Mashrabaمشربة

The commentators side by side

One passage at a time. Each column is a commentator; each row gathers the comments on the same words, so readings and emphases can be compared.

فَصُّ حِكْمَةٍ مُهَيَّمِيَّةٍ فِي كَلِمَةٍ إِبْرَاهِيمِيَّةٍ

←→Read ¶7 in the text

7 · 70 words · shading: how many commentators stop on each word

فَإِنْ قُلْتَ فَمَا فَائِدَةُ قَوْلِهِ فَلَوْ شَآءَ لَهَدَىٰكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ قُلْنَا لَوْ شَآءَ لَوْ حَرْفُ امْتِنَاعٍ الٱمْتِنَاعِ فَمَا شَاءَ إِلَّا مَا هُوَ الأَمْرُ عَلَيْهِ وَلَكِنَّ عَيْنُ المُمْكِنِ قَابِلٌ لِلشَّيْءِ وَنَقِيضِهِ فِي حُكْمِ دَلِيلِ العَقْلِ وَأَيُّ الحُكْمَيْنِ المَعْقُولَيْنِ وَقَعَ ذَٰلِكَ هُوَ الَّذِي كَانَ عَلَيْهِ المُمْكِنُ فِي حَالِ ثُبُوتِهِ وَمَعْنَى لَهَدَاكُمْ لَبَيَّنَ لَكُمْ وَمَا كُلُّ مُمْكِنٍ مِنَ العَالَمِ فَتَحَ اللَّهُ عَيْنَ بَصِيرَتِهِ لِإِدْرَاكِ الأَمْرَ فِي نَفْسِهِ عَلَى مَا هُوَ عَلَيْهِ فَمِنْهُمْ العَالِمُ وَالجَاهِلُ

If you say, 'Then what is the point of His saying, "So had He willed, He would have guided you all" [Q 6:149]?', we say: "Had He willed" [Q 6:148]: law is a particle [signifying] the impossibility [of one thing] because of the impossibility [of another]. So He willed nothing but what the matter is [in itself]. But the entity of the possible is receptive of a thing and of its contradictory according to the judgment of rational proof, and whichever of the two intelligible judgments occurs, that is what the possible was in the state of its fixity. And the meaning of 'He would have guided you' is 'He would have made [it] clear to you.' Yet not every possible of the cosmos has God opened the eye of its insight to perceive the matter in itself as it is. So among them are the knower and the ignorant.

al-Jandī

﴿فإن قلت : فما فائدة قوله : " فَلَوْ شاءَ لَهَداكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

؟ قلنا : " لو " حرف امتناع لامتناع ، فما شاء إلَّا ما هو الأمر عليه . ولكن عين الممكن قابل للشيء ونقيضه في حكم العقل ، وأيّ الحكمين المعقولين وقع فذلك هو الذي كان عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته . ومعنى « لهديكم » أي لبيّن لكم

, so He willed only what the matter actually is. But the very essence of the possible thing (al-mumkin) is receptive, in the judgment of reason, to a thing and its opposite, and whichever of the two intelligible judgments occurs is what the possible thing was upon in the state of its fixity. And the meaning of "would have guided you" is "would have made clear to you."]

al-Qayṣarī

﴿فإن قلت: فما فائدة قوله: "فلو شاء لهديكم أجمعين"﴾

قلنا: (لو) حرف امتناع لامتناع، فما شاء إلا ما هو الأمر عليه، ولكن عين الممكن قابل للشئ ونقيضه في حكم دليل العقل، وأي الحكمين المعقولين وقع، فذلك هو الذي عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته , إنما أورد السؤال للتنبيه على سر القدر في الجواب. والسؤال أنه: لما كان الحاكم علينا أعياننا، وليس للحق إلا إفاضة الوجود على حسب مقتضى الأعيان، فما فائدة قوله

We say: (law) ["had"] is a particle indicating impossibility due to [another] impossibility. So He did not will except what the matter actually is; but the entity of the possible thing (al-mumkin) is receptive to a thing and its contrary according to the judgment of rational proof, and whichever of the two rationally conceivable judgments occurs, that is what the possible thing is upon in the state of its fixity (thubūt). He only raised the question to draw attention to the secret of destiny (qadar) in the answer. And the question is: since what judges over us is our entities, and the Real has nothing but the effusion of existence according to what the entities require, what then is the benefit of His saying

Ibn Turka

﴿فإن قلت﴾

« إذا كان أمر أحوال الأعيان وما يطرأ جزئيّات قوابل الإمكان مطلقا إنّما هو على ما هم عليه في حال ثبوتهم ، ولا دخل للفاعل فيه أصل ( فما فائدة قوله : " فَلَوْ شاءَ لَهَداكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ " [ 6 / 149 ] ؟

'if the matter of the states of the entities and whatever befalls the particulars of the receptacles of possibility absolutely is only according to what they are in the state of their fixity (thubūt), and the agent has no part in it at all, then what is the benefit of His saying: "Had He willed, He would have guided you all" [6:149]?'

