The commentators side by side

﴿فلما علمناه بنا ومنا نسبنا إليه كل ما نسبناه إلينا﴾

من الكمالات،لا النقائص، إلا ما نسبه الحق إلى نفسه منها. وقوله: (وبذلك وردت الأخبار الإلهية) مثل: "إن الله خلق آدم على صورته." و "لنعلم من يتبع الرسول ممن ينقلب على عقبيه " . و "مرضت فلم تعدني". وغير ذلك من "القرض" و "الاستهزاء" و "السخرية" و "الضحك"، كقوله: "واقرضوا الله قرضا حسنا". و "الله يستهزء بهم ويمدهم في طغيانهم يعمهون". و"سخر الله منهم". و "ضحك الله مما فعلتها البارحة". وقوله

of perfections, not deficiencies, except what the Real Himself attributed to Himself of them. His saying: ("and it is on this account that the divine reports have come") such as: "Indeed God created Adam upon His form"; "that We may know who follows the Messenger from him who turns upon his heels"; "I fell ill and you did not visit Me"; and other than that from "lending," "mockery," "derision," and "laughter," as in His saying: "and lend to God a goodly loan"; "God mocks them and prolongs them in their transgression, wandering blindly"; "God derided them"; "God laughed at what you did last night." His saying

﴿فلمّا علمناه بنا﴾

أي بوجودنا وحقائقن ( ومنّا ) أي من أوصافنا ولواحق حقائقنا

i.e., through our existence and our realities (and from us) i.e., from our attributes and the concomitants of our realities

﴿فلما علمناه بنا﴾

باعتبار معنى الإلية أو السببية (ومنا) باعتبار معنى المنشئية (نسبنا إليه تعالي كلما نسبناه إلينا) من الأوصاف الكمالية لا ما فيه توهم نقص إلا ما نسبه الحق تعالى إلى نفسه كالمرض والقرض والاستهزاء والسخرية و غيره (وبذلك) ، أي بتوصيفه سبحانه كما نسبناه إلين

in respect of the meaning of causal agency (ilhiyya) or instrumentality, (and from us) in respect of the meaning of origination — (we ascribed to Him, exalted, whatever we ascribed to ourselves) of the perfections, not what implies deficiency, except what the Real, exalted, ascribed to Himself, such as sickness, lending, mockery, derision, and the like. (And by that) — i.e., by His describing Himself, glory be to Him, just as we ascribed it to ourselves...

﴿فلما علمناه بنا ومنا نسبنا اليه كل ما نسبناه الينا﴾

پس وقتاکم بزحتی نزم ایله وبزدن بیلدک ایسه اکانسبت اتدک هر وصفیکه بزه نسبت ایتدک حیوة وعلم وارادت وقدرت وسمع وبصر وکلام کبی بوتقدیر اوزره بزده ظاهره اولان صفات الیهیه ایله بزم اتصافن حسبیله بزاول صفات ایله حقی وصف ایدوب کندی نفوسمزه نسبت ایتد یکمزی اکانسبت ایده وزد یمکدر اما مکر واستهزا وکید وفرح وتأذی کبی اولان صفات خلقیه که بزه نسبت اولنورلر براعتبار ایله حقه دخی نسبت اولنورلر نته کم السنه رسل اوزره اخبارات الهیه ده وارده اولدی* پس بزم وجودات متعینه من آنک تجلیاتی مظاهر یدرو صوریمز آنک نوری ظهور بنک مرایاسیدر* پس بزم وجوداتمز آنک وجودی ایدوکی معلوم اولد قده بزه نسبت اولنان صفات اکانسبت اولنور* پس معنی بویله اولور وقتا کم زحقی بزم ایله وبزدن بیلدک ایسه بزه نسبت ایتد یکمز جمیع صفات ربانیه بی اکا نسبت ایتدک)

So when we knew the Real through us and from us, we attributed to Him every attribute that we attributed to ourselves, such as life, knowledge, will, power, hearing, sight and speech. On this supposition it means: according to our being qualified by the divine attributes that are manifest in us, we describe the Real by those attributes and attribute to Him what we attributed to our own selves. As for the creaturely attributes that are attributed to us, such as scheming, mockery, plotting, joy and being hurt, they too are attributed to the Real in one respect, as has come in the divine reports upon the tongues of the messengers. So our mutaʿayyin (determined) existences are the maẓāhir (loci of manifestation) of His tajalliyāt (self-disclosures), and our forms are the mirrors of the ẓuhūr (manifestation) of His light. So when it is known that our existences are His existence, the attributes attributed to us are attributed to Him. So the meaning becomes thus: when we knew the Real through us and from us, we attributed to Him all the lordly attributes that we attributed to ourselves.)

﴿نسبنا إليه كلّ ما نسبناه إلينا﴾

ضرورة أنّ ذلك لو لم يكن مشتركا ما علم به . ثمّ إنّ الواقفين في مواقف العقائد التقليديّة ، والعاكفين لدى الرسوم الوضعيّة والأصول الاصطلاحيّة إذ لم يتفطَّنوا لذلك الاستدلال ، قاصرين عن الوصول إلى طريقه الموصل إلى الحقّ ، جاهلين به وبحقيّته ، حائرين في ذلك ، أرشدهم إليه بأنّ هذا الاستدلال ليس ممّا اختلقه أهل الذوق ، إذ به نطق الزبر المنزلة السماويّة على قلوب القوابل لنا

necessarily, since that could not be known unless it were shared. Then, as for those who stand at the stations of traditional creeds and cling to conventional formulas and technical principles, since they did not grasp that mode of reasoning, being incapable of reaching the path leading to the Real, ignorant of it and of its veracity, bewildered in that regard — he [the Shaykh] guided them to it, [showing] that this mode of reasoning is not something invented by the people of tasting (ahl al-dhawq), since by it spoke the revealed scriptures sent down upon the hearts of those receptive [to it] on our behalf

﴿نسبنا إليه﴾

أي وصفناه لكل

that is, we described Him with every

﴿ما نسبناه إلينا﴾

من الأوصاف كالعلم والحياة والقدرة وغيرها لا النقائص إلا ما ينسبه الحق إلى نفسه .(وبذلك) أي و بوصفنا الحق بكل ما نسبناه إلين

of the attributes (awṣāf), such as knowledge, life, power, and others—not the imperfections (naqāʾiṣ), except what the Real ascribes to Himself. (And by that) that is, by our describing the Real with everything we ascribed to ourselves

﴿وبذلك وردت الأخبار الإلهية على ألسنة التراجم إلينا ، فوصف نفسه لنا بن ، فإذا شهدناه شهدنا نفوسنا ، وإذا شهدنا شهد نفسه﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

قال العبد أيّده الله تعالى به : اعلم : أنّ الله علم نفسه ذات نسب مستهلكة الأعيان في أحدية ذاته وهويّته المطلقة ، وأراد أو أحبّ أن يظهرها في الوجود العيني ، أو يظهر هويّتها فيها بحسبها ، وكانت متمايزة الأعيان في التعين بالعلم الذاتي كعلم الواحد العالم بأنّه ذو نسب ونسب نسب . فلمّا تعلَّقت المشيّة بإظهار هذه النسب في الوجود ، تجلَّى الله الجواد الرحمن المحسن الوهّاب بإفاضة الوجود من ينبوع الجود ، فأوجدها في أعيانها لها في عرصة الشهود. وبعد تحقّق هذه النسب الحقيقة ، إنّ الحقائق النسبية فما لها أن تدلّ على الحق المطلق ، أو نشهده إلَّا من خصوصها وبها ، قد ظهر الوجود فيها بحسبها .فلولا أنّ في الوجود صلاحية الظهور في كل حقيقة أو نسبة منها بحسبها وعلى صورتها ، لما ظهر بذلك كذلك ، ويضاف إذ ذاك إلى الوجود الحق الظاهر في كل حقيقة منها على صورتها ما يضاف إلى تلك الصورة ، فافهم . إذا فهمت ، فهمت .فاعلم أنّا نحن صور تلك النسب الذاتية والشؤون الغيبية ، اقتضانا بالذات من كونه إلها موصوفا بالموجدية ، منعوتا بالربوبية ، فلمّا وصف نفسه لنا بنا أعني بالنسب والأسماء والصفات التي نحن صورها وأحالنا في المعرفة والعلم به علينا بقوله الحق ، على لسان رسول الصدق :"من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربّه ".فعلمنا به أنفسنا ، وعلمنا من علمنا بنا علمنا به ، فما علمناه إلَّا بنا وما علمنا ما علمنا إلَّا به ، فما علمنا إلَّا إيّاه به منه فيه .وما علمنا أنفسنا إلَّا فيه عينه ، فنحن فيه هو عينه ، وهو فينا نحن أعياننا ، لأنّا فيه شؤونه الذاتية ونسب نسب الإنّيّة الغيبية ، وهي الهوية العينية ، فإذا شهدنا فيه شهد نفسه .وإذا شهدناه فيه أو فينا شهدنا أنفسنا ، فما نحن إلَّا وجودات تعيّنية وتجلَّيات وجوديّة ، نفسية ، ظاهرة بخصوصيات أعياننا وماهياتنا التي هي شؤونه الذاتية ونسبه أو نسب نسبه الغيبية الوحدانية ، فافهم .قال رضي الله عنه

, He witnesses Himself.] The servant — may God support him — said: Know that God knew Himself as possessing relations (nisab) whose entities (aʿyān) are absorbed/annihilated in the oneness (aḥadiyya) of His Essence and His absolute identity (huwiyya), and He willed or loved to manifest them in concrete existence (al-wujūd al-ʿaynī), or to manifest their identity therein according to them, while they were distinct in entity within the entification (taʿayyun) by essential knowledge, like the knowledge of the One who knows that He possesses relations and relations of relations. So when the [divine] will attached itself to manifesting these relations in existence, God — the Generous, the All-Merciful, the Beneficent, the Bestower — disclosed Himself (tajallā) by the effusion (fayḍ) of existence from the fountain of generosity, and thus brought them into existence in their entities, for them, in the arena of witnessing. And after the realization of these relational realities — for the relational realities have no capacity to indicate the Absolute Real, nor can we witness Him, except through their particularity and by them — existence has manifested within them according to them. For were it not that existence has the fitness (ṣalāḥiyya) to manifest in every reality or relation thereof according to it and in its form, it would not have manifested thus; and at that point, whatever is ascribed to that form is [also] ascribed to the true existence (al-wujūd al-ḥaqq) manifest in each of these realities in its form. So understand. If you understand, you understand. Know that we are the forms of those essential relations and the nonmanifest affairs (shuʾūn ghaybiyya), which required us essentially by virtue of His being a God described by bringing-into-existence (al-mūjidiyya), characterized by lordship (al-rubūbiyya); so when He described Himself to us by us — I mean, by the relations, names, and attributes of which we are the forms — and referred us, in [attaining] knowledge and cognizance of Him, to ourselves, by His true word upon the tongue of the truthful Messenger: 'Whoever knows himself knows his Lord' — we came to know ourselves through Him, and from our knowledge of ourselves we came to know Him; so we knew Him only by us, and we did not know what we knew except by Him; so we knew none but Him, by Him, from Him, in Him. And we did not know ourselves except in Him, as His very self; so we, in Him, are He Himself, and He, in us, is our very entities (aʿyān), because we, in Him, are His essential affairs (shuʾūn) and relations of the relations of the nonmanifest ipseity (al-inniyya al-ghaybiyya), which is the entified identity (al-huwiyya al-ʿayniyya). So when we are witnessed in Him, He witnesses Himself; and when we witness Him in Him or in us, we witness ourselves; for we are nothing but entified existences (wujūdāt taʿayyuniyya) and existential, self-related self-disclosures (tajalliyāt), manifest through the particularities of our entities and quiddities, which are His essential affairs and His relations, or the relations of His nonmanifest unitary relations. So understand. He, may God be pleased with him, said:

﴿وبذلك وردت الإخبارات الإلهيّة على ألسنة التراجم إلينا﴾

فإنّ تلك الألسنة هي صور وجوه العبيد المحدثين

to us upon the tongues of interpreters] for those tongues are the forms of the faces of the originated servants

﴿وردت الأخبار الإلهية على ألسنة التراجم﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

من الأنبياء والأولياء وانتهت

from among the prophets and the friends (of God), and they arrived...

