so that he may see, in turn, the beauty of knowledge, and, looking now toward

                  Readers through the ages · 3

                    Also on this section: Plotinus, I.6.1 (from 210a) · Plotinus, I.6.9 (from 210b) · R. G. Bury, § iv (B) 3(a), the final mysteries (from 210a)

                    Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
                  1. 210d

                    πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλὸν μηκέτι τὸ παρʼ ἑνί, ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνός, δουλεύων φαῦλος ᾖ καὶ σμικρολόγος, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεὶς καὶ αὐξηθεὶς κατίδῃ τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἥ ἐστι καλοῦ

                    beauty in its breadth, no longer, like a household servant, cherishing the beauty of one boy or one human being or one practice, be a slave, paltry and small-minded; but turned toward the great open sea of the beautiful, and contemplating it, he may give birth to many beautiful and magnificent words and thoughts in unstinting philosophy, until, strengthened and grown there, he catches sight of a single knowledge of this kind, which is of a beauty

                    So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere.

                    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                    Readers through the ages · 1
                    1. Baldassare Castiglione (tr. Hoby) Book IV, the heavenly beauty · on 210d–211b

                    Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                  2. 210e

                    τοιοῦδε. πειρῶ δέ μοι, ἔφη, τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. ὃς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ παιδαγωγηθῇ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν, πρῶτον μὲν

                    such as this. Try,' she said, 'to pay me attention as closely as you can. For whoever has been guided thus far toward the things of love, beholding beautiful things in order and rightly, coming now toward the end of the things of love, will suddenly catch sight of something wondrous, beautiful in its nature: that very thing, Socrates, for the sake of which all the earlier labours were: first,

                    To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention:

                    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                    Readers through the ages · 1
                    1. Marsilio Ficino VI.18 · on 210e–211b

                    Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                  3. 211a

                    ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δʼ αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδʼ ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν· οὐδʼ αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα μετέχει, οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ που ὂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινι, οἷον ἐν ζῴῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ

                    always being, and neither coming to be nor passing away, neither growing nor waning; then, not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another, nor at one time and not at another, nor beautiful in relation to this and ugly in relation to that, nor beautiful here and ugly there, as being beautiful to some and ugly to others. Nor again will the beautiful appear to him as a face or hands or anything else the body partakes of, nor as some account or some knowledge, nor as being anywhere in something else, as in a living creature or in earth or in heaven

                    'He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils)--a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things.

                    Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                    Readers through the ages · 2

                      Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI.18 (from 210e) · Baldassare Castiglione (tr. Hoby), Book IV, the heavenly beauty (from 210d)

                      Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 3 differ
                    1. 211b

                      ἢ ἔν τῳ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ μεθʼ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. ὅταν δή τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους. τοῦτο γὰρ δή ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ

                      or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, always being of one form; and all the other beautiful things partake of it in some such way that, while the others come to be and pass away, it becomes neither more nor less and undergoes nothing at all. So when someone, going up from these things through rightly loving boys, begins to see that beauty, he would almost touch the end. For this is what it is to go rightly

                      He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end.

                      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                      Readers through the ages · 3
                      1. Plotinus I.6.7 · on 211b–211e

                      Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI.18 (from 210e) · Baldassare Castiglione (tr. Hoby), Book IV, the heavenly beauty (from 210d)

                      Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                    2. 211c

                      τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἰέναι ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι

                      to the things of love, or to be led by another: beginning from these beautiful things here, to go up always for the sake of that beauty, as if using steps of a stair, from one to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, and from beautiful bodies to beautiful practices, and from practices to beautiful learnings, and from learnings to end in that learning which is the learning of nothing other than that beauty itself, and in the end to know what it is,

                      And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.

                      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                      Readers through the ages · 3
                      1. R. G. Bury apparatus on 211C · on 211c

                      2. Benjamin Jowett on the ladder · on 211c

                      Also on this section: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (tr. Stanley), Book III, the six degrees (from 210a)

                      Synthesis of the readings · 5 agree · 4 differ
                    3. 211d

                      καλόν. ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. ὃ ἐάν ποτε ἴδῃς, οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδάς τε καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοι εἶναι, οὓς νῦν ὁρῶν ἐκπέπληξαι καὶ ἕτοιμος εἶ καὶ σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, ὁρῶντες τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ συνόντες ἀεὶ αὐτοῖς, εἴ πως οἷόν τʼ ἦν, μήτʼ ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν, ἀλλὰ θεᾶσθαι μόνον καὶ συνεῖναι. τί δῆτα, ἔφη, οἰόμεθα, εἴ τῳ γένοιτο

                      the beautiful itself. There, if anywhere, dear Socrates,' said the stranger from Mantinea, 'life is worth living for a human being: in beholding the beautiful itself. If you ever see it, it will not seem to you to be measured against gold and clothing and beautiful boys and young men, the sight of whom now strikes you out of yourself; and you and many others are ready, seeing your beloveds and always being with them, if it were somehow possible, neither to eat nor to drink but only to gaze and be with them. What then,' she said, 'do we think, if it should be given to someone

                      This, my dear Socrates,' said the stranger of Mantineia, 'is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible--you only want to look at them and to be with them.