Bālī Zāde

﴿فإن قلت: فما فائدة قوله تعالى: "لو شاء، لهداكم أجمعين "﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

[النحل: 9] . يعني إذا كان الحكم علينا منا لا من الله فما معنى تعلق المشيئة إلى هداية الكل في قوله تعالی: "لو شاء، لهداكم أجمعين " [النحل: 9] (قلنا) في بيان فائدة هذا الكلام

[al-Naḥl: 9] — that is, if the decree upon us is from us and not from God, then what is the meaning of the attachment of the Divine Will (mashīʾa) to the guidance of all in His saying, Almighty: "Had He willed, He would have guided you all" [al-Naḥl: 9]? (We say), in clarifying the benefit of this statement:

al-Qayṣarī

﴿فلو شاء لهديكم أجمعين﴾

وجوابه: أن (لو) حرف لامتناع الشئ لامتناع غيره. ولما كانت الأعيان متفاوتة الاستعداد: بعضها قابلة للهداية وبعضها غير قابلة لها، امتنع حصول الهداية للجميع. فمعنى قوله تعالى

And its answer is: that (law) is a particle for the impossibility of a thing due to the impossibility of another. And since the entities differ in preparedness—some receptive to guidance and some not receptive to it—the attainment of guidance for all became impossible. So the meaning of His saying, exalted is He,

﴿فلو شاء لهديكم أجمعين﴾

أنه لم يشأ، لعلمه بامتناع حصول الهداية للجميع. فما تعلقت المشيئة إلا بما هو الأمر عليه، فعدم المشيئة معلل بعدم إعطاء أعيانهم هداية الجميع. وذلك لأن المشيئة والإرادة نسبتان تابعتان للعلم، إذ المشيئة تطلب المشاء، والإرادة المراد، وهمالا بد وأن يكونا معلومتين. والعلم في حضرة الأسماء والصفات من وجه تابع للمعلوم، من حيث كونه نسبة طالبة للمنتسبين، كما مر تحقيقه في المقدمات. وما يوجد الحق إلا بحسب استعداد القوابل لا غير. فلا يقع في الوجود إلا ما أعطته الأعيان، والعين ما تعطى إلا بمقتضى ذاتها، ولا يقتضى الذات شيئا ونقيضه، وإن كان العقل يحكم على أن الممكن قابل للشئ ونقيضه لاتصافه بالإمكان المقتضى لتساوي الطرفين: طرفي الوجود والعدم. لكن الواقف على سر القدر يعلم أن الواقع هو الذي يقتضيه ذات الشئ فقط. والأعيان ليست مجعولة بجعل جاعل، ليتوجه الإيراد بأن يقال: لم جعل عين المهتدى مقتضية للاهتداء وعين الضال مقتضية للضلالة؟ كمالا يتوجه أن يقال: لم جعل عين الكلب نجس العين وعين الإنسان إنسانا طاهرا؟ بل الأعيان صور الأسماء الإلهية ومظاهرها في العلم، بل عين الأسماء والصفات القائمة بالذات القديمة. بل هي عين الذات من حيث الحقيقة. فهي باقية أزلا وأبدا، ولا يتعلق الجعل والإيجاد عليها، كما لا يتطرق الفناء والعدم إليها. وهذا غاية المخلص من هذه المضائق. والله أعلم بالأسرار والحقائق. وفي قوله