﴿وردت الإخبارات الإلهية﴾

من الآيات والأحاديث النبوية

from the verses and prophetic ḥadīths

﴿وبذلك وردت الاخبارات الالهية علي السنة التراجم الينا﴾

وبوطریق اوزره یعنی بزکندی وجود مزله حقک وجود نه استدلال ایدوب اکامعرفتمزک حصولی نفسمره معرفتمزک حصولندن اولدیغی اوزره بزه السنه انبیا اوزره اخبارات الهیه وارده اولدی (من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه) (ومن یطع الرسول فقد اطاع الله* ومارمیت اذرمیت ولکن الله رمی) (و بذلک قولی نسبنا الیه کل ما نسبناه الینا قولنه اشارت اولمق جائز در یعنی صفات کمالیه وصفات خلقیه دن بزه نسبت اولنان صفات ایله حقک اتصافی اوزره* السنه رسل اوزره• بزه اخبارات الهیه وارده اولدی* والاحق تعالی ذاتیله صفات محدثات ایله اتصافدن منزهدر وعقول دخی حق ایجون صفات محدثانی محال کورر وحقک صفات محدثات ایله اتصافی حقنده وارده اولان اخبارات الهیه بونلردر قال الله تعالی (الله یستهزئ بهم* واقرضوا الله فرضا حسنا* وقال* والله خیر الماکرین* ان الذین یؤذون الله ورسوله واکید کیدا* وقال* مرضت فلم تعد فی وجعت فلم تطعمنی) وبونلردن غیری صفات محدثات ایله مظاهر انسانیه ده حقک ظهوری اعتبار یله اتصافی السنة رسل انبیا اوزره وارده در* پس صفات الهیه بزم مرایای وجوداتمزده ظاهره در وصفات محدثه دخی بزم وجودات متعینه مزله ثابته در پس بزم وجود مز حقک وجود ندن مفاض اولمغله بلکه آنک وجودی بزم وجود مزده ظاهر ومتجلی اولمغله بزه نسبت اولنان شئ اکانسبت اولنور

And in this way — that is, according as we infer the being of the Real by our own being, and our attaining knowledge of Him comes from our attaining knowledge of ourselves — the divine reports came to us upon the tongues of the prophets: (“Whoever knows himself knows his Lord”) (“And whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed God” (Q 4:80); “And you did not throw when you threw, but God threw” (Q 8:17)). (It is also permissible that his words “wa-bi-dhālika” (and in this way) be an allusion to his words “we attributed to Him all that we attributed to ourselves”; that is, the divine reports came to us upon the tongues of the messengers concerning the Real's being qualified by the attributes attributed to us, of the attributes of perfection and the creaturely attributes. Otherwise, God Most High in His essence is transcendent above being qualified by the attributes of originated things, and the intellects too see the attributes of originated things as impossible for the Real. And the divine reports that have come concerning the Real's being qualified by the attributes of originated things are these: God Most High said: (“God mocks them” (Q 2:15); “and lend God a goodly loan” (Q 73:20); and He said: “and God is the best of schemers” (Q 3:54); “Truly those who hurt God and His Messenger” (Q 33:57); “and I plot a plot” (Q 86:16); and He said: “I was sick and you did not visit Me, I was hungry and you did not feed Me”). And besides these, [the Real's] being qualified by the attributes of originated things, in respect of the Real's ẓuhūr (manifestation) in human maẓāhir (loci of manifestation), has come upon the tongues of the messengers and prophets. So the divine attributes are manifest in the mirrors of our existences, and the attributes of originated things are also established through our determined existences. So since our being is effused from the being of the Real — rather, since His being is manifest and self-disclosed in our being — the thing attributed to us is attributed to Him.

﴿على ألسنة التراجم﴾

من الأنبياء والأولياء. وقوله

i.e., the prophets and the friends (of God). His saying

﴿على ألسنة التراجم﴾

وهي سنة الأنبياء عليهم السلام فوصف الحق نفسه أي ذاته بكل ما نسبناه إلينا في الإخبارات الإلهية (لنا) لأجل استدلالنا عليه .فيكون قوله: (بنا) متعلقة بالاستدلال لقوله: (فاستدللنا) بنا عليه أو لأجل هدايتنا إلى طريق العلم والشهود.فيكون قوله : بن متعلقة بوصف فإنا خلقنا على صفة الله تعالى فكنا عبارة عنها في التحقيق .فكان وصفه نفسه بصفة عين وصفه نفسه بنا أو معناه وصف بنفسه بنا أو بصفاتنا فإذا وصلنا بهذا الاستدلال إلى الحق شهدناه

which is the custom (sunna) of the prophets, peace be upon them. So the Real described Himself—that is, His Essence (dhāt)—with everything we ascribed to ourselves, in the divine reports, (for us) for the sake of our inferring proof of Him. Thus his statement 'by us (bi-nā)' is connected to the inference in his statement 'so we inferred (fa-stadlalnā) by us upon Him,' or it is for the sake of our guidance to the path of knowledge and witnessing. In that case his statement 'by us' is connected to 'description,' for we were created upon the attribute of God, Most High, so we were, in verified reality (fī l-taḥqīq), an expression of it. Thus His describing Himself with an attribute is identical to His describing Himself by us, or its meaning is: He described Himself by us, or by our attributes. So when we arrive, through this inference, at the Real, we witness Him

﴿إلينا فوصف﴾

أي الحق. وقوله

i.e., the Real. His saying

﴿فوصف نفسه لنا بنا﴾

حيث تبيّن أنّا نحن عين أوصافه من العلم والحياة وما يتبعهما . وقد ظهر من ذلك العين ما ورد في التنزيل : " سَنُرِيهِمْ آياتِنا في الآفاقِ وَفي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّه ُ الْحَقُّ ". " وَما تَشاؤُنَ إِلَّا أَنْ يَشاءَ الله ". و " من عرف نفسه فقد عرف رب "

since it became clear that we are the very entity (ʿayn) of His attributes — knowledge, life, and what follows from them. And from that very entity there appeared what is stated in the revealed Text: "We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in themselves, until it becomes clear to them that He is the Real"; and "You do not will except that God wills"; and "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord."

﴿إلينا فوصف … نفسه لنا بنا﴾

أي بصفاتنا من أتا عين الأوصاف ، (فإذا شهدناه تعالی) بصفاته

— i.e., by our attributes, since we are the very essence (ʿayn) of the attributes. (So when we witness Him, exalted) by His attributes...

﴿فوصف نفسه لنا بنا فاذا شهدناه شهدنا نفوسنا﴾

پس حق تعالی کندی نفسنی بزم اوصافزله بزه وصف ایلدی یعنی شول نسب واسماء وصفات ایله کندی نفسنی آنلرایله بزه وصف ایلد یکه بزآنلرک صوری یز وآنلر بزده ظاهره در* حیوة وعلم وارادت وقدرت کی* پس چونکم بزآنی بروصف ایله مشاهده ایتسک اول وصف ایله کندی نفسمزی مشاهده ایدرز زیرا آنک وجودی مر أننده ظاهر اولان شی بزم اوصافمزدر

So God Most High described Himself to us by our attributes; that is, He described Himself to us by those relations, names and attributes of which we are the forms and which are manifest in us, such as life, knowledge, will and power. So when we witness Him with an attribute, we witness our own selves with that attribute, because the thing that is manifest in the mirror of His being is our attributes.

﴿نفسه لنا بنا﴾

أي بصفاتنا، لماكانت عائدة إلى عيننا الثابتة من وجه، كما مر، قال: (بنا). وقوله

i.e., by our attributes, since they revert, from one aspect, to our fixed entity (ʿayn thābita), as was mentioned before; hence he said "by us." His saying

﴿فإذا شهدناه شهدنا نفوسنا﴾

لأن ذواتنا عين ذاته لا مغايرة بينهما إلا بالتعين والإطلاق. أو شهدنا نفوسنا فيه لأنه مرآة ذواتنا. وقوله: (و إذا شهدنا) أي الحق. وقوله

because our essences are identical with His Essence (dhāt), there being no difference between them except through entification (taʿayyun) and absoluteness (iṭlāq); or: we witness ourselves in Him, because He is the mirror of our essences. His saying "and when we witness" [means] the Real. His saying

﴿فإذا شهدناه شهدنا نفوسنا، وإذا شهدنا هو شهد نفسه﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

ولا سيما قوله

"So when we witness Him, we witness ourselves, and when we witness Him, He witnesses Himself" — especially his saying

﴿فإذا شهدناه﴾

في مواقف قرب النوافل ( شهدنا ) في مشاهد سمعنا وبصرنا بما ورد : « كنت سمعه الذي يسمع به ، وبصره الذي يبصر به »

at the stations of the proximity of supererogatory works (qurb al-nawāfil), (we witness) — in the loci of witnessing of our hearing and our sight — that which is reported: "I am his hearing by which he hears, and his sight by which he sees"

﴿فإذا شهدناه شهدنا فيه نفوسنا﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

لوجودنا فيه لكونه متصفا بنا وهو رؤية الحد في المحدود .أو شهدنا نفوسنا في التحقيق لأشهدناه لأنه من حيث اتصافه بنا عین ذواتنا لا غيرنا.وهو رؤية الحد متحدا بالمحدود .يعني الشاهد والمشهود واحد في هذه المشاهدة وهو الاستدلال من الأثر إلى المؤثر ومشاهدة الأثر نفسه في المؤثر او لتستره عنا بنا فلا يقع نظرنا إلا علينا .لا عليه (وإذا شهدنا الحق) بمشاهدتنا إياه (شهد فينا نفسه) .لذلك قال : إني أشد شوقا إليه لأن هذه المشاهدة له لا نحصل بدون مشاهدتنا إياه لأنه فينا مظهره .وهو رؤية المحدود في الحد أو شهد نفسه كما مر أو رؤية المحدود متحدة بالحد يعني لا اثنينية من هذا الوجه أيضا .فانظر إلى المرآة كيف نجد فإنك إذا نظرت إليها وشهدت فيها صورتك فقد شهدت عينك فهو قوله.وإذا شهدنا شهد نفسه وإذا شهدت صورتك ونظرت إليك فقد شهدت نفسك فهي عينك، وأنت عينها، فهو قوله : وإذا شهدناه شهدنا نفوسنا.ولما بين "الاتحاد" السر الساري بين العبد والرب من هذين الوجهين شرع في بيان الافتراق فقال

because of our existence in Him, since He is qualified by us—and this is 'the seeing of the delimitation (ḥadd) in the delimited (maḥdūd).' Or: we witness our own selves in reality (fī l-taḥqīq) when we witness Him, because He, insofar as He is qualified by us, is identical to our very essences (dhawāt), not other than us. And this is 'the seeing of the delimitation as united with the delimited'—meaning the witness (shāhid) and the witnessed (mashhūd) are one in this witnessing, which is the inference from the effect (athar) to the one exerting effect (muʾaththir), and the witnessing of the effect itself in the one exerting effect. Or: because of His being veiled from us by us, so our gaze falls only upon ourselves, not upon Him. (And when we witness the Real) through our witnessing of Him, (He witnesses, in us, His own self)—for that reason he [the author] said: 'I am even more desirous of Him,' because this witnessing of Him is not attained without our witnessing of Him, since He, in us, is His locus of manifestation (maẓhar)—and this is 'the seeing of the delimited in the delimitation,' or He witnesses His own self as mentioned before, or 'the seeing of the delimited as united with the delimitation'—meaning there is no duality (ithnayniyya) from this respect either. So consider the mirror: how do we find [this]? For when you look into it and witness your form in it, you have witnessed your very self (ʿaynaka)—this is his statement, 'and when we witness, He witnesses His own self.' And when you witness your form and look at it, you have witnessed your own self, for it is your very self (ʿaynuka), and you are its very self (ʿaynuhā)—this is his statement, 'and when we witness Him, we witness our own selves.' And when he had explained 'union' (al-ittiḥād)—the secret pervading (al-sirr al-sārī) between the servant and the Lord—from these two respects, he began to explain separation (al-iftirāq), saying:

﴿نفوسنا وإذا شهدنا﴾

في مواقف قرب الفرائض

at the stations of the proximity of obligatory works (qurb al-farāʾiḍ)

﴿شهدنا نفوسنا﴾

لأن نفوسنا عين تلك الصفات ظهرت في مرتبة أخرى (وإذا شهدنا بالحق) سبحانه

, for our selves are the very essence of those attributes, appearing at another level (martaba). (And when we witness by the Real), glory be to Him...

﴿واذا شهد ناشهد نفسه﴾

وچونکم حق بزی بروصف ایله مشاهده ایتسه کندی نفسنی اول وصف ایله مشاهده ایدر* زیرا اول وصف آنک وصفیدر که انکله بزه بزم استعداد مز حسبیله تجلی ایلدی* پس بزآنی مشاهده ایتسک کندی نفو سمزی مشاهد . ایدرز زیرا آنک وجودی مراً تنده ظاهره اولان بزم اوصافزدر واول بزی مشاهده ایتسه کندی نفسنی مشاهده ایدر «زیرا بزم نفوسمز مرایا سنده ظهور ایدن آنک اوصافیدر* پس بزم اطاعتمز آنک اطاعتیدر وبزم رمیمز آنک رمییدر وبزم کندی نفوسمزه معرفتمز آنک وجودنه معرفتمز در زیرا مقتضای تحقیق اوزره وقتاکه حق تعالی کندی ذاتنی مستهلکة الاعیان نسب صاحبی مشاهده ایتدی ایسه پس اعیان غیبیه بی وجود عینیده اظهار ایتمکه محبت ذاتیسی تقاضا ابتدی واول نسب مستهلکه حضرت علم ذاتیده بری برندن متمیزه ایدی* پس وقتاکه مشیت الهیه اول نسبی وجودده اظهار ایتمکه منافی ایتدی ایسه ینبوع جوددن افاضه جود ایله حق تعالی تجلی ایدوب اول اعیانی عرصه شهودده ابراز ایلدی پس بز اول نسب ذاتیه وشئون غیبیه نک صوری یز پس حق تعالی بزی بالذات اقتضا ایتدی موجدیت وربوبیت ابله موصوف الله اولمغله وکندی نفسنی بزه وصف ایتدی بزم ایله پس آنک نسب ذاتیه سی وتجلیات وجود یه سی اولان وجودا تمزک معرفتی آنک وجودی معرفتیدر پس بزآنی مشاهده ایتدیکمزده کندی نفوسمزی مشاهده ایدرز* زیرا بز آنک وجودی نور نده ظاهرز واول بزی مشاهده ایتد کده کندی نفسنی مشاهده ایدر* زیرا بزآنک شئون ذاتیه سی صوری یز* پس شیخ رضی الله عنه بونده حقله خلق بیننده اولان ارتباطی بیان ایتدکدنصکره براعتبار ایله بینهماده اولان فرقی بیان ایتمکه شروع ایدوب ایتدی