                      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                      Readers through the ages · 2
                      1. Marsilio Ficino VI.19 · on 211d–212a

                      Also on this section: Plotinus, I.6.7 (from 211b)

                      Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                    4. 211e

                      αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναιτο μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν; ἆρʼ οἴει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον

                      to see the beautiful itself, pure, clean, unmixed, not infected with human flesh and colours and much other mortal nonsense, but could catch sight of the divine beautiful itself, of one form? Do you think,' she said, 'that it is a paltry life

                      But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty--the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life--thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine?

                      Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                      Readers through the ages · 2

                        Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI.19 (from 211d) · Plotinus, I.6.7 (from 211b)

                        Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                      1. 212a

                        γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;

                        for a human being to look there, to behold that with what one must behold it, and to be with it? Or do you not consider,' she said, 'that there alone, seeing the beautiful with that to which it is visible, will it be given him to give birth not to images of excellence, since he is not touching an image, but to true excellence, since he is touching the true? And to one who has given birth to true excellence and nourished it, it belongs to become dear to the gods, and, if to any human being, to him to be immortal?'

                        Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?'

                        Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                        Readers through the ages · 3
                        1. Plotinus I.6.8 · on 212a

                        Also on this section: Marsilio Ficino, VI.19 (from 211d) · Plotinus, I.6.9 (from 210b)

                        Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                      2. 212b

                        ταῦτα δή, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἔφη μὲν Διοτίμα, πέπεισμαι δʼ ἐγώ· πεπεισμένος δὲ πειρῶμαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πείθειν ὅτι τούτου τοῦ κτήματος τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει συνεργὸν ἀμείνω Ἔρωτος οὐκ ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως λάβοι. διὸ δὴ ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα τὸν ἔρωτα τιμᾶν, καὶ αὐτὸς τιμῶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ καὶ διαφερόντως ἀσκῶ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρακελεύομαι, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἐγκωμιάζω τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν τοῦ Ἔρωτος καθʼ ὅσον οἷός τʼ εἰμί. τοῦτον

                        This, Phaedrus and the rest of you, is what Diotima said, and I have been persuaded; and being persuaded I try to persuade others too that for this possession one could not easily find a better fellow-worker for human nature than Love. That is why I say that every man must honour Love, and I myself honour the things of love and practise them above all, and I urge them on the others, and now and always I praise the power and courage of Love as far as I am able. This

                        Such, Phaedrus--and I speak not only to you, but to all of you--were the words of Diotima; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a helper better than love: And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honour him as I myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever.

                        Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                        Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ
                      3. 212c

                        οὖν τὸν λόγον, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς ἔρωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅτι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε.

                        εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ Σωκράτους τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὅτι ἐμνήσθη αὐτοῦ λέγων ὁ Σωκράτης περὶ τοῦ λόγου· καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὔλειον θύραν κρουομένην πολὺν ψόφον παρασχεῖν ὡς κωμαστῶν, καὶ αὐλητρίδος φωνὴν ἀκούειν. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα, παῖδες, φάναι,

                        account, then, Phaedrus, consider it spoken, if you like, as an encomium of Love; if not, call it whatever and however you like to call it. When Socrates had said this, the others praised him, and Aristophanes was trying to say something, because Socrates in speaking had mentioned him and his account; and suddenly the courtyard door was knocked, making a great noise as of revellers, and they heard the voice of a flute-girl. So Agathon said: 'Boys,

                        The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please. When Socrates had done speaking, the company applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard.

                        Jowett (1892)Divided into sections automatically; approximate.

                        Synthesis of the readings · 4 agree · 4 differ

                      Greek: Burnet's Oxford text as digitised by Perseus (CC BY-SA 4.0). Lemmas and morphology: GLAUx, automatic (CC BY-SA 4.0), a few corrected and listed on the About page. The AI translation and word glosses were written by AI (Claude) and are marked. The published translations (Ficino (1484), Sydenham (1767), Schleiermacher (1807), Shelley (1818), Cousin (1831), Burges (1850), Jowett (1892), Chambry (1919), Lamb (Loeb 1925)) are public domain; Lamb's only in the US. This page is share-alike: the Perseus, GLAUx, LSJ and Wiktionary layers are CC BY-SA. How this text was established.