is that He did not will it, due to His knowledge of the impossibility of guidance being attained for all. So the will (mashīʾa) attached only to what the matter actually is; the absence of the will is explained by the absence of their entities' granting guidance to all. This is because will (mashīʾa) and intention (irāda) are two relations (nisbatān) that follow upon knowledge, since the will seeks the willed object, and the intention [seeks] the intended object, and both of these must be known. And knowledge in the Presence of the Names and Attributes is, from one aspect, dependent upon the known object, inasmuch as it is a relation seeking its correlates, as was established in the preliminaries. The Real brings nothing into existence except according to the preparedness of the receptacles, nothing else. So nothing comes into existence except what the entities grant, and an entity grants only according to what its essence (dhāt) requires, and the essence does not require a thing and its contrary simultaneously—even though reason judges that the possible thing is receptive to a thing and its contrary, due to its being characterized by possibility (imkān), which requires the equivalence of the two sides, the sides of existence and nonexistence. But one who has grasped the secret of destiny (qadar) knows that what actually occurs is only what the essence of the thing requires, exclusively. The entities are not made by the making of a maker, such that the objection would apply, that one might say: why was the entity of the rightly-guided made to require guidance, and the entity of the misguided made to require error? Just as it would not be appropriate to say: why was the dog's entity made impure, and man's entity made a pure human being? Rather, the entities are the forms of the divine Names and their loci of manifestation in knowledge—indeed, they are identical with the Names and Attributes subsisting in the eternal Essence. Indeed, they are identical with the Essence from the standpoint of reality. So they remain eternally, without beginning and without end, and making and bringing-into-existence do not attach to them, just as annihilation and nonexistence do not befall them. This is the ultimate deliverance from these straits. And God knows best the secrets and realities. And in His saying

Jāmī

﴿«فلو شاء لهداكم أجمعين» قلنا «لو شاء» لو حرف امتناع لامتناع: فما شاء إلا ما هو الأمر عليه. و لكن عين الممكن قابل للشيء ونقيضه في حكم دليل العقل، و أي الحكمين المعقولين وقع، ذلك هو الذي كان عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته. و معنى «لهداكم لبين لكم: و ما كل ممكن من العالم فتح الله عين بصيرته لإدراك الأمر في نفسه على ما هو عليه: فمنهم العالم و الجاهل. فما شاء ، فما هداهم أجمعين، و لا يشاء، و كذلك «إن يشأ»: فهل يشاء؟ هذا ما لا يكون. … فما فائدة قوله : فلو شاء لهداكم أجمعين﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أما المعنى المستفاد منه (قلنا) قوله : لو شاء (لو) فيه (حرف امتناع لامتناع) أي يدل على امتناع التالي لامتناع المقدم. ففائدة الآية امتناع هداية الكل ل لامتناع تعلق مشيئته سبحانه بها "لهداكم" ، وإنما امتنع تعلق مشيئته سبحانه به لأن الأعيان متفاوتة الاستعداد بعضها قابلة للهداية وبعضها غير قابلة للهداية. وعلمه سبحانه تابع للأعيان لا يتعلق بها إلا على ما هي عليه في أنفسه ومشيئته تابعة للعلم "الإلهي"

We say: his statement 'if He had willed' — 'if' (law) is a particle indicating impossibility due to impossibility [of the antecedent]: He willed nothing but that which the matter actually is. But the entity of the possible thing (al-mumkin) is receptive to a thing and its opposite according to the judgment of rational proof, and whichever of the two rationally conceivable judgments occurs — that is what the possible thing was upon in the state of its fixity (thubūt). And the meaning of 'He would have guided you' is 'He would have made it clear to you'; and not every possible thing in the cosmos has had God open the eye of its insight to perceive the matter in itself as it truly is: so among them are the knower and the ignorant. So He did not will [it], and He did not guide them all, nor does He will [it]. Likewise 'If He wills' — does He will? This cannot be... So what benefit is there in His saying: 'If He had willed, He would have guided you all'? As for the meaning derived from it: [We say] His statement 'if He had willed' — 'law' therein is a particle of impossibility due to impossibility, i.e., it indicates the impossibility of the consequent due to the impossibility of the antecedent. So the benefit of the verse is the impossibility of guiding all, due to the impossibility of His will, be He exalted, attaching to it — 'He would have guided you' — and His will's attachment to it was impossible only because the entities (aʿyān) differ in preparedness (istiʿdād): some are receptive to guidance and some are not receptive to guidance. And His knowledge, be He exalted, follows the entities; it attaches to them only as they are in themselves, and His will follows the 'divine' knowledge.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿لو شاء﴾

كذلك، نقول في

likewise we say regarding

Ibn Turka

﴿قلنا : لو شاء « لو » حرف امتناع﴾

التالي ( لامتناع ) المقدّم . فيكون امتناع هداية الكلّ لامتناع المشيّة فإنّ المشيّة إنّما تتعلَّق بما عليه أمر القوابل

of the consequent (due to) the impossibility of the antecedent. Thus the impossibility of guiding all is due to the impossibility of the Will, for the Will only attaches to what the receptacles are in themselves

Words 12–16 · 1 of 6

شَآءَ لَوْ حَرْفُ امْتِنَاعٍ الٱمْتِنَاعِ

Only Bālī Zāde comments here.