And when the Real witnesses us with a quality, He witnesses His own self (nafs) with that quality, because that quality is His quality, by which He disclosed Himself (tajallī, self-disclosure) to us in accordance with our istiʿdād (preparedness). So when we witness Him, we witness our own selves, because what is manifest in the mirror of His wujūd (being) is our qualities. And when He witnesses us, He witnesses His own self, because what becomes manifest in the mirrors of our selves is His qualities. So our obedience is His obedience, our throwing is His throwing, and our knowledge of our own selves is our knowledge of His wujūd. For, according to what verification requires: when the Real Most High witnessed His own essence as possessor of relations (nisab) whose entities are consumed [in it], His essential love demanded that He make the unseen entities manifest in entified (ʿaynī) wujūd; and those consumed relations were distinguished from one another in the ḥaḍra (presence) of essential knowledge. So when the divine will […] making those relations manifest in wujūd, the Real Most High disclosed Himself with the effusion of generosity from the fount of generosity and brought those entities forth into the arena of witnessing. So we are the forms of those essential relations and unseen shuʾūn (affairs). So the Real Most High required us by [His] essence, through being God qualified with bringing-into-being and rubūbiyya (lordship), and He described His own self to us by means of us. So knowledge of our existences, which are His essential relations and His existential self-disclosures, is knowledge of His wujūd. So when we witness Him, we witness our own selves, because we are manifest in the light of His wujūd; and when He witnesses us, He witnesses His own self, because we are the forms of His essential affairs. Then the Shaykh (raḍiya llāhu ʿanhu), after explaining here the connection that exists between the Real and creation, began to explain the difference between the two in one respect, and said:

﴿شهد نفسه﴾

أي، ذاته التي تعينت وظهرت في صورتنا. أو شهد نفسه فينا لكوننا مرآة لذاته وصفاته. وقوله

i.e., His Essence which became entified (tataʿayyan) and manifested in our form; or: He witnesses Himself in us, since we are a mirror for His Essence and attributes. His saying

﴿شهد نفسه﴾

في مشهد سمعه ، كما ورد : " سمع الله لمن حمده " . التنزيه وإذ قد انساق كلامه في الجهة الارتباطيّة بين الواجب والممكن إلى موطن الاتحاد المفصح عن صرف التشبيه ، لا بدّ أن يستردفه بما ينبئ عن التنزيه ، جمعا بينهما وأداء به عن التوحيد الذاتي حقّه ، على ما جرت عليه الكلمة الكماليّة الختميّة ، كما ستقف عليه. فإليه أشار بقوله رضي الله عنه : ( ولا شكّ أنّا ) أي الحوادث الإمكانيّة

in the locus of witnessing of His hearing, as it is reported: "God hears him who praises Him." [Section:] Declaration of Transcendence (tanzīh). And since his discourse has been carried, in respect of the relational aspect (nisba) between the Necessary and the possible, to the station of union which expresses pure assimilation (tashbīh), it must needs be followed by what proclaims transcendence (tanzīh), joining the two together and thereby rendering to essential unification (al-tawḥīd al-dhātī) its due, in accordance with what the perfecting, seal-bearing Word requires, as you will come to see. To this he alluded, may God be pleased with him, by his statement: (There is no doubt that we) — i.e., the possible, originated things

﴿شهد نفسه﴾

أي ذاته التي تعينت وظهرت بصورتنا. وفي بعض النسخ: وإذا شهدنا نفوسنا شهدنا نفسه فكلاهما صحيح ثم اتساق كلامه رضي الله عنه في بيان جهة الارتباط بين الواجب والممكن إلى سائرهم الإيجاد متن نص فصوص الحكم : و لا نشك أنّا كثيرون بالشخص و النوع، و أنا و إن كنا على حقيقة واحدة تجمعنا فنعلم قطعاً أن ثَمَّ فارقاً به تميزت الأشخاص بعضها عن بعض، و لو لا ذلك ما كانت الكثرة في الواحد. فكذلك أيضاً، و إن وَصَفَنَا بما وصف نفسه من جميع الوجوه فلا بد من فارق، و ليس إلا افتقارنا إليه في الوجود و توقف وجودنا عليه لإمكاننا و غناه عن مثل ما افتقرنا إليه. فبهذا صح له الأزل و القدم الذي انتفت عنه الأولية التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم. فلا تُنسَبُ إليه الأوليّة مع كونه الأول. شرح الجامي : دفعه بقوله : (ولا تشك أنا) يعني أهل العالم (كثيرون) متفاوتون

, i.e., His Essence (dhāt), which became entified (taʿayyanat) and manifested in our form. In some copies it reads: 'and when we witness our own selves, we witness Himself' — both readings are sound. Then follows the coherence of his words, may God be pleased with him, in explaining the aspect of the connection between the Necessary and the possible, down to the rest of [the discussion of] bringing-into-existence. Text of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam: 'And we do not doubt that we are many in person and in species (nawʿ), and that we — though we share one reality (ḥaqīqa wāḥida) that unites us — know for certain that there is a differentiating factor (fāriq) by which individuals are distinguished from one another, for without that there would be no multiplicity in the one. Likewise also, even though He described us with what He described Himself with, in every respect, there must be a differentiating factor, and it is none other than our need (iftiqār) for Him in existence and the dependence of our existence upon Him owing to our possibility (imkān), and His independence (ghinā) from the like of that which we need. By this, eternity (azal) and pre-eternity (qidam) are established for Him, from which is negated the firstness (awwaliyya) that entails the inception of existence from nonexistence. So firstness, in this sense, is not to be ascribed to Him, even though He is the First.' Sharḥ al-Jāmī: He rebuts this by his saying: '(we do not doubt that we) — meaning the people of the world — (are many)' — differing...

﴿ولا نشكّ أنّا كثيرون بالشخص والنوع ، وأنّا وإن كنّا على حقيقة واحدة تجمعنا ، فنعلم قطعا أنّ ثمّ فارقا ، به تميّزت الأشخاص بعضها عن بعض ، ولولا ذلك ما كانت الكثرة في الواحد﴾

يعني : رضي الله عنه :أنّ هذه الشؤون وإن اشتركت في أنّ كلَّا منها شأن ذاتي له أو نسبة من نسب الألوهية ، ولكنّه لا بدّ أن تكون لكلّ شأن منها خصوصية ، بها يتميّز عن غيره . فتلك الخصوصيات هي التي أوجبت تعدّد الأشخاص وتمايزها بشخصياتها عند وجودها العيني بموجب وجودها العلمي ، فالوجود وإن كان موجودا للكلّ ، ولكنّ الخصوصيات الذاتية تعيّن الوجود الواحد بحسبها . فيختلف ظهور الوجود الحق الواحد الأحد في جميع مراتب العدد ، ويتكثّر بحسب القوابل المختلفة المتكثّرة . ولولا هذا السرّ ، لم تظهر الكثرة المتعقّلة في الواحد ظهورا وجوديا ، ولا الكثرة الوجودية في أحدية الجمع ، كما نقول : " مدينة واحدة " مع اشتمالها على البيوت والدور الكثيرة ، وكقولنا : « كتاب واحد » مع أنّه ذو حروف وكلمات كثيرة ، و « شخص واحد » مع أنّه ذو أجزاء وأعضاء كثيرة .قال رضي الله عنه : ( فكذلك أيضا ، وإن وصفنا بما وصف به نفسه من جميع الوجوه ، فلا بدّ من فارق وهو افتقارنا إليه في وجودنا ، وتوقّف وجودنا عليه لإمكاننا وغناه عن مثل ما افتقرنا إليه . فبهذا صحّ له الأزل والقدم الذي انتفت عنه الأوّلية التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم فلا تنسب إليه الأوّلية مع كونه الأوّل . ولهذا قيل فيه :الآخر ، فلو كانت أوّليته أوّلية وجود التقييد ، لم يصحّ أن يكون الآخر للمقيّد لأنّه لا آخر للممكن لأنّ الممكنات غير متناهية ، فلا آخر لها .وإنّما كان آخرا لرجوع الأمر كلَّه إليه بعد نسبة ذلك إلينا ) .قال العبد أيّده الله :كما أنّا وإن كنّا مشتركين في الاستناد إلى الحق والدلالة عليه وفي القيام بوجوده الواحد ، ولكنّا كثيرون بالأشخاص والخصوصيات الذاتية ، والتفرقة فيما بيننا ظاهرة . فكذلك إذا دللنا عليه فإنّ دلالة كلّ منّا بخصوصية ليست في الآخر . وكذلك وإن وصفنا بما وصف به نفسه وأعطانا الاتّصاف بأوصافه جميعا والتسمّي بأسمائه طرّا ، فلا بدّ من فارق بيننا وبينه لا نشاركه فيه أصلا ، وهو وجوبه الذاتي الذي انفرد به من ذاته دوننا ، وأمّا الفارق من قبلنا الذي خصّصنا به دونه فهو افتقارنا جميعا إليه على التعين في الوجود وذلك لإمكاننا الذاتي ، كما مرّ ، فتذكَّر .واعلم : أنّ في الإمكان سرّا شريفا ذكرنا في موضعه ، فاطلبه من هناك ، إن لم تعثر عليه من هاهنا ، فقد أومأنا إليه في مواضع ممّا سلف وفيما خلف .وقوله : « عن مثل ما افتقرنا إليه » يدلّ على شمول الافتقار ومرتبتي الوجود أعني مرتبتي الحق والخلق لكون الوجود يشملهما ، والحق من حيث ذاته ووجوده الذاتي غنيّ عنّا ونحن مفتقرون إليه بذواتنا في وجودنا . ولكنّ الربوبية من كونها تقتضي المربوب بحقيقتها ، والخالقية لا تتعقّل بدون المخلوق وجودا وتقديرا فثبت الافتقار للنسب الإلهية في تعيّنها الوجودي والتعقلي إلى متعلَّقاتها ضرورة توقّف الأمور الإضافية والنسبية على طرفيها وافتقارها إليها . ولا يقدح ذلك في الغنى الذاتي فإنّ الله غنيّ بذاته في وجوده أزلا وأبدا .وهذا الافتقار المذكور ليس إلَّا في النسب الأسمائية فإنّ الألوهية والربوبية والخالقية والرازقية وغيرها حقائق يتحقّق وجودها بالمألوه والمربوب والمخلوق والمرزوق ، والغنى لله في ذاته لكون وجوده من ذاته ، وعين ذاته .ولهذا السرّ صحّ له الأزل والقدم ، يعني نفي الأوّلية والمسبوقية عن وجوده الذاتي ، فلا أوّل له سابقا عليه ، بل هو الأوّل السابق بوجوده المطلق الذاتي على التعينات الوجودية التقييدية .وليس متعلَّق الحدوث والقدم حقيقة الوجود ، بل تعيّنه بحسب الأزمان والأوقات والمواطن والمراتب لا غير ، والتعيّن نسبة عدمية أيضا مع قطع النظر عن المتعيّن .فسبحان الذي وسع بجوده ورحمته وعلمه وحكمته كلّ شيء حتى النسب العدمية ، أحدثها وأعطاها ضربا من الوجود ، وأظهرها موجودة للشهود المعهود .فلو كانت أوّلية الحق من حيث الوجود العيني المقيّد ، لم يصحّ أن يكون هو الآخر لأنّه لا آخر للممكنات لأنّها غير متناهية ، فلو كانت متناهية ، صحّ أن يكون لها آخر .فليست أوّليّته تعالى بمعنى أوّلية وجود التقييد ، ولا آخريّته بمعنى أنّه إذا انتهت الممكنات غير المتناهية ، كان هو آخرها .فكان آخر وجود التقييد ، بل أوّليّته وآخريته بمعنى أنّه لا موجود إلَّا هو ، فالكلّ منه إليه " لا إِله َ إِلَّا هُوَ إِلَيْه ِ الْمَصِيرُ " .بمعنى أنّه المطلق غير المتعيّن في عين كونه عين الكلّ أوّلا بداية ، والمتعيّن في عين لا تعيّنه وإطلاقه بتجلَّيات غير متناهية آخرا لا إلى غاية ونهاية .قال رضي الله عنه