Bālī Zāde

﴿أن لو حرف امتناع لامتناع﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي حرف موضوع لامتناع الشيء لامتناع غيره. فامتناع هداية الكل إنما كان لامتناع تعلق المشيئة إليه . وإنما امتنع تعلق المشيئة إلى بداية الكل لأن تعلق المشيئة تابع لتعلق العلم والعلم تابع للمعلوم . فما علم الله إلا على ما هو الأمر عليه. قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه

— that is, a particle posited to indicate the impossibility of a thing due to the impossibility of something else. So the impossibility of the guidance of all is due to the impossibility of the attachment of the Will to it; and the attachment of the Will to the guidance of all is impossible because the attachment of the Will follows the attachment of knowledge, and knowledge follows the known object (al-maʿlūm). So God knows only in accordance with how the matter actually is. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said:

Ibn Turka

﴿فما شاء إلا ما هو الأمر عليه ، ولكن عين الممكن قابل للشيء ونقيضه في حكم دليل العقل﴾

وذلك لأنّه ليس في قوّة قابليّة العقل النظري ومكنة اقتداره أن يجاوز حضرة المعلومات ، حيث يتمايز العلم عن الوجود ، فإنّما يتصوّر الحقائق هناك مفردة ، مجرّدة عن سائر لوازمها الوجوديّة ، ولواحقها الضروريّة ، فتكون نسبة سائر المتقابلات من الأحكام إليها سواء في ذلك النظر

and this is because it is not within the capacity of the receptivity of discursive reason, nor within its power, to go beyond the Presence of known things (maʿlūmāt), where knowledge is distinguished from existence; for there the realities are conceived singly, stripped of their existential concomitants and necessary accompaniments, so that the relation of all the correlative rulings to them is equal in that consideration

Jāmī

﴿فما شاء إلا ما هو الأمر عليه﴾

فكل عين اقتضت الهداية تعلقت مشيئته بهدايتها ولا يمكن خلاف ذلك في نفس الأمر . وإن جوزه العقل كما أشار إليه رضي الله عنه بقوله

For every entity that required guidance, His will attached to its guidance, and the contrary of that is not possible in actuality — even though reason may permit it, as he, may God be pleased with him, indicated by his statement:

Bālī Zāde

﴿فما شاء إلا ما هو الأمر عليه﴾

فلو كانت الأعيان الثابتة كلها طالبة من الله الهداية لقاء هداية الكل تهداهم كلهم فكانت هداية الكل ممتنعة في نفس الأمر لأنه لا مكان لها ولا تعلق للمشيئة بالممتنع وأما عند العقل فلا امتناع. وإليه أشار بقوله

— for if all the fixed entities (aʿyān thābita) were seeking guidance from God such that the guidance of all would guide them all, then the guidance of all would have been impossible in actual fact (nafs al-amr), because there would be no possibility for it, and the Will cannot attach to the impossible. As for the intellect, however, there is no impossibility [in this regard]. He alluded to this by saying:

al-Qāshānī

﴿ولكن عين الممكن قابل للشيء ونقيضه في حكم دليل العقل ، وأي الحكمين المعقولين وقع ذلك هو الذي كان عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته﴾

أي لكن عين الممكن من حيث هو فرد من نوع قابل للنقيضين ، كالهداية والضلالة بالنسبة إلى كل فرد من أفراد الإنسان قابل لهما بحسب النظر العقلي . وأي النقيضين الذي وقع من كل فرد فهو الذي كان عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته. "" من حاشية تعليقات بالى أفندي

that is, but the entity of the possible being, insofar as it is an individual of a species, is receptive to the two opposites, such as guidance and misguidance with respect to every individual of mankind — receptive to both according to rational consideration. And whichever of the two opposites occurs from each individual, that is what the possible being was upon in the state of its fixity. "" From the marginal notes of Bālī Efendi:

al-Qayṣarī

﴿ولكن عين الممكن﴾

%~% إشارة إلى كون العقل محجوبا عاجزا عن إدراك حقيقة الشئ على ما هو عليه في نفسه. وليس حكمه بكون الممكن قابلا للشئ ونقيضه إلا كحكم الأعمى على من حضر عنده. وهو ساكت – هذا إما زيد أو ليس بزيد. فإنه وإن كان بحسب الإمكان صحيحا، لكنه في نفس الأمر أحدهما حق وصاحب الشهود يعلم ما هو الحق. قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه : ( ومعنى (لهداكم) لبين لكم. وما كل ممكن من العالم فتح الله عين بصيرته لإدراك الأمر في نفسه على ما هو عليه، فمنهم العالم والجاهل). هذا كجواب آخر للسؤال. وتقريرة: ليس المراد من الهداية هنا الإيمان بالرسل، كما سبق على الذهن، ليرد السؤال. بل معناه: لو شاء، لبين لكم حقيقة الأمر بالكشف ورفع الحجاب عن عيون قلوبكم، لتذكروا الأمر على ما هو عليه، فتعلموا أن أعيان بعضكم اقتضت الإيمان، وأعيان بعض الآخر اقتضت الكفر، فتكون الحجة لله عليكم. ولكن ليس كل واحد من أهل العالم بحيث يمكن أن ينفتح عين قلبه ليدرك الأمر في نفسه، لأن منهم عالم ومنهم جاهل بحكم اقتضاء الأعيان ذلك. وإنما قال

there is an indication that reason is veiled, incapable of grasping the reality of a thing as it is in itself. Its judgment that the possible thing is receptive to a thing and its contrary is like nothing but the judgment of a blind man concerning someone present before him while he remains silent—[saying]: "This is either Zayd or not Zayd." For although this is correct with respect to [mere] possibility, in the reality of the matter one of the two is [actually] true, and the possessor of direct witnessing (shuhūd) knows what is true. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said: (The meaning of "He would have guided you" is "He would have made clear to you." And not every possible thing in the cosmos has had God open the eye of its insight to grasp the matter in itself as it truly is; among them are the knower and the ignorant). This is like another answer to the question. And its explanation is: the meaning of guidance here is not meant to be faith in the messengers, as first occurred to the mind, which would raise the objection. Rather, its meaning is: had He willed, He would have made clear to you the reality of the matter through unveiling and lifting the veil from the eyes of your hearts, so that you would recall the matter as it truly is, and would know that the entities of some of you required faith, and the entities of others required disbelief, so that the argument would be God's against you. But not everyone among the people of the world is such that the eye of his heart can be opened to grasp the matter in itself, for among them is one who knows and one who is ignorant, by the ruling of what their entities require. He only said

Jāmī

﴿ولكن عين الممكن قابل للشيء ونقيضه في حكم دليل العقل﴾

وذلك لأن العقل قاصر عن إدراك ما هو الأمر عليه في نفسه

That is because reason falls short of perceiving what the matter actually is in itself.

Bālī Zāde

﴿ولكن عين الممكن … قابل للشيء ونقيضه في حكم دليل العقل﴾

فأمكن عند العقل هداية عين كل ممكن لأن العقل قاصر عن إدراك الشيء على ما هو عليه فجاز أن يكون الشيء الواحد ممتنعا في نفسه وممكنا عند العقل

— so the guidance of every single possible entity is possible according to the intellect, because the intellect falls short of grasping a thing as it actually is. Hence it may be the case that a single thing is impossible in itself yet possible according to the intellect.

Ibn Turka

﴿وأيّ الحكمين المعقولين وقع ، ذلك هو الذي عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته﴾

وتلك الحال غير متبيّن عند العقول المحجوبة والأفكار التي تتوسل في اقتناص المطالب بمخالب الدلائل والأنظار ، فإنّها قبل حضرة العلم ، إذ هي تابعة لتلك الحال كما عرفت

and that state is not made clear to veiled intellects and to the thoughts that resort to seizing their objects with the claws of proofs and speculations, for these come before the Presence of knowledge, since they are subordinate to that state, as you have learned

Jāmī

﴿وأي الحكمين المعقولين﴾

الذين جوزهم العقل (وقع) فلا محالة . (فذلك) الحكم

that reason permits 'occurs' — inevitably, 'that' is the judgment

Bālī Zāde

﴿واي الحكمين المعقولين﴾

من الهداية وعدمه قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه

— of guidance and its absence — the Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said:

Words 37–38 · 1 of 6

وَقَعَ ذَٰلِكَ

Only Bālī Zāde comments here.

Bālī Zāde

﴿وقع ذلك﴾

الحكم المعقول

occurred] — the rationally conceivable judgment.

Jāmī

﴿هو الذي كان عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته﴾

في المرتبة العلمية

in the cognitive rank (al-martaba al-ʿilmiyya).