He means, may God be pleased with him: that these affairs (shuʾūn), although they share in each being an essential affair belonging to Him, or a relation among the relations of divinity (al-ulūhiyya), nevertheless each affair among them must have a particularity (khuṣūṣiyya) by which it is distinguished from another. It is these particularities that necessitated the multiplicity of individuals and their distinction by their individualities, upon their entified existence, in accordance with their existence in [divine] knowledge; for although existence is possessed in common by all, the essential particularities determine (tuʿayyin) the one existence according to themselves. Thus the manifestation of the one, single true existence differs throughout all levels of number, and becomes multiple according to the differing, multiple receptacles (qawābil). Were it not for this secret, the intelligible multiplicity within the One would not have manifested in an existential manifestation, nor would the existential multiplicity [have manifested] within the oneness of the totality (aḥadiyyat al-jamʿ), just as we say 'one city' although it comprises many houses and dwellings, and as we say 'one book' although it has many letters and words, and 'one individual' although he has many parts and members. He, may God be pleased with him, said: 'Likewise too, although He described us with what He described Himself in every respect, there must still be a distinguishing factor, namely our need (iftiqār) for Him in our existence, and the dependence of our existence upon Him owing to our possibility (imkān), and His independence from the like of that to which we are in need. By this, pre-eternity (al-azal) and eternity-without-beginning (al-qidam) are rightly His, from which the firstness that entails the opening of existence from nonexistence is negated; so firstness [in that sense] is not ascribed to Him, even though He is the First. And it is for this reason that it was said of Him: the Last. For if His firstness were the firstness of delimited existence (wujūd al-taqyīd), it would not be valid for Him to be the Last of the delimited, because there is no last for the possible (al-mumkin), since possible things are without end, and thus have no last. Rather, He is the Last because the whole affair returns to Him, after its ascription to us.' The servant — may God support him — said: Just as, although we share in our reliance upon the Real and our indication of Him, and in our subsistence by His one existence, we are nevertheless many in individuals and essential particularities, and the differentiation among us is manifest. So likewise, when we indicate Him, the indication of each of us is by a particularity not found in another. Likewise, although He described us with what He described Himself and granted us qualification by all His attributes and naming by all His names, there must still be a distinguishing factor between us and Him in which we do not share with Him at all, namely His essential necessity (wujūb) by which He is singled out from His own Essence, without us; while the distinguishing factor on our part, by which we are singled out apart from Him, is our need, all of us, for Him with respect to entification in existence, and that is on account of our essential possibility, as has passed. So remember. Know that in possibility (al-imkān) there is a noble secret we have mentioned in its [proper] place; seek it there if you do not find it here, for we have alluded to it in places among what has preceded and what follows. His statement 'from the like of that to which we are in need' indicates the comprehensiveness of need with respect to the two levels of existence, I mean the levels of the Real and creation, since existence comprises both; and the Real, in respect of His Essence and His essential existence, is independent of us, while we, in our essences, are in need of Him in our existence. However, lordship (al-rubūbiyya), in that it requires by its very reality the object of lordship (al-marbūb), and creatorship (al-khāliqiyya), which is inconceivable without the created thing, whether in existence or in [conceptual] estimation — thus need is established for the divine relations, in their existential and intelligible entification, toward their correlates, by the necessity that relative and relational matters depend upon their two terms and are in need of them. This does not impugn essential independence (al-ghinā al-dhātī), for God is independent by His Essence in His existence, pre-eternally and post-eternally. This mentioned need exists only with respect to the relations pertaining to the names (al-nisab al-asmāʾiyya), for divinity, lordship, creatorship, providence, and others are realities whose existence is realized only through the object-of-divinity, the object-of-lordship, the created, and the provided-for; whereas independence belongs to God in His Essence, since His existence is from His Essence and is identical with His Essence. For this secret, pre-eternity and eternity-without-beginning are rightly His — meaning the negation of [temporal] firstness and of being preceded, with respect to His essential existence; so there is no first preceding Him, rather He is the First who precedes, by His absolute essential existence, the delimited existential entifications. That to which origination and eternity attach is not the reality of existence itself, but rather its entification (taʿayyun) in respect of times, moments, locales, and levels only; and entification is also a nonexistential relation (nisba ʿadamiyya), apart from consideration of the entified thing (al-mutaʿayyin). Glory be to Him who, by His generosity, mercy, knowledge, and wisdom, has encompassed all things, even nonexistential relations — He originated them and gave them a mode of existence, and manifested them as existent for familiar witnessing. For if the Real's firstness were in respect of delimited concrete existence, it would not be valid for Him to be the Last, since there is no last for possible things, they being infinite; but if they were finite, it would be valid for them to have a last. So His firstness, exalted is He, is not in the sense of the firstness of delimited existence, nor is His lastness in the sense that, were the infinite possible things to end, He would be their last — [nor] that He were the last of delimited existence; rather, His firstness and lastness mean that there is no existent but He, so all is from Him and to Him: 'There is no god but He; to Him is the return.' That is, He is the Absolute, non-entified, in the very state of being the very reality of the whole, as First, at the beginning; and He is the entified, in the very state of His non-entification and His absoluteness, through infinite self-disclosures, as Last, without limit or end. He, may God be pleased with him, said:

﴿ولا نشك أنا كثيرون بالشخص والنوع﴾

ويجوز أن يكون (أنا) عبارة عن لسان أهل العالم، أي، أهل العالم أي، إنا كثيرون. بالأشخاص والأنواع التي فيه، ويجوز أن يكون عن لسان الأفراد الإنسانية، أي، إنا كثيرون بالشخص وبحسب الأنواع التي فينا لتركبنا من العالمين الروحاني والجسماني. ويؤيد الثاني مابعده . وهو قوله

It is possible that "we" is an expression on the tongue of the people of the world (ahl al-ʿālam), i.e., that the people of the world, that is, "we," are many by the individuals and species within it. And it is possible that it is on the tongue of human individuals, i.e., "we are many" in individual and according to the species within us, on account of our being composed of the spiritual and corporeal worlds. The second is supported by what follows, namely his saying

﴿ولا شك أنا كثيرون بالشخص﴾

باعتبار انضمام تشخصاتنا إلى حقيقتنا النوعية (و) كثيرون (بالنوع) باعتبار انضمام فصولنا المميزة إلى حقيقتنا الجنسية

considering the joining of our individuations (tashakhkhuṣāt) to our specific reality (ḥaqīqa nawʿiyya), (and) many (in respect of species/genus, bi-l-nawʿ) considering the joining of our distinguishing differentiae (fuṣūl) to our generic reality (ḥaqīqa jinsiyya)

﴿ولانشك انا كثيرون بالشخص والنوع وانا وان كما علي حقيقة واحده يجمعنا﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

وبزشک ایتمرزکه تحقیق بز شخص ونوع حسبیله کثیرونز وتحقیق بزاکرچه کیم حقیقت واحده اوزره یزکه جمیع اشخاص وانوا عمزی اول حقیقت واحده جمع ایدر یعنی شک بوقدر مزم وجودات محدثه مرجو قدر اشخاصک افرادی وافرادک انواعی حسبیله زیراشئون ذاتیه دن هر برشانک برخصو صیتی واردر که انکله غیردن متمیز در* پس اول خصوصیات علیه اشخاص وانواعک تعددن ووجود علی موجبیله وجود عینیده بری برندن شخصیات اله تما یزن ایجاب ایدر پس اکرچه کیم وجود مطلقک حقیقتی جمیع شئون ذاتیه بی جامعه وموجده در لکن خصوصیات ذاتیه وجود واحدی کندی حسبیله معینه درو بزم وجودات حادثه مز دن هر بریسی شخصا ونوعا کندی شان خصوصی تله غیردن متمیز اولوب بر صوره کثیره ایله ظاهر اولمشز وحال بوکه حقیقت واحده جمله مزی جامعه در پس جمع مراتبده وجود واحد حقک ظهوری مختلفدر وقوابل مختلفه ومتکثر حسبیله متکثره در)

And we do not doubt that we are indeed many by individual and by species, and that, even though we are upon a single ḥaqīqa (reality), that single reality gathers all our individuals and species. That is, there is no doubt that our originated existences are many, in respect of the individual members of the persons and the species of the individual members. For each of the essential shuʾūn (affairs) has a specificity by which it is distinguished from others. So those [cognitive?] specificities require the multiplicity of persons and species, and, in accordance with [knowledge-]wujūd (being), their being distinguished from one another by individualities in entified wujūd. So even though the reality of absolute wujūd gathers and brings into being all the essential affairs, the essential specificities nevertheless determine the one wujūd according to themselves; and each one of our originated existences, individually and by species, being distinguished from others by its own specific affair, we have become manifest in a multiple form, while the single reality gathers all of us. So in all marātib (levels) the ẓuhūr (manifestation) of the one wujūd of the Real is different, and it is multiplied according to the different and multiplied qawābil (receptacles).

﴿كثيرون بالشخص والنوع ، وأنّا﴾

أي الأفراد الإنسانيّة منه

[Text: are many in person and in kind, and that we) — i.e., the human individuals among them

﴿بالشخص والنوع﴾

فإن في العالم أنواعا مختلفة . ولكل نوع أشخاصا متعددة (وإنا) يعني الأفراد الإنسانية (وأن ?نا) مشتملة على حقيقة واحدة) نوعيه (يجمعنا ليعلم قطعا أن ثمة) . أي أشخاص تلك الحقيقة

, for in the world there are various species, and each species has multiple individuals. (And we) — meaning the individuals of mankind — (though we) comprehend a single reality — specific (nawʿiyya) — (that unites us, so that it may be known for certain that there is) — i.e., among the individuals of that reality...

﴿وإنا وإن كنا على حقيقة واحدة﴾

أي، وإن كنا مشتملة على حقيقة نوعية هي قوله

i.e., though we comprise a specific reality (ḥaqīqa nawʿiyya), which is his saying

﴿وإن كنّا على حقيقة واحدة تجمعنا﴾

بوحدتها العينيّة التي لا تقبل التفصيل ولا التكثّر بالذات كما بيّن

by its unity of entity (waḥda ʿayniyya), which admits neither differentiation nor multiplicity in itself (bi-l-dhāt), as has been made clear

﴿وإنا وإن كنا على حقيقة … هي تجمعنا فنعلم قطعا أن ثم﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي في حقيقة واحدة

reality … that gathers us, we know with certainty that there is] that is, in a single reality (ḥaqīqa wāḥida)

﴿تجمعنا، فنعلم قطعا أن ثمة فارقا به﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي، بذلك الفارق. قوله

i.e., by that differentiating factor. His saying

﴿فنعلم قطعا أنّ ثمّ فارقا به تميّزت الأشخاص بعضها عن بعض ، ولولا ذلك … ما كانت الكثرة في الواحد … فكذلك أيضا﴾

فيما نحن فيه ، فإنّه ( وإن وصفناه ) أي الحقّ في الموطنين المذكورين

in the matter at hand, for indeed He (i.e., the Real, in the two stations mentioned)

﴿فنعلم قطعا ان ثم فارقا به تميزت الاشخاص بعضها عن بعض﴾

پس بز قطعا پیلورز که تحقیق حقیقت واحدهده اولان شئونمز بیننده فارق واردرکه آنک سببیله اشخاص تمیز ایلدی بعضی بعضندن واول فارق بزم خصوصیات ذاتیه من درکه هر بریسی کندی حسبیله وجود مطلقی تعیین وتخصیص ابلدی وأنک سبیله اشخاصک بعضی بعص ندن حسن وقبح وعلم وجهل جهتله متمیز اولدی که هر بریسنک شانی خصوصیات ذاتیه سیله واستعداد ذاتیسیله ری برندن حضرت علمده متمیز اولوب وجود واحد حقیقی هر برینک حسبیله متعین اوادیغی کی کذلک حضرت عبنده دخی هر بر شخصک استعدادی وهر بر مرتبه نک اقتضاسی حسبیله قوابل مختلفه ومتکثره ده مختلف ظهور ایتدی وأنک مظاهری اولان اشخاصک بعضی بعضندن انگل، متمیز اولدی

So we know definitively that there is indeed a differentiator among our shuʾūn (affairs) within the single ḥaqīqa (reality), because of which persons have been distinguished one from another. And that differentiator is our essential specificities, each of which determined and specified absolute wujūd (being) according to itself; and because of it persons became distinguished one from another in respect of beauty and ugliness, and knowledge and ignorance. So, just as the affair of each one, being distinguished from one another in the ḥaḍra (presence) of knowledge by its essential specificities and its essential istiʿdād (preparedness), the one real wujūd was determined according to each of them, likewise in the presence of the ʿayn (entity) too it became manifest differently in different and multiplied qawābil (receptacles), according to the preparedness of each person and the requirement of each martaba (level); and the persons who are its maẓāhir (loci of manifestation) became distinguished one from another by it.

﴿فارقا به﴾

أي بذلك الغارق

— i.e., by that differentiator...

﴿فارقا به﴾

أي بذلك الفارق (تميزت الأشخاص بعضها من بعض ولولا ذلك) الفارق

that is, by that differentiating factor (fāriq), (the individuals are distinguished one from another, and were it not for) that differentiating factor

﴿تميزت الأشخاص بعضها عن بعض، ولو لا ذلك﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي الفارق. قوله

i.e., the differentiating factor. His saying

﴿تميزت الأشخاص بعضها عن بعض﴾

وإذا لم يجمعنا يعني أهل العلم حقيقة واحدة نوعية فوجود الفارق أظهر ولهذا ما وقع التعريض له. (ولولا ذلك) الفراق

. And if a single specific reality did not unite us — meaning the people of knowledge — the existence of the differentiator would be more evident, and this is why no allusion was made to it. (And were it not for that) differentiation...

﴿ولولا ذلك ما كانت الكثرة في الواحد﴾

واکر وجود واحد حقیقتنک حقیقتنده مستهلکه اولان شئون ذاتیه دن هر برینک خصوصیتی حسبیله* ووجود واحدک تعین علمیله تعینی وبعده قوابل مختلفه حسبیله وجود عینیده ظهوری واشخاصک بری برندن تمیزی سری اولمیدی کثرت نسبیة علمیه وکثرت عنیه وجودیه وجودواخد حقک ظهوراتی اختلافی وتعدد وکثرتی قوابلک اختلافی وتعددی وکثرت حسبیله در (واذک) الحق

And were it not for the secret of each of the essential shuʾūn (affairs) consumed in the reality of the reality of the one wujūd (being), according to its specificity, and of the determination of the one wujūd by the cognitive taʿayyun (determination), and after that of its ẓuhūr (manifestation) in entified wujūd according to the different qawābil (receptacles), and of the distinction of persons from one another, there would be neither relational, cognitive multiplicity nor entified, existential multiplicity. The difference of the manifestations of the one wujūd of the Real, and its number and multiplicity, are according to the difference, number and multiplicity of the receptacles. (And that […]) is the truth.

﴿ما كانت الكثرة في الواحد﴾

أي، حاصلة ومتصورة في الواحد. قوله

i.e., occurring and conceivable in the one. His saying

﴿ما كانت الكثرة﴾

بحسب الأفراد متحققة (في) النوع (الواحد) ، وإذا عرفت أن بين أفراد العالم بل الأفراد الإنسانية فارقة يميز بعضها عن بعض (فكذلك) الحال بيننا وبين الحق (أيضا) ، فإنه

realized with respect to individuals within (the) one (species). And once you know that among the individuals of the world — indeed the individuals of mankind — there is a differentiator distinguishing some from others, (likewise) is the case between us and the Real (also), for indeed He...

﴿ما كانت … الكثرة في الواحد﴾

فإذا حصل الفراق بين الممكنات بعد اتحادها في حقيقة واحدة

for when the differentiation (firāq) occurs among the contingent existents (mumkināt) after their unity in a single reality

﴿فكذلك أيضا وإن وصفناه﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أيالحق. قوله

i.e., the Real. His saying

﴿فكذلك أيضا﴾

حصل الفارق بيننا وبين الحق

a differentiation occurred between us and the Real

﴿ايضا وان وصفنا بما وصف به نفسه من جميع الوجوه فلابد من فارق﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

پس نته کذلک حق تعالی اگرچه کیم زی من جمیع الوجوه جمیع اوصافیله وصف ایدیسه وجمیع اوصافیله اتصافی وجمیع اسماسیله تسمیه بزه اعطا ایتدیسه* پس البته حق ابله بزم بینمزده بر فارقدن لابد در)

So likewise, even if the Real Most High has described us in all respects with all His qualities, and has given us qualification by all His qualities and naming by all His names, there must certainly be a differentiator between the Real and us.