Bālī Zāde

﴿هو الذي كان عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته﴾

فلا يمكن الهداية أي الإيمان بالرسل في استعداد كل أحد فلا يشاء إيمانه ولو أمكن إيمانه في نفسه يشاؤه فحصل له الإيمان. ولما حقق الآية على التفسير شرع تأويلها وتطبيقها بما ذكر من حاصل الكشفين بقوله: (ومعنى لهديكم ليبين لكم) أجمعين ما هو الأمر عليه كما بين لبعضكم الاقتضاء استعداد ذلك البعض بيان الأمر على ما هو عنيه. قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه : (وما) أي ليس

Thus guidance - i.e., belief in the messengers - is not possible in the preparedness (istiʿdād) of everyone; so He does not will his belief. But if his belief were possible in itself, He would will it, and belief would be obtained for him. And when he verified the verse according to the interpretation, he began its tropological interpretation (taʾwīl) and its application to what was mentioned from the result of the two unveilings, by his saying: (The meaning of 'He would have guided you' is 'that He might make clear to you') all of you what the matter is, just as He made clear to some of you - the requirement being the preparedness of that portion - the clarification of the matter as it truly is. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said: (and not) i.e., it is not

Words 44–46 · 1 of 6

فِي حَالِ ثُبُوتِهِ

Only al-Qāshānī comments here.

al-Qāshānī

﴿في حال ثبوته﴾

فلا يمكن الهداية في استعداد كل أحد فلا يشاء إيمانه ولما حقق الآية على التفسير : شرح تأويلها وتطبيقها على حاصل الكشفين .أهـ بالى "" قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه

so guidance cannot occur in the preparedness of everyone, hence He would not will his faith. And when he verified the verse according to the exegesis, he explained its interpretation and its application to the outcome of the two disclosures. End, Bālī. "" The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said:

al-Qāshānī

﴿ومعنى لهداكم لبين لكم الحق﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

على ما هو عليه الأمر الإلهي في نفسه . ""

as the divine matter is in itself. ""

﴿ومعنى لهداكم لبين لكم﴾

أجمعين ما هو الأمر عليه كما بين لبعضكم لاقتضاء استعداده ذلك اهـ بالى "" قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه

all of you what the matter actually is, just as He made it clear to some of you by the requirement of his preparedness for that. End, Bālī. "" The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said:

Ibn Turka

﴿ومعنى " لَهَداكُمْ " : لبيّن لكم﴾

الأمر في نفسه على ما هو عليه

the matter in itself as it actually is

Jāmī

﴿ومعنى قوله : "لهداكم" لبين لكم﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

الأمر على ما هو عليه في نفسه . فيصير معنی الآية : أمتناع بيان الأمر على ما هو عليه لكل أحد . لامتناع تعلق مشيئته سبحانه به. ثم بين رضي الله عنه امتناع تعلق مشيئته تعالى ببيان الأمر لكل أحد . بقوله

the matter as it is in itself. So the meaning of the verse becomes: the impossibility of making the matter clear as it is in itself to everyone, due to the impossibility of His will, be He exalted, attaching to it. Then he, may God be pleased with him, explained the impossibility of His will, exalted be He, attaching to making the matter clear to everyone, by his statement:

Words 49–50 · 1 of 6

لَبَيَّنَ لَكُمْ

Only al-Qayṣarī comments here.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿لبين لكم﴾

تنبيه على أن الهداية الحقيقية هو حصول العلم اليقيني بما هو الأمر عليه في ذاته

there is an indication that true guidance is the attainment of certain knowledge of the matter as it is in itself

al-Qāshānī

﴿وما كل ممكن من العالم﴾

أي من الأفراد الإنسانية

that is, of the human individuals

al-Jandī

﴿وما كلّ ممكن من العالم فتح الله عين بصيرته ، فأدرك الأمر في نفسه على ما هو عليه ، فمنهم العالم والجاهل . فما شاء ، فما هداهم أجمعين ، ولا يشاء . وكذلك " إِنْ يَشَأْ " فهل يشاء ؟ هذا ما لا يكون﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