﴿بما وصف به نفسه من جميع الوجوه، فلا بد من فارق.﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

لما شبه في الأول، أراد أن ينزه هنا ليجمع بين (التنزيه) و (التشبيه) على ما هو طريقة الأنبياء. (وليس) ذلك الفارق. قوله

Since he had drawn a likeness (tashbīh) at first, he wished here to declare transcendence (tanzīh), so as to combine transcendence and likening, in accordance with the way of the prophets. "And that differentiating factor is nothing but..." His saying

﴿بما وصف به نفسه من جميع الوجوه ، فلا بدّ من فارق﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

به يتميّز الوصفان ، ( وليس ) ذلك الفارق

by which the two descriptions are distinguished, (and that) distinguishing factor

﴿وإن وصفنا﴾

أي الحق سبحانه وأعطانا الاتصاف

— i.e., the Real, glory be to Him — having granted us the quality of being so described...

﴿وان وصفنا … بما وصف به نفسه من جميع الوجوه فلا بد من فارق وليس … الفارق إلا افتقارنا إليه في الوجود وتوقف وجودنا عليه لإمكاننا وفناه عن مثل ما افتقرنا إليه﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

وهو افتقارنا في الوجود (فبهذا) الغناء

which is our need in existence. (So by this) independence (ghinā)

﴿ولا بد من فارق﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

ثم قال: وليس إلا افتقارنا إليه. وبالجملة فهذا كله مبني على أن الوجود واحد والأعيان متمايزة وتسميها الأعيان الثابتة. وأما قوله

"and there must be a distinguishing factor (fāriq)" — then he said: "and it is nothing but our need (iftiqār) for Him." In sum, all of this is founded upon [the premise] that existence (al-wujūd) is one while the entities (al-aʿyān) are distinct, and he calls them the fixed entities (al-aʿyān al-thābita). As for his saying

﴿فلا بد من فارق﴾

بيننا وبينه لا نشاركه ولا يشاركنا فيه أصل (وليس) الفارق من قبلنا الذي خصصنا به دونه

between us and Him in which we share nothing with Him, nor He with us, at all. (And) the differentiator (is not) on our part, by which we alone, and not He, are specified...

﴿إلا افتقارنا إليه في الوجود، وتوقف وجودنا عليه، لإمكاننا وغناه عن مثل ما افتقرنا إليه﴾

وإنما حصر الفارق في افتقارنا وغناه، لأن غيرهما أيضا عائد إليهما، سواء كان وجوديا أو عدميا. قوله

He restricted the differentiating factor to our need and His independence, because everything else also reverts to these two, whether existential or privative (ʿadamī). His saying

﴿إلا افتقارنا إليه في الوجود وتوقّف وجودنا عليه لإمكاننا وغناه عن مثل ما افتقرنا إليه﴾

أي انحصر الفارق في الافتقار في الوجود ، والغناء عنه . فإنّ الغناء المطلق لا يصح فيما اعتبر فيه نسبة من النسب أصلا ، فما اختصّ به ذات الممكن هو الافتقار الذي به افترق عن الواجب وتكثّر ، ومنه بعد عنه وسمّي عبدا . كما أنّ ما اختصّ به الواجب هو الغناء عن مثل ذلك ، وهو الذي به يتقدّم ذاتا ورتبة ، ويتّصف بالوحدة الحقيقية الذاتية ، لا العدديّة الإضافيّة .وفي هذا الكلام تلويح غير خفيّ . ( فبهذا ) الفارق

i.e., the distinguishing factor is confined to neediness in existence [on our part] and self-sufficiency from it [on His part]. For absolute self-sufficiency cannot rightly be attributed to anything in which any relation (nisba) whatsoever is considered. Thus what is proper to the essence of the possible thing is precisely the neediness by which it is distinguished from the Necessary and becomes multiple, and by virtue of which it is distanced from Him and named 'servant' ('abd). Likewise, what is proper to the Necessary is self-sufficiency from anything of that sort, and it is by this that He is antecedent in essence and rank, and is characterized by true essential unity, not numerical, relative unity. In this statement there is a plain allusion. (By this) distinguishing factor

﴿إلا افتقارنا إليه في الوجود وتوقف وجودنا عليه الإمكاننا﴾

وتساوي نسبتي الوجود وانعدم إلى ذواتنا فلا بد من مرجح. وأما الفارق الذي انفرد به سبحانه ، فهو وجوبه الذاتي وغناه عن مثل ما افتقر إليه من الموجد (فبهذا) الوجوب الذاتي والمعنى

, and the equivalence of the two relations of existence and nonexistence to our essences — so there must be a determining factor (murajjiḥ). As for the differentiator by which He alone, glory be to Him, is characterized, it is His essential necessity (wujūb dhātī) and His independence from the like of what He required from an originator. (By this) essential necessity and meaning...

﴿وليس الا افتقارنا اليه في الوجود وتوقف* ل* وجودنا عليه لامكاننا وغناه عن مثل ما افتقرنا اليه﴾

وحفله بزم بینمز ده اولان فارق بزم اکا افتقارمزدر وجودده وجود مزک دخی اکاتوقفیدر بزم امکانمزدن اوتری زیرا ممکنک کندی ذاتندن وجودی یوقدراواو جودک وجودندن مفاضدر* ودخی حقله بزم بینمزده فارق حقک غناسیدر شول شیئت مثلندن که بز اکا مفتقر اولدق زیرا حقک کندی وجودی من ذاته در غیر دن مفاض دکلدر* امدی شویله بیل که افتقار بزم وجودمزه عائد اولدیغی کی من حیث لظهور حقک اسما سنه دخی شاملدر زیرا اسماء الهیه نک احکام واثاری ظاهر ده مظاهرسز ظاهره ومتحققه دکادر والوهیت وربوبیت وخالقیت وجود اوتعلقا متحققه اولمز الامألوه ومربوب ومخلوق ایله* پس نسب اسمائیه ایچون دخی افتقار ثابت اولدی اماحق تعالی ذاتنده و وجو دنده عالمیندن غنیدر زیرا آنک وجودی ذاتندندر وذاتنک عینیدر ذاتی اوزره زائده دکلدر) فبهذا) ای الفارق الذی هو افتقارنا الیه وغنؤه الذاتی عن الغیر

And the differentiator between the Real and us is our need (iftiqār) for Him in wujūd (being), and also the dependence of our wujūd upon Him, on account of our imkān (possibility); for the possible has no wujūd from its own essence; [its wujūd] is effused from the wujūd of […]. And further, the differentiator between the Real and us is the Real's independence (ghināʾ) from the like of the thing we are in need of; for the Real's own wujūd is from His essence and is not effused from another. Now know this: just as need pertains to our wujūd, it also extends, in respect of ẓuhūr (manifestation), to the names of the Real; for the rulings and traces of the divine names are not manifest and realized in the outward without maẓāhir (loci of manifestation), and ulūhiyya (divinity), rubūbiyya (lordship) and creatorship are not realized, either in existence or in relation, except with one divinized (maʾlūh), one lorded-over (marbūb) and one created. So need is established for the name-relations as well. But the Real Most High, in His essence and His wujūd, is independent of the worlds; for His wujūd is from His essence and is the very same as His essence, not additional to His essence. (fa-bi-hādhā) i.e. "by the differentiator which is our need for Him and His essential independence from anything other."

﴿فبهذا صح له الأزل والقدم الذي انتفت عنه الأولية التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم فلا تنسب إليه مع كونه الأول﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي فبالغنى الذاتي الصمدى القيومى لكل ممكن وكونه سند مقوم لكل مقيد صح له الأزل والقدم ، وانتفت عنه الأولية بمعنى افتتاح الوجود عن العدم ، فإنه محال في حقه مع كونه الأول

That is: by virtue of the essential, self-sufficient (ṣamadī), self-subsisting (qayyūmī) richness [in relation] to every possible thing, and His being the sustaining support (sanad muqawwim) of every delimited thing, eternity-without-beginning and eternity-without-end are established for Him, and firstness in the sense of the inception of existence out of nonexistence is negated of Him, for that is impossible with respect to Him, even though He is the First.

﴿فبهذا صح له الأزل و القدم الذي انتفت عنه الأولية التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم. فلا تنسب إليه الأولية مع كونه الأول. و لهذا قيل فيه الآخر.﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

وإنما وصف (الأزل) و (القدم) بقوله: "انتفت عنه الأولية" بمعنى "افتتاح الوجود عن العدم" لأن الأعيان والأرواح أيضا أزلية، لكن أزليتها وقدمها زمانية لا ذاتية، وأزلية الحق ذاتية، لغنائه في وجوده عن غيره. فانتفت (الأولية) منه بمعنى افتتاح الوجود عن عدم، فلا تنسب إليه الأولية بهذا المعنى، كما تنسب به إلى الأرواح والأعيان. كما قال، صلى الله عليه وسلم: "أول ما خلق الله العقل". أي، أول ما افتتح من العدم إلى الوجود العقل، لكونه مسبوقا بالعدم الذاتي، وإن كان غير مسبوق بالعدم الزماني. بل ينسب "الأولية" إليه بمعنى آخر وهو كونه "مبدأ" كل شئ، كما أن آخريته عبارة عن كونه منتهى كل شئ ومرجعه، أو كونه في مقام أحديته بحيث لا شئ معه. كما قال عليه السلام: "كان الله ولم يكن معه شئ". وهذا المعنى يجتمع مع الآخرية. لذلك قال الجنيد، قدس الله روحه،عند سماعه لهذا الحديث: "والآن كما كان". أي، لم يتغير هذا المقام عن حاله، وإن كان في المرتبة الواحدية معه أسماء وصفات وأعيان ثابتة للأكوان. ويظهر هذا المقام للعارف عند التجلي الذاتي له، لتقوم قيامته الكبرى فيفنى ويفنى الخلق عند نظره، ثم يبقى ويشاهد ربه بربه. رزقنا الله وإياكم. قوله

He described "beginninglessness" (azal) and "eternality" (qidam) by his statement "the 'firstness' has been negated from Him" in the sense of "an inception of existence out of nonexistence," because the entities (aʿyān) and spirits are also beginningless, but their beginninglessness and eternality are temporal, not essential (dhātī), whereas the beginninglessness of the Real is essential, on account of His independence in His existence from other than Himself. Thus "firstness" is negated from Him in the sense of an inception of existence out of nonexistence, so that "firstness" is not attributed to Him in this sense, as it is attributed in this sense to the spirits and the entities — as he (God bless him and grant him peace) said: "The first thing God created was the Intellect," meaning: the first thing to have an inception from nonexistence into existence was the Intellect, since it is preceded by essential nonexistence, even though it is not preceded by temporal nonexistence. Rather, "firstness" is attributed to Him in another sense, namely His being the "principle" (mabdaʾ) of everything, just as His "lastness" is an expression of His being the terminus and return of everything, or of His being in the station of His oneness (aḥadiyya) such that nothing is with Him — as he (peace be upon him) said: "God was, and nothing was with Him." This meaning coincides with lastness. Hence Junayd — may God sanctify his spirit — upon hearing this ḥadīth, said: "And now it is as it was," meaning: this station has not changed from its condition, even though at the level of oneness (wāḥidiyya) there are, together with Him, names, attributes, and fixed entities for the engendered things. This station becomes manifest to the gnostic at the essential self-disclosure (tajallī dhātī) directed to him, so that his greater resurrection may take place; he then passes away (yafnā), and creation passes away in his vision; then he subsists (yabqā) and witnesses his Lord by his Lord. May God grant this to us and to you as sustenance. His saying

﴿فبهذا صح له الأزل والقدم الذي انتفت عنه الأولية﴾

قلنا: معناه أنه لا أولية لغناه عن خلقه ولا أولية له في افتتاح الوجود أي وجوده ليس عن عدم سابق فيتحقق له الأولية في اتصافه بالوجود بعد أن لم يكن متصفا به. قوله

"by this, eternity-without-beginning (al-azal) and pre-existence (al-qidam) — from which primordiality (al-awwaliyya) is negated — are validly established for Him" — we say: its meaning is that there is no primordiality for Him owing to His independence (ghinā) from His creation, nor is there for Him a primordiality in the inception of existence — that is, His existence is not preceded by a prior nonexistence such that primordiality would be realized for Him in His being characterized by existence after not having been so characterized. His saying

﴿صحّ له الأزل والقدم الذي انتفت عنه الأوّليّة التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم﴾

على ما يلزم أرباب العقائد التقليديّة فيما اعتقدوه في الواجب من الصورة المحصورة المقيّدة ، والوجه الجزئي الجعلي تعالى عن ذلك علوّا كبيرا وذلك لأنّ الأوّليّة في تلك الصور إنّما يتصوّر إذا كان لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم . لا يقال : "الأوّليّة إنّما تقتضي السابقيّة على الكل ، لا المسبوقيّة" . لأنّ الأوّليّة مفهومها مركب من نسبة وجوديّة هي السابقيّة المذكورة ، ومن أخرى عدميّة ، هي اللامسبوقيّة بآخر ، وبيّن أنّ الأوّل على ما اعتقدوه في تلك الصور إذا لم يكن بحسب الزمان على ما اتّفقوا عليه - لا بدّ وأن يكون بحسب الذات والوجود ، وهو معنى الافتتاح المذكور . هذا ما يلزم أرباب العقائد العقليّة المحصورة. بخلاف ما انكشف لأولي الألباب من الانشراح الصدريّ العلميّ ، فإنّه يتصوّر فيه الأوّليّة بالمعنى الذي يستلزمه الغناء والوحدة الذاتيّة ، من استناد افتقار الممكنات في الوجود إليه وتقدّم الواجب في انتساب الوجود له. فقال رضي الله عنه : ( فلا ينسب إليه ) الافتتاح المذكور

— as is necessarily entailed for the adherents of traditional creeds in what they believe of the Necessary, [namely] a confined, delimited form and a partial, posited aspect — He is exalted far above that. This is because 'firstness' in those [conceived] forms can only be conceived if it entails the inception of existence out of nonexistence. One might object: 'Firstness only requires precedence over the totality, not being preceded [by anything else].' [We reply that] the concept of firstness is composed of a positive relation — namely, the aforementioned precedence — and a negative one, namely, not being preceded by anything else. And it is clear that the First, according to what they believe regarding those [conceived] forms, if it is not [understood] temporally — as they agree — must then be [understood] essentially and existentially, and that is the meaning of the aforementioned 'inception.' This is what is necessarily entailed for the adherents of confined, rational creeds. It is otherwise for what has been unveiled to those possessed of understanding through the expansion of the breast that comes with [true] knowledge, for in their case firstness is conceived in the sense entailed by self-sufficiency and essential unity — namely, the possible things' neediness in existence being grounded in Him, and the Necessary's precedence in the ascription of existence to Him. So he said, may God be pleased with him: (So the aforementioned 'inception' is not ascribed to Him)

﴿صح له الأزل﴾

أي الأزلية (والقدم) الذاتي

— i.e., beginninglessness (azaliyya) — (and pre-eternity, qidam) essential...