قال العبد : « لو » في « لو شاء لهدى » تعليل عدم الهداية لعدم المشيّة ، فإنّه حرف امتناع لامتناع ما يسند إليه ، فحيث أسند إلى المشيّة بيّن امتناع المشيّة ، وإنّما جاء لعدم الهداية وامتناعها لامتناع المشيّة ، يعني ما هداهم أجمعين ، لأنّه لم يشأ هدايتهم أجمعين ، لعلمه أنّهم لا يستعدّون لقبول الهداية جميعا ، بل البعض . فشاء بموجب علمه هداية البعض المستعدّين لها ، فهداهم ، ولو شاء هداية الكلّ لهدى الكلّ ، ولكنّه لم يشأ ، لعدم تعلَّق العلم بهداية الكلّ ، لما لم يكن في قابليتهم الاهتداء . إذ المشيّة وهي تخصيص بعض المعلومات للهداية تابعة للعلم في تعلَّقه بهداية البعض الذين لهم قابلية الهداية ، فما شاء إلَّا ذلك البعض ، لأنّ مشيّة الحكيم العليم لا تتعلَّق إلَّا بما فيه صلاحية ما يشاء ، وإلَّا لكان عبثا ، ويتعالى عن ذلك علوّا كبيرا . وكذلك " إِنْ يَشَأْ يُذْهِبْكُمْ " حرف امتناع وشرط ممتنع دخل على المشيّة ، لامتناع الإذهاب ، فامتنع إذهابهم ، لامتناع تعلَّق المشيّة به ، فهل يشاء الممتنع ؟ هذا لا يكون ، لعدم تعلَّق مشيّة الحكيم بالممتنع . قال رضي الله عنه

. Likewise "if He wills" (in yashaʾ)—does He will it? This is something that cannot be.] The servant says: "Law" in "law shāʾa lahadā" gives the reason for the absence of guidance as being due to the absence of the will, for it is a particle of impossibility implying the impossibility of that to which it is attached. Since it is attached to the will, it makes clear the impossibility of the will [in this case], and it came [in the verse] only because of the absence of guidance, its impossibility being due to the impossibility of the will—meaning He did not guide them all together because He did not will to guide them all together, since He knew that they were not all prepared to accept guidance together, but only some of them. So He willed, according to His knowledge, the guidance of the portion prepared for it, and guided them; and had He willed the guidance of all, He would have guided all, but He did not will it, because knowledge was not attached to the guidance of all, since it was not within their receptivity to be guided. For the will (mashīʾa)—which is the specification of some objects of knowledge for guidance—follows knowledge in its attachment to the guidance of those who have the receptivity for guidance. So He willed only that portion, for the will of the Wise, the Knowing does not attach except to that in which there is fitness for what He wills; otherwise it would be futile play, and He is exalted far above that, greatly exalted. Likewise, "if He wills, He will take you away" is a particle of impossibility and an impossible condition entering upon the will, due to the impossibility of the taking-away; so their taking-away is impossible because of the impossibility of the will's attachment to it. So does He will the impossible? This cannot be, because the will of the Wise does not attach to the impossible. He, may God be pleased with him, said:]

Ibn Turka

﴿وما كل ممكن من العالم فتح الله عين بصيرته لإدراك الأمر في نفسه على ما هو عليه﴾

في القابليّة الأولى ، لدى الفيض الأقدس الذاتي ، الذي لا مجال فيه لثنويّة القابل والفاعل أصلا . وهناك تسأل القوابل بألسنة استعداداتهم ما هي عليه ، فمن العالم من فتح الله عيني بصيرته لإدراك ذلك الأمر - وهم المهتدون العارفون بسائر الأحكام والخواص التي للحقائق - ومنه من لم يفتح عين بصيرته ، فتكون مدركاته مقصورة على ما يدركه العقل النظريّ بحجب الأكوان ومحتملات عوالم الإمكان

in the first receptivity, at the Most Holy Essential Effusion (al-fayḍ al-aqdas al-dhātī), in which there is no room whatsoever for the duality of receiver and agent. There the receptacles are asked, by the tongues of their preparednesses (istiʿdādāt), what they are; so among the world are those whose eye of insight God has opened to perceive that matter — and these are the guided ones, the knowers of all the rulings and properties belonging to the realities — and among them are those whose eye of insight has not been opened, so that their perceptions are restricted to what discursive reason perceives through the veils of created things and the possibilities of the worlds of contingency

Jāmī

﴿وما كل ممكن من العالم فتح الله عين بصيرته لإدراك الأمر في نفسه على ما هو عليه﴾

لأن عين بعض الممكنات لا يقتضي ذلك الفتح، فلا يتعلق المشبه به فلا ينفتح عين بصيرته فلا يدرك الأمر على ما هو عليه

because the entity of some possible things does not require that opening, so the similitude (al-mushabbah) does not attach, and the eye of its insight does not open, and it does not perceive the matter as it truly is.

Bālī Zāde

﴿كل ممكن من العالم فتح الله عين بصيرته لإدراك الأمر في نفسه على ما هو﴾

الأمر (عليه) . لأن منهم يقتضي ذلك الفتح فتح الله له ومنهم من يقتضي عدم الفتح فلم يفتح الله له

matter (is). For some of them, that opening requires that God open [it] for him, and some of them require non-opening, so God did not open [it] for him

al-Qāshānī

﴿فتح الله عين بصيرته لإدراك الأمر في نفسه على ما هو عليه ، فمنهم العالم والجاهل فما شاء الله فما هداهم أجمعين﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

لأن الحكمة اقتضت تنوع الاستعدادات لتنوع الشؤون المختلفة. قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه

, so He did not guide them all] because wisdom required the diversification of preparedness for the diversification of the various affairs. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said:

al-Qayṣarī

﴿فتح الله عين بصيرته﴾

وأسند (الفتح) إلى (الله) لأنه تعالى يفتح عين بصيرة شخص باقتضاء عين ذلك الشخص الفتح، كما يغطى على الآخر باقتضاء عينه الغطاء. وفي تفسير قوله: (لهداكم) بقوله

and attributed the "opening" to "God" because He, exalted is He, opens the eye of a person's insight by virtue of that person's entity requiring the opening, just as He covers another by virtue of that one's entity requiring the covering. And in his interpretation of His saying: (He would have guided you) by his saying

Ibn Turka

﴿فمنهم العالم والجاهل ، فما شاء ، فما هداهم أجمعين﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

مشيّة الحقّ تعالى أحديّة التعلَّق تابعة للعلم فعلم من هذا الكلام أنه ممّا يحسم به مادة الشبهة عن أصلها بأيّ عبارة عبّر عنها غير مبتن على أن تكون « المشيّة » على صيغة الماضي أو ملحوقة ل « لو » - على ما يمكن أن يبادر إلى بعض الأوهام . فلذلك قال

the Will of the Real, exalted is He, is singular in attachment (aḥadiyyat al-taʿalluq), subordinate to knowledge. From this discourse it is known that this is what cuts off the root matter of doubt, however it is expressed, not being dependent on whether 'the Will' is in the past-tense form or is followed by 'law' — as might occur to some imaginations. Therefore he said

Jāmī

﴿فمنهم العالم﴾

الذي يقتضي عينه أن يتعلق المشبه ببيان الأمر له ومنهم الجاهل الذي لا يقتضي عينه ذلك. ثم ذكر رضي الله عنه نتيجة هذه المقدمات بقوله

whose entity requires that the similitude attach to the clarification of the matter for it, 'and among them is the ignorant' whose entity does not require that. Then he, may God be pleased with him, mentioned the result of these premises by his statement:

Bālī Zāde

﴿فمنهم العالم﴾

حقيقة الأمر على ما هو عليه يفتح الله عين بصيرته . قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه : (و) منهم (الجاهل) حقيقة الأمر على ما هو عليه بعدم فتح الله عين بصيرته فإذا لم يفتح عين بصيرة كل ممكن. قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه

the reality of the matter as it truly is - God opens the eye of his insight. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said: (and) among them (is the ignorant one) [who does not know] the reality of the matter as it truly is, due to God's not opening the eye of his insight. So since the eye of insight of every possible thing is not opened. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, said

Sources: where each commentator's text comes from
ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 730/1330), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0730CabdRazzaqKashani.SharhFususHikam.IAC00084-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/qashani.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī (d. c. 691/1291), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0691MuayyadDinJanadi.SharhCalaFususHikam.IAC00080-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/jandi.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350), Maṭlaʿ khuṣūṣ al-kilam fī maʿānī Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0751DawudQaysari.MatlacKhususKalam.IAC00085-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

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Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/qaysari.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka (d. 835/1432), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/taraka.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Muṣṭafā b. Sulaymān Bālī Zāde (d. 1073/1663), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1274), al-Fukūk fī asrār mustanadāt ḥikam al-Fuṣūṣ

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

The ibnalarabi.com texts sometimes print other hands inside a commentary: Bālī Zāde's glosses inside al-Qāshānī («إضافة بالي زادة»), and notes by the modern editor (al-muḥaqqiq) or compiler (al-jāmiʿ). We cut these out of the commentator's own text and show them as separate entries, each labelled with its author and the line of the file it came from.

Arabic of the commentaries from the OpenITI digital texts (each comment links to its line); Bosnevî's Ottoman Turkish from our collation of two OCRs of the 1873 Istanbul print (each comment links to its page scan at HathiTrust); passages matched to the commentators' quotations automatically.English translations of the commentaries and of the passage are AI (Claude) and marked. Differences are computed by comparing the words each commentator quotes with our working text; they may reflect a different manuscript reading, a paraphrase, or an alignment error. About this text.