﴿صح له الأزل والقدم الذي انتفت عنه الأولية التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم فلا ينسب إليه هذه الأولية مع کونه الأول﴾

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بمعني مبدأ كل شيء كما ينسب إليه الآخرية بمعني منتهي كل شيء ومرجعه (ولهذا) أي ولأجل انتفاء الأولية عنه بمعني افتتاح الوجود عن العدم (قیل فيه الآخر) فلما قيل فيه الآخر لم يكن له الأولية بهذا المعنى

in the sense of the origin (mabdaʾ) of everything—just as 'lastness' (ākhiriyya) is ascribed to Him in the sense of the terminus and return of everything. (And for this reason) that is, because of the negation from Him of 'firstness' in the sense of the opening of existence out of nonexistence, (He is called 'the Last' in this respect)—so when He is called 'the Last,' He does not possess 'firstness' in this sense

﴿صح له الازل والقدم الذي انتفت عنه الاولية التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم﴾

پس بو فارق سببیله عبدک افتقار یدر* وحقک غناء ذاتیسیدر* حق ایچون ازل ایله قدم صحیح اولدیکه آندن اولیت منتفیه اولدی شول اولیتکه انگیجون عد مدن افتتاح وجود واردر یعنی شول ازل وقدم انکیجون ثابت اولد یکد عد مدن وجودک افتتاحی ایله مقیده اولان اولیت آندن منتفیه در یعنی اولیت مقیده دن مطلق اولان قدم حق ایچون صحیح اولدی وبواولیت مقیده بزم ایچون ثابته در* زیرا عدمدن وجودک افتتاحی اله معیده اولان اولیت ایله بز متصف اولمشز زیرا تعین اولده متعینه اولان بزم حقیقتمزدر وقصد ایله اول اولان دخی بزم وجود مزدر

So by reason of this differentiator — which is the servant's need and the Real's essential independence — azal (beginninglessness) and qidam (pre-eternity) became valid for the Real, from which firstness (awwaliyya) is negated: that firstness which has the opening of wujūd (being) from nonexistence. That is, that azal and qidam were established for Him, from which the firstness restricted by the opening of wujūd from nonexistence is negated; i.e. qidam that is absolute, [free] of restricted firstness, became valid for the Real. And this restricted firstness is established for us, for we have become qualified with the firstness restricted by the opening of wujūd from nonexistence; because what is determined in the first taʿayyun (determination) is our ḥaqīqa (reality), and what is first by intention is also our wujūd.

﴿الذي انتفت به عنه الأولية التي﴾

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ثبت (بها) ، أي تلك الأولية

was established (by it) — i.e., that firstness...

﴿افتتاح الوجود عن عدم﴾

قال صلى الله عليه وسلم : "أول ما خلق الله العقل" ، أي الذي افتتح الوجود بعدم العدم من الموجودات هو العقل

. He (peace and blessings be upon him) said: 'The first thing God created was the intellect (ʿaql)' — i.e., that which inaugurated existence, after the nonexistence of existents, is the intellect.

﴿فلا تنسب إليه تعالى الأولية﴾

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بهذا المعنى. فإنها من سمات الحديث

in this sense, for it is among the marks of the temporally originated (ḥādith)...

﴿فلا ينتسب اليه مع كونه اول﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

پس ذکر اولنان اولیت مقیده حقه نسبت اولنمز حق اول ایکن* واولیت انکیجون ثابته ایکن* زیرا حق اولیت مطلقه ایله اولدر بلکه حق بواولیتدن اطلاق اولنور* پس شول اولدر که تعینات وجودیه یی وجود مطلق ذاتیسیله سابقه وحدوث ایله قدم حقیقتده وجوده متعلقق دکلدر* بلکه بحسب الازمان والاوقات تعینه متعلقدر تعین خود متعیندن نظری قطع ایتمکله امر عدمیدر فسبحان الذی وسع بوجوده ورحمته وعلمه وحکمته کل شیء حتی النسب العدمیة التی احدثها واعطاها ضربا من الوجود واظهرها موجودة مشهودة للشهود المعهود الموعود والوجود المشهود

So the restricted firstness mentioned is not ascribed to the Real, even while the Real is First and firstness is established for Him; for the Real is First with absolute firstness; rather, the Real is freed [of restriction] from this firstness. So He is that First who precedes the existential taʿayyunāt (determinations) by His absolute essential wujūd (being); and origination and pre-eternity are not in reality attached to wujūd, but rather are attached to determination according to times and moments; and determination, when one cuts off one's view from the determined, is a nonexistential matter. "So glory be to Him who encompassed all things with His wujūd, His mercy, His knowledge and His wisdom, even the nonexistential relations which He originated and gave a kind of wujūd, and made manifest as existent and witnessed, for the known, promised witnessing and the witnessed wujūd."

﴿مع كونه الأول﴾

قلت: قوله، رضي الله عنه، مع كونه الأول في قوله تعالى: "هو الأول والآخر" (الحديد: 3). إلا أن الشيخ هنا لم يذكر بأي معنى قيل فيه تعالى: أنه الأول مع ما ذكره من انتفاء تلك الأولية المذكورة عنه. قوله: ولهذا قيل له الآخر. قلت: يعني لنفي تلك الأولية المذكورة. قوله

"while He is the First" — I say: his saying, may God be pleased with him, "while He is the First," [refers to] the words of the Exalted: "He is the First and the Last" (al-Ḥadīd: 3). However, the Shaykh did not here mention in what sense the Exalted is called the First, given what he stated regarding the negation of that aforementioned primordiality from Him. His saying: "and for this reason He is called the Last." I say: meaning, in negation of that aforementioned primordiality. His saying

﴿مع كونه الأوّل﴾

ضرورة أنّ الغناء المطلق يأبى اعتبار النسبة فيه مطلقا

necessarily, since absolute self-sufficiency precludes the consideration of any relation whatsoever within it

﴿مع كونه الأول﴾

بالأولية التي هي عبارة عن كونه مبدأ لما سواه كما أن آخريته عبارة عن كونه مرجع كل متن نص فصوص الحكم : و لهذا قيل فيه الآخِر. فلو كانت أوليته أولية وجود التقييد لم يصح أن يكون الآخِرَ للمقيد، لأنه لا آخر للممكن، لأن الممكنات غير متناهية فلا آخر لها. و إنما كان آخراً لرجوع الأمر كله إليه بعد نسبة ذلك إلينا، فهو الآخر في عين أوّليته، و الأول في عين آخريّته. ثم لتعلم أن الحق وصف نفسه بأنه ظاهر باطن ، فأوجد العالم عالم غيب و شهادة لندرك الباطنَ بغيبنا و الظاهر بشهادتنا. و وصف نفسه بالرضا و الغضب، و أوجد العالم ذ خوف و رجاء فيخاف غضبه و يرجو رضاه. شرح الجامي : شيء ومنتهاه (ولهذا) . أي لأن أوليته لیست، بمعنى افتتاح الوجود عن العدم

, with the firstness that consists in His being the principle (mabdaʾ) of all besides Him, just as His lastness (ākhiriyya) consists in His being the return of every... Text of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam: '...thing and its terminus. This is why He is called the Last. For if His firstness were the firstness of the existence of the delimited (taqyīd), it would not be valid for Him to be the Last of the delimited, since there is no last for the possible — because possible things are unlimited and so have no last. Rather, He is the Last because the whole affair returns to Him after its ascription to us; so He is the Last in the very state of His firstness, and the First in the very state of His lastness. Then know that the Real described Himself as manifest (ẓāhir) and nonmanifest (bāṭin), and so brought the world into existence as a world of the unseen (ghayb) and the witnessed (shahāda), that we might apprehend the nonmanifest through our unseen and the manifest through our witnessing. And He described Himself with contentment (riḍā) and wrath (ghaḍab), and brought the world into existence possessed of fear and hope, so that it fears His wrath and hopes for His contentment.' Sharḥ al-Jāmī: '...thing and its terminus.' (This is why) — i.e., because His firstness is not in the sense of the inception of existence from nonexistence...

﴿ولهذا قيل فيه الآخر﴾

أي ولأن أوليته بالغنى الذاتي وعدم الاحتياج في وجوده إلى الغير قيل فيه الآخر ، لا بمعنى أنه آخر كل ممكن إذ الممكنات غير متناهية فلا آخر لها

That is: because His firstness consists in essential richness and in His not needing another for His existence, He is called the Last — not in the sense that He is the last of every possible thing, since possible things are non-finite and thus have no last.

﴿ولهذا قيل فيه الآخر … فلو كانت أوليته أولية وجود التقييد، لم يصح أن يكون الآخر للمقيد، لأنه لا آخر للممكن لأن الممكنات غير متناهية فلا آخر لها. … وإنما كان آخرا لرجوع الأمر كله إليه بعد نسبة ذلك إلينا. فهو الآخر في عين أوليته والأول في عين آخريته﴾

أي، ولأجل أن أوليته ليست عبارة عن افتتاح الوجود عن عدم، قيل فيه الآخر، كما قال الله تعالى: (هو الأول والآخر.) %~% فلو كانت أولية الحق تعالى مثل أولية الموجود المقيد، بمعنى افتتاح الوجود عن العدم، لم يصح أن يكون آخرا، لأن الآخرية عبارة حينئذ عن انتهاء الموجودات المقيدة والممكنات غير متناهية، فلا آخر لها. وهذا الكلام إنما هو بحسب الدار الآخرة. وأما بحسب الدنيا فهي متناهية فلا ينبغي أن يتوهم أنه رضي الله عنه قائل بقدم الدنيا، لذلك قال

That is, because His firstness is not an expression of an inception of existence out of nonexistence, He is called "the Last," as God, Exalted, said: "He is the First and the Last." Now, if the firstness of the Real, Exalted, were like the firstness of a delimited existent, in the sense of an inception of existence out of nonexistence, it would not be valid for Him to be "Last," because lastness would then be an expression of the termination of delimited existents, and contingent things are unending, so there is no last for them. This statement, however, pertains to the standpoint of the Hereafter (al-dār al-ākhira); as for the standpoint of this world (al-dunyā), it is finite, so one should not imagine that he — may God be pleased with him — holds the doctrine of the eternity of the world (qidam al-dunyā). Hence he said

﴿ولهذا قيل فيه : الآخر﴾

جمع بين المتقابلين بوحدته الإطلاقيّة

joining together the two opposites by virtue of His absolute unity (waḥda iṭlāqiyya)

﴿قيل فيه الآخر﴾

المقابل للأول

— the counterpart of the First...

﴿ولهذا قيل فيه الاخر﴾

بوندن اوتری حقک حقنده آخر دینلدی زیرا آنک اولیتی وجود مقید اولیتی دکلدر بلکه جمیع اشیادن وجود سابق ازلی ایله اول موجوددر واشیاایجون هدادر* پس اشیا ایچون ینه مرجعدر پس بووجه ایله آخر در

Because of this, "the Last" was said concerning the Real; for His firstness is not the firstness of restricted wujūd (being); rather He is the First Existent, by a beginningless wujūd prior to all things, and is […] for things. So He is also the place of return for things; so in this respect He is Last.

﴿فلو كانت أوليته أولية وجود التقييد لم يصح أن يكون الآخر للمقيد لأنه لا آخر للممكن لأن الممكنات غير متناهية فلا آخر لها ، وإنما كان آخرا لرجوع الأمر كله إليه بعد نسبة ذلك إلينا فهو الآخر في عين أوليته والأول في عين آخريته﴾

أي فلو كانت أوليته بأن يكون وجودا مقيدا واحدا من الموجودات المقيدة فابتدأ منه المقيدات لزم أن يكون آخريته بأن يكون آخرا للمقيدات لكنه لا آخر لها ولو كان لها آخرية ينتهى به الوجود لم يصح أن يكون الآخر عين الأول فآخريته برجوع الأمر كله إليه بعد نسبته إلينا كما ذكر في دائرة الوجود . فكذلك أوليته بابتداء الكل منه بنسبته إلينا فالنسب والإضافات ممكنة والحقيقة من حيث هي هي واجبة وذلك معنى قولهم التوحيد إسقاط الإضافات ولا إله إلا هو كل شيء هالك إلا وجهه. ( ثم ليعلم أن الحق ) أي بعد العلم بما ذكر . ليعلم أنه تعالى لما أرانا آيات أسمائه وصفاته في العالم جعل فينا ما نعرف به ذلك فشركنا مع العالم في صفاته لنعرف بما فينا ما فيه وما أمكن العالم قبول جميع أسماء الحق وصفاته ، لأن الفارق بينه وبين الحق الوجوب الذاتي والإمكان وما يلزمهما من الغنى والفقر لازم فيقبل بعضها وهو الذي لا يختص بالوجوب كالوجود والظهور والبطون . وأما البعض الآخر فلا يقبل إلا آثارها التي يليق بفقره ونقصه ،وجمع فينا بأحدية الجمع الأمرين. فلذلك قسمها قسمين وجعل القسم الأول مشتركا بين الكل أي بين الحق تعالى وبيننا وبين العالم فقال

has been attributed to us; so He is the Last in the very state of His firstness, and the First in the very state of His lastness."] That is: if His firstness consisted in His being a single delimited existent among delimited existents, such that the delimited things began from Him, it would follow that His lastness would consist in His being the last of the delimited things; but the possible has no last, and were there a lastness for it at which existence terminates, it would not be valid for the Last to be identical with the First. Rather, His lastness consists in the reversion of the whole affair to Him, after that reversion has been attributed to us, as was mentioned regarding the circle of existence. Likewise, His firstness consists in the inception of the whole from Him, by attribution to us. Thus relations (nisab) and ascriptions (iḍāfāt) are possible (mumkina), while the Reality (al-ḥaqīqa), in itself, is necessary (wājiba). This is the meaning of their saying: 'Unification (tawḥīd) is the dropping of ascriptions,' and '[there is] no god but He; everything perishes except His Face.' [Text: "Then let it be known that the Real..."] — that is, after knowledge of what has been mentioned: let it be known that He, exalted, when He showed us the signs of His Names and Attributes in the cosmos (al-ʿālam), placed within us that by which we might know this, so that He made us share with the cosmos in [His] attributes, in order that we might know by what is within us what is within it. Yet the cosmos was not able to receive all the Names and Attributes of the Real, because the distinguishing factor between it and the Real is essential necessity (al-wujūb al-dhātī) as against possibility (al-imkān), together with what necessarily attaches to each — richness (ghinā) and poverty (faqr) respectively. So it receives some of them, namely those not specific to necessity, such as existence, manifestation (ẓuhūr), and nonmanifestation (buṭūn). As for the rest, it receives only their traces (āthār), suited to its poverty and deficiency. And He gathered within us, by the oneness of all-comprehensiveness (aḥadiyyat al-jamʿ), both matters together. For this reason He divided them into two divisions, making the first division common to all — that is, shared between the Real, exalted, ourselves, and the cosmos — and He said:

﴿فلو كانت أوليته أولية وجود التقييد لم يصح أن يكون الآخر المقيد، لأنه لا آخر للممكن، لأن الممكنات غير متناهية فلا آخر لها. وإنما كان آخرا لرجوع الأمر كله إليه بعد نسبة ذلك إلينا، فهو الآخر في عين أوليته، والأول في عين آخريته.﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

قلت: يعني لو كانت له أولية اتصفت بها بالوجود بعد اتصافه بالعدم إذ كانت هذه الأولية هي أولية خاصة مقيدة. فكأنه يقول: إن هناك أولية أخرى يصح معها أن تكون أولا مع کونه آخرا وأما تلك الأولية المذكورة فلا يصح أن يسمى من كان بها أولا أن يكون آخرا أيضا وإلا اجتمع الضدان لشيء واحد . لكن الشيخ ما علل باجتماع الضدين بل علل بإن من كان له الأولية بافتتاح الوجود كان کالممکنات في وجودها، فإن لها الأولية بافتتاح الوجود لكن مع هذا القيد لا يصح أن يكون لها الآخرية إذ الممكنات لا نهاية لها وفي قوة كلامه في قوله: لأن الممكنات لا نهاية لها، أنها ستوجد إلى غير نهاية وصرح بأن هذه الأولية ليست للحق تعالی. فلا جرم صح مع أوليته تعالى أن يكون له آخرية في عين أوليته و أوليته في عين آخريته . بخلاف الممكن وأما كيف ذلك؟ ولم ذلك؟ فما ذكره ولعمري أن الحاجة داعية إلى بيانه فإنه مهم وأما قوله: وإنما كان آخرا لرجوع الأمر كله إليه، فذلك غير واضح في تسميته بالآخرية، فإنه إن كانت أوليته بابتداء إيجاد العالم فكان الحال يقتضي أن يكون آخرا باعتبار انتهاء ایجاد العالم . وقد قال: إن العالم لا آخر لإيجاده، فكيف يكون هو آخرا بهذا التقدير، فإذن له معنى آخر نحتاج نحن أن يعرفنا إياه. قوله

"For if His primordiality were the primordiality of delimited existence, it would not be valid for Him to be the delimited Last, since there is no last for the possible thing (al-mumkin), because the possible things (al-mumkināt) are unbounded and thus have no last. Rather, He is the Last through the return of the whole affair to Him, after that [return] is ascribed to us; so He is the Last in the very state of His firstness, and the First in the very state of His lastness." I say: he means that if He had a primordiality by which He was characterized by existence after being characterized by nonexistence, this primordiality would be a specific, delimited primordiality. It is as though he is saying: there exists another primordiality with which it is valid for Him to be first while also being last; but as for that aforementioned [delimited] primordiality, it is not valid for the one who possesses it to be called "first" and also "last," for otherwise two opposites would coincide in a single thing. Yet the Shaykh did not give as his reason the coincidence of two opposites; rather, he gave as his reason that whoever has primordiality through the inception of existence would be like the possible things in their existence, for they too have primordiality through the inception of existence, but with this qualification it is not valid for them to have lastness, since the possible things are without end. And it is implicit in his statement — "because the possible things are without end" — that they will continue to come into existence without end, and he made explicit that this [kind of] primordiality does not belong to the Real, exalted is He. Hence it is necessarily valid that, along with His primordiality, exalted is He, He should have a lastness in the very state of His firstness, and a firstness in the very state of His lastness — unlike the possible thing. But as for how this is so, and why it is so, he did not state, and, by my life, the need calls for its clarification, for it is a matter of importance. As for his saying, "rather, He is the Last through the return of the whole affair to Him," this is not clear as a designation of lastness, for if His primordiality consisted in the inception of the existentiation of the world, the situation would require that He be last by virtue of the termination of the existentiation of the world. Yet he has said that the world's existentiation has no end, so how, on this supposition, can He be last? There must then be another meaning [intended], which we need him to make known to us. His saying

﴿فلو كانت أوّليّته أوّليّة وجود التقييد﴾

بأن يكون افتتاح سلسلة الأعيان الممكنة في الوجود منه على ما عليه مسلك أرباب العقائد العقليّة مطلقا تقليديّة أو برهانيّة نظريّة

such that the inception of the series of possible entities in existence were from Him, according to the way of the adherents of rational creeds absolutely — whether traditional or speculative-demonstrative

﴿فلو كانت أوليته أولية وجود التقييد﴾

وافتتاح وجود المقيد عن عدم

and the inception of the existence of the delimited from nonexistence...

﴿فلو كانت أوليته أولية وجود التقييد﴾

أي افتتاح الوجود من العدم

that is, the opening of existence out of nonexistence

﴿فلو كانت اوليته اولية وجود التقييد﴾

پس اکر حقک اولیتی وجود تقیید اولیتی اولیدی یعنی اکر حقک اولیتی وجود ی حیثیتیله مقیده اولان اولیت اولیدی

So if the Real's firstness were the firstness of the wujūd (being) of restriction — that is, if the Real's firstness were a firstness restricted in respect of wujūd —

﴿لم يصح أن يكون الآخر للمقيّد ، لأنّه لا آخر للممكن ، لأنّ الممكنات غير متناهية فلا آخر لها﴾

أصلا ، لا دنيا ولا آخرة ، إذ الحوادث اليوميّة غير متناهية اتفاقا ، وظاهر أنّه لا يستلزم ذلك قدم الدنيا - كما توهّمه البعض - فإنّ نسبة الزمان بمعزل عن هذه الأوليّة والآخريّة كما لا يخفى

at all — neither in this world nor the next, since daily occurrences are infinite by consensus. It is clear that this does not entail the eternity of the world, as some have imagined, for the relation of time is quite apart from this firstness and lastness, as is not hidden

﴿لم يصح أن يكون آخرا للمقيد﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

بأن ينتهي إليه وجود المقبلات الممكنة ولا يوجد بعده ممكن لا آخر

in the sense that the existence of the successive possible things terminates in Him, and no possible thing exists after Him — there being no last (for it)...

﴿لم يصح أن يكون آخرا للمقيد﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي للممكن بمعني رجوع الكل إليه لأنه حينئذ يكون من الممكنات والممكن لا يرجع إليه شيء فكانت آخريته حينئذ بمعني الانتهاء والانقطاع وهذا لا يصح أيض

that is, relative to the contingent (mumkin), in the sense of the return of all things to Him—for in that case He would be among the contingent things, and nothing returns to the contingent. So His 'lastness' would then be in the sense of termination and cessation, and this too is not valid

﴿لم يصح ان يكون﴾

آخر المقید لانه الاخر الممکن لان الممکات غیر متناهیة ولا آخرلها) صحیح اولمزدی حقک مقید ایجون آخراولمسی ز براشان بودر که ممکن ایچون آخر یوقدر زیرا ممکنات غیرمتناهیه در* پس آنلر ایچون آخر یوقدر و حال بو که حق آخر در* امدی حقک آخریتی بومعنایه دکلدر که فی ممکنات منتهیه اولسه حق آنلرک آخری اوله یعنی وجود تقییدک آخری اوله

"the Last of the restricted, because He is the last of the possible, because possibles are unending and have no last": it would not be valid for the Real to be Last for the restricted; for the matter is that the possible has no last, since possibles are unending; so they have no last, whereas the Real is Last. So the Real's lastness is not in this sense: that if possibles were [supposed to be] ending, the Real would be their last, i.e. the last of the wujūd (being) of restriction.

﴿لأنه آخر للممكن لأن الممكنات غير متناهية﴾

وإن كان بحسب النشأة الأخروية

, even if this be considered in respect of the eschatological constitution (al-nashʾa al-ukhrawiyya)...

﴿لأنه لا آخر للممكن لأن الممكنات غير متناهية﴾

أي غیر منعدم بانتفاء لعينه بحيث تفوته تعالى .قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه في آخر نص يونسية وإليه برجع الأمر كله ، فإذا أخذه إليه سوى له مركبة غير هذا المركب من جنس الدار التي ينتقل إليه .فالكل في قبضته فلا فقدان في حقه.تم كلامه فكانت الممكنات غير متناهية بهذا المعنى وهو المراد منا فلا ينافيه الانتهاء بحسب الدار الدنيا فإذا كانت غير متناهية

that is, they do not cease to be nonexistent, in the sense that His very Essence is never lost to Him, Most High. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said at the end of the Fuṣṣ of Jonah (naṣṣ yūnusiyya): 'And to Him the whole matter returns, for when He takes it to Himself, He composes for it another composition, other than this composition, of the kind of the abode to which it moves—for the whole is within His grasp, and there is no loss in what pertains to Him.' His words end here. Thus the contingent things are without end in this sense, and this is what is intended by us—so it is not contradicted by their finitude with respect to the abode of this world. So since they are without end

﴿فلا آخر لها﴾

وإذا لم يكن لها آخر فكيف يكون سبحانه آخرا له

. And if they have no last, how then could He, glory be to Him, be a last for it?

﴿فلا آخر لها﴾

فلا يتصف بالآخرية للمنافاة بينها وبين الآخرية فكان الحق آخرا ومنتهى لها

so they are not qualified by 'lastness,' due to the incompatibility between them and 'lastness.' Thus the Real is 'the Last' and the terminus for them

﴿وإنّما كان آخرا لرجوع الأمر كلَّه إليه بعد نسبة ذلك إلينا﴾

كما أنّه إنّما كان أوّلا لبدء ذلك الأمر منه قبل نسبته إلينا

just as He is the First because that affair begins from Him, prior to its ascription to us

﴿وإنما كان سبحانه آخرا لرجوع الأمر كله﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

متن نص فصوص الحكم : و لا نشك أنّا كثيرون بالشخص و النوع، و أنا و إن كنا على حقيقة واحدة تجمعنا فنعلم قطعاً أن ثَمَّ فارقاً به تميزت الأشخاص بعضها عن بعض، و لو لا ذلك ما كانت الكثرة في الواحد. فكذلك أيضاً، و إن وَصَفَنَا بما وصف نفسه من جميع الوجوه فلا بد من فارق، و ليس إلا افتقارنا إليه في الوجود و توقف وجودنا عليه لإمكاننا و غناه عن مثل ما افتقرنا إليه. فبهذا صح له الأزل و القدم الذي انتفت عنه الأولية التي لها افتتاح الوجود عن عدم. فلا تُنسَبُ إليه الأوليّة مع كونه الأول. شرح الجامي : دفعه بقوله : (ولا تشك أنا) يعني أهل العالم (كثيرون) متفاوتون

, i.e., His Essence (dhāt), which became entified (taʿayyanat) and manifested in our form. In some copies it reads: 'and when we witness our own selves, we witness Himself' — both readings are sound. Then follows the coherence of his words, may God be pleased with him, in explaining the aspect of the connection between the Necessary and the possible, down to the rest of [the discussion of] bringing-into-existence. Text of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam: 'And we do not doubt that we are many in person and in species (nawʿ), and that we — though we share one reality (ḥaqīqa wāḥida) that unites us — know for certain that there is a differentiating factor (fāriq) by which individuals are distinguished from one another, for without that there would be no multiplicity in the one. Likewise also, even though He described us with what He described Himself with, in every respect, there must be a differentiating factor, and it is none other than our need (iftiqār) for Him in existence and the dependence of our existence upon Him owing to our possibility (imkān), and His independence (ghinā) from the like of that which we need. By this, eternity (azal) and pre-eternity (qidam) are established for Him, from which is negated the firstness (awwaliyya) that entails the inception of existence from nonexistence. So firstness, in this sense, is not to be ascribed to Him, even though He is the First.' Sharḥ al-Jāmī: He rebuts this by his saying: '(we do not doubt that we) — meaning the people of the world — (are many)' — differing...

﴿وإنما كان﴾

الحق (آخرا لرجوع كل الأمر إليه بعد نسبة ذلك) الأمر إلينا، فإذا كان الرجوع بعد النسبة إلينا فكنا نحن نتصف بالرجوع إليه تعالی في کل آن بحسب كل يوم هو في شأن وإذا كان الأمر كذلك

—so if the return occurs after its ascription to us, then we ourselves are qualified by 'return' to Him, Most High, at every instant, in accordance with 'every day He is upon some task' (kulla yawmin huwa fī shaʾn). And since the matter is thus

﴿والماكان آخر الرجوع الامر كله اليه بعد نسبة ذلك الينا﴾

بلکه حق آخر اولدی امر کلیسی اکا رجوع ایتدیکندن اوتری امرک کلیسی بزه نسبت اولدقد نصکره یعنی اولاتمین اول مرتبه سنده لاتعین اولان ذاتک تجلیسی متعین اولدقد نصکره جمیع تعینات علمیه ده متعین ومحدثات کونیه ده بحسب المراتب ظاهر ومتعین اولوب انسان کامل مرتبه سنده امر ظهور منتهی اولنجه جمیع امور بزم وجودات متعینه مزه بحسب المراتب نسبت اولنور کن امر ظهور منتهی اولمغله* حجب تعینات مراتب مرتفع اولوب وجه وجود مطلق ظاهر اولدقده بزم وجودات متعینه مزه نسبت اولنان امور اکا رجوع ایدر مثلا وجودات حادثه مزده متعینه اولوب مظاهر مزله مقیده اولان تجلیات الهیه کبی* ووجود امزده راسخه اولان صفات الهیه وعلوم ربانیه وصفات عبدا نیه وسار اخلاق وافعال کبیکه آنلر بزه نسبت او لنور لردی جمله سی اکارجوع ایدر واکانسبت اولنور* مظاهر مزده آنلرک ظهوری اعتباریله* پس امر تجلی وظهور وامر تعینات اسمائیه* اکا رجوع ایتمکله آخر اولور* لاموجود الا هو* فالکل منه بدأ والیه یعود (لا اله الا هو والیه المصیر) اول مطلق غیر متعین فی کونه عین الکل بلا بدایة وآخر فی عین لاتعینه واطلاقه یرجع الامور الیه لا الی نهایة)

Rather, the Real became Last because the whole of the matter returns to Him, after the whole of the matter has been ascribed to us. That is, after the tajallī (self-disclosure) of the Essence — which is non-determination — has become determined at the martaba (level) of the first taʿayyun (determination), it becomes determined in all the cognitive determinations and manifest and determined in the engendered originated things according to the levels; and until the matter of ẓuhūr (manifestation) comes to an end at the level of the insān kāmil (perfect human), all matters are ascribed to our determined existences according to the levels. When the matter of manifestation comes to its end, the veils of the determinations of the levels are lifted, and when the face of absolute wujūd (being) becomes manifest, the matters that were ascribed to our determined existences return to Him: for example, like the divine self-disclosures that are determined in our originated existences and restricted by our maẓāhir (loci of manifestation); and like the divine attributes and lordly knowledges firmly rooted in our existences, and servant-attributes, and other character traits and acts, which used to be ascribed to us — all of them return to Him and are ascribed to Him, in respect of their manifestation in our loci. So, through the matter of self-disclosure and manifestation and the matter of the name-determinations returning to Him, He is Last. "There is no existent but He. So all began from Him and to Him returns. (There is no god but He; to Him is the journeying) (Q 40:3). First, absolute, undetermined, in His being the very all, without beginning; and Last in His very non-determination and absoluteness, the matters returning to Him, not to an end."

﴿بعد نسبة ذلك﴾

الأمر (إلينا) . لأن الوجود وتوابعه كان لله اولا ثم نسب إلينا ئم بعد هذه النسبة مرجع الكل إليه

affair (to us). For existence and what follows upon it belonged to God first, then was ascribed to us; then, after this ascription, the return of all is to Him.

﴿فهو الآخر في عين أوّليّته ، والأوّل في عين آخريّته﴾

يعني رضي الله عنه :أنّ الوجود المطلق هو الأوّل على الإطلاق ، ثم إن تعيّن وتقيّد الوجود بتنوّع التجلَّي في مراتب تعيّناته فهو في حقيقته على أوّل الإطلاق الأصلي .لأنّ التعين والتقيد نسبتان لا تقدحان في إطلاقه الحقيقي الذي ليس في مقابلة التقييد ، بل هو معنى ذاتيّ للذات .نعم ، الإطلاق والتعيّن يستلزم تعقّلهما انتفاء البداية والنهاية ، والافتتاح والاختتام ، شمل بنور هويّته وإنّيّته المطلق والمقيّد .فإنّ العين المطلق عين المطلق اللامتعيّن وعين المتعيّن غير المتناهي في تعيّنه ، لا إلى أبد أبدا الأبد ، فهي هي في اللاتعيّن الأوّل الباطن وفي التعيّن الآخر الظاهر .فما ثمّ إلَّا هو هو ، فهو الأوّل في عين آخريته والآخر في عين أوّليته .قال رضي الله عنه

He means, may God be pleased with him: that absolute existence is the First absolutely; then, if existence becomes entified and delimited through the diversification of self-disclosure within the levels of its entifications, it nevertheless remains, in its reality, upon the original absolute firstness. For entification and delimitation are two relations that do not impugn His true absoluteness, which is not in opposition to delimitation, but rather is an essential meaning belonging to the Essence. Indeed, the conceiving of absoluteness and entification necessitates the negation of beginning and end, of opening and closing; [this negation] encompasses, by the light of His identity and ipseity, both the absolute and the delimited. For the absolute entity (al-ʿayn al-muṭlaq) is the very entity of the absolute non-entified, and the very entity of the entified that is unlimited in its entification, unto everlasting eternity without end; so it is the very same, in the first non-entification, the Nonmanifest, and in the last entification, the Manifest. So there is nothing there but He Himself; He is the First in the very state of His lastness, and the Last in the very state of His firstness. He, may God be pleased with him, said:

﴿فهو الآخر في عين أوّليّته ، والأوّل في عين آخريّته﴾

ضرورة أنّ بدء الأمر في الافتقار المذكور منه إنّما هو عين رجوع الأمر كلَّه إليه كما أنّ رجوع أمر الانتساب إليه هو عين البدء منه ، ومن هاهنا تبيّن ظهور الكثرة في الواحد ببدئها منه ورجوعها إليه . وصورة ذلك هي الدائرة الكاملة ، المبتدأ فيها بالنقطة المنتهية إليها ، ولذلك إذا استقصيت الحروف وجدت ما اشتمل منها على تلك الصورة رقما هو الهاء ، ولفظا هو الواو ، والمركب منهم « هو » المحمول عليه الاسمان تنبّه . ثمّ إذ قد بيّن من الأسماء الأربعة المذكورة الأولين منها الدالين على التنزيه حان أن يبيّن الآخرين، الدالَّين منها على التشبيه، إتماما لما هو بصدد بيانه . ولمّا كان مبنى أمر التشبيه على الجهة الارتباطيّة كما عرفت، وهي على ضروب : منها ما هو بنفسه مشترك اشتراك اتحاد وذلك إنّما يكون في الأسماء الأول الذاتيّة - كما سبق في العلم والحياة وهما اللذان مؤدّاهما في هذا السياق الباطن والظاهر، وذلك إنّما يكون على ما تقرّر بصدقه على أفراده وجزئيّاته العينيّة ب « هو هو » ، كالغيب والشهادة من العالم بالنسبة إلى الباطن والظاهر منه . ومنها ما هو بآثاره المترتّبة وأحكامه التابعة هي الرابطة ، كالخوف والرجاء من العالم بالنسبة إلى الغضب والرضا منه ، وذلك إنّما يكون في الأوصاف والأسماء الأخيرة . ومنها ما هو بصورة وأمثلته التي هي أنهى غايات تلك الآثار رابطة ، كالهيبة والانس من العالم بالنسبة إلى الجلال والجمال منه . وذلك إنّما يكون في الأسماء الجامعة الإلهيّة . وأشار إلى ذلك بقوله

necessarily, since the beginning of the affair, in the aforementioned neediness, from Him is precisely identical with the return of the whole affair to Him, just as the return of the affair of ascription to Him is precisely identical with its beginning from Him. From this it becomes clear how multiplicity appears within the One, through its beginning from Him and its returning to Him. The image of this is the perfect circle, in which the point of beginning is [also] the point of ending. Hence, if you examine the letters, you find that what encompasses this form — as a written shape — is the hā', and as a spoken sound, the wāw, and their composite is 'Huwa' (He), upon which the two names [First and Last] are predicated — reflect upon this. Then, having explained the first two of the four aforementioned Names, which indicate transcendence (tanzīh), it is now time to explain the other two, which indicate assimilation (tashbīh), so as to complete what he intends to expound. And since the basis of the matter of assimilation rests upon the relational aspect (nisba), as you have learned, and this is of [several] kinds: one of them is that which is itself shared in a sharing of identity (ittiḥād), and this occurs only in the primary essential Names — as previously [seen] with Knowledge and Life, whose import in this context is the Nonmanifest (bāṭin) and the Manifest (ẓāhir) — and this occurs, as established, by [the Name's] being true of its individual instances and particular entities in the manner of 'He is it' (huwa huwa), like the unseen and the witnessed of the world in relation to its nonmanifest and manifest [aspects]. Another kind is that in which the connecting link consists in the resultant effects and the consequent properties [of the Names], like fear and hope on the part of the world in relation to [the divine] wrath and good-pleasure — and this occurs [only] in the later attributes and Names. And another kind is that in which the connecting link consists in a form and its exemplars, which are the ultimate limits of those effects, like awe and intimacy on the part of the world in relation to [the divine] majesty and beauty — and this occurs [only] in the comprehensive divine Names. To this he alluded by his statement:

﴿فهو الآخر في عين أوليته الأول في عين آخريته﴾

بهويته بين الأضداد وهو ظاهر بها أزل الآزال و أبد الآباد. وكما أشار رضي الله عنه فيما تقدم إلى الأوصاف المشتركة بيننا وبين الحق سبحانه خص بالذكر منها الأوصاف المتقابلة ههنا ليفرع عليها بيان المراد من اليدين اللتين توجهتا من الحق على خلق آدم و بنيه على أن في جميع الیدین تشريفا له و ليس لإبليس هذه الجمعية. فقال: (لعلم أن الحق سبحانه وصف نفسه) ، أي ذاته المطلقة

, by His identity (huwiyya) amid the opposites, being manifest through them from the eternity of eternities (azal al-āzāl) to the everlastingness of everlastingnesses (abad al-ābād). And just as he, may God be pleased with him, alluded earlier to the attributes shared between us and the Real, glory be to Him, he singles out here, from among them, the paired/opposing attributes, in order to base upon them the explanation of what is meant by the two hands that were directed from the Real toward the creation of Adam and his progeny — namely, that in both hands together there is honor for him, whereas Iblīs does not possess this comprehensiveness (jamʿiyya). So he said: '(That it be known that the Real, glory be to Him, described Himself)' — i.e., His absolute Essence...

﴿فهو الآخر في عين أوليته والأول في عين آخريته﴾

بحيث لا يسبق ولا ولا يتقدم أحدهما على الآخر في الرتبة فهو الآخر حيث أزل إذ رجوعية الكل إليه ثابتة فيه وهو الأول حيث أخر. إذ مبتدئ الكل ثابتة فيه فكان أوليته عين آخريته وآخريته عين أوليته ولا كذلك الممكن

such that neither of the two precedes nor takes rank before the other. So He is 'the Last' in the sense that the return of all things to Him is established as constant in Him, and He is 'the First' in the sense that the origination of all things is established as constant in Him. Thus His 'firstness' is identical to His 'lastness,' and His 'lastness' is identical to His 'firstness'—unlike the contingent (mumkin)

﴿فهو الآخر في عين اوليته والاول في عين اخريته﴾

پس حق آخر درعین اولیتنده واولدر عین آخر بتنده یعنی وجود مطلق اطلاق ذاتیسنده ایکن تعیناتک مبدائی اولمغله اول اولمسی وتعیناتک امری اکا رجوع ایتمکله آخر اولمسی* اطلاق ذاتیسی اوزره امر زائده دکلدر بلکه هو هودر* واول وآخر اولمسی امر نسبیدر* پس آخریتی عین اولیت واولیتی عین آخر یتدر* پس وجودده بزم افتقارمز اکاذاتی اولمغله اکااول واخر اطلاق اولندی وغناء ذاتیسی ارلمغله انکیجون ازل وقدم صحیح اولدی فهو الاول والباطن فی اللا تعین والاخر والظاهر فی التعین فثم الاهو (ثم یتعلم) بابله مفعول ایچون مبنیدر وانت قلیله اوزره تا الله امر حاضر معلوم اولمق جائزدر)

So the Real is Last in the very [midst of] His firstness, and First in the very [midst of] His lastness. That is, absolute wujūd's (being's) being First, while in its essential absoluteness, through being the origin of the taʿayyunāt (determinations), and its being Last, through the matter of the determinations returning to it, is not a matter additional to its essential absoluteness; rather He is He. And His being First and Last is a relational matter. So His lastness is the very firstness, and His firstness is the very lastness. So, our need for Him in wujūd being essential, "First and Last" was applied to Him; and His independence being essential, azal (beginninglessness) and qidam (pre-eternity) became valid for Him. "So He is the First and the Inward in non-determination, and the Last and the Outward in determination; so there is none but He." (thumma yuʿlam) is built for the passive with […]; and on a rare [reading] it may be with tāʾ, as an active second-person imperative.