Mashrabaمشربة

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فَصُّ حِكْمَةٍ نَفْثِيَّةٍ فِي كَلِمَةٍ شِيثِيَّةٍ

←→Read ¶10 in the text

10 · 78 words · shading: how many commentators stop on each word

وغايَةُ المُنَزِّهِ أنْ جَعَلَ ذلكَ الحُدُوثَ في العِلْمِ لِلتَّعَلُّقِ وهوَ أَعْلَى وَجْهٍ يَكونُ لِلْمُتَكَلِّمِ بِعَقْلِهِ في هذِهِ المَسْأَلَةِ لَوْلا أنَّهُ أَثْبَتَ العِلْمَ زائِدًا على الذَّاتِ فَجَعَلَ التَّعَلُّقَ لهُ لا لِلذَّاتِ وبِهذَا انْفَصَلَ عنِ المُحَقِّقِ مِنْ أَهْلِ اللهِ صاحِبِ الكَشْفِ والوُجُودِ ثُمَّ نَرْجِعُ إِلى الأَعْطِيَاتِ فَنَقُولُ إِنَّ الأَعْطِيَاتِ إِمَّا ذاتِيَّةٌ أوْ أَسْمَائِيَّةٌ فَأَمَّا المِنَحُ والهِبَاتُ والعَطَايَا الذَّاتِيَّةُ فلا تَكونُ أَبَدًا إِلا عن تَجَلٍّ إِلَهِيٍّ والتَّجَلِّي مِنَ الذَّاتِ لا يَكونُ أَبَدًا إِلا بِصُورَةِ اسْتِعْدادِ المُتَجَلَّى لهُ غَيْرُ ذلكَ لا يَكونُ

The utmost that the one who declares incomparability [can reach] is to make that temporal origination [pertain] in knowledge to [its] attachment [to the object known]. This is the highest aspect available to the one who speaks [on theology] by his reason on this question, except that he affirms knowledge as superadded to the Essence, and so assigns the attachment to it [i.e., to knowledge], not to the Essence. By this he parts company with the realizer among the folk of God, the possessor of unveiling and existence [i.e., experiential finding]. Then we return to the gifts and say: the gifts are either of the Essence or of the Names. As for the bestowals, the grants, and the gifts of the Essence, they never come about except from a divine self-disclosure. And self-disclosure from the Essence never occurs except in the form of the preparedness of the one to whom self-disclosure is made; other than that does not occur.

On the whole passage · 1 of 6

Only al-Qayṣarī comments here.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿ثم نرجع إلى الأعطيات، فنقول، إن الأعطيات إما ذاتية، أو أسمائية فأما المنح والهبات والعطايا الذاتية فلا تكون أبدا إلا عن تجلى إلهي، والتجلي من الذات لا يكون أبدا إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلى له، غير ذلك لا يكون. فإذا المتجلى له، ما رأى سوى صورته في مرأة الحق﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

(الأعطيات) جمع (أعطية) وهي جمع (عطاء)، فهي جمع الجمع. و (المنح) جمع (منحة) وهي العطايا. ولما ذكر في أول الفص: (إن العطايا منها ذاتية ومنها أسمائية) وشبه انقسامه بالقسمين بانقسام السؤال بقسمين وفرع عن تقريره، شرع بذكر الفرق بينهما، فقال: (إما %~% العطايا الذاتية فلا تكون %~% إلا عن تجلى إلهي) أي، عن حضرة هذا الاسم إلا فيها. وذلك لأن العبد ما دام باقيا لا يتخلص من جميع القيود، بل يبقى ما به تعينه، فلا يحصل المناسبة التامة بينهما فلم يمكن رؤيته وشهوده، كما لم يمكن رؤيته الموضع الذي يرى فيه الصورة من المرآة الصقيلة، فإنك إذا رأيت صورتك فيها، تعجز عن رؤيتها مع أنك تعلم أن صورتك ما ظهرت إلا فيها. الجامع الذي هو باعتبار اسم الذات فقط، وباعتبار آخر اسم للذات مع جميع الصفات وغيره من أسماء الذات ك (الغنى) و (القدوس) وأمثالهما. والتجلي من الذات لا يكون إلا على صورة المتجلى له، وهو العبد وبحسب استعداده، لأن الذات الإلهية لا صورة لها متعينة ليظهر الذات بها، وهي مرآة الأعيان، فتظهر صورة المتجلى له فيها بقدر استعداده، كما أن الحق يظهر في مرايا الأعيان بحسب إستعداداتها وقابلياتها بظهور أحكامه، غير ذلك لا يكون، إذ لا بد من المناسبة بين المتجلي والمتجلى له، ولما كان المتجلي وجودا مطلقا غير مقيد باسم جزئي وصفة معينة. كذلك لا بد أن يكون المتجلى له مخلصا عن رق القيود المشخصة و عبودية الأسماء الجزئية إلا عن القيد الذي به تميزت ذاته عن ربه، لأن الشئ لا يمكن أن يتخلص عن ذاته إلا بالفناء، وحينئذ ينعدم المتجلى له والكلام مع بقائه. فهذا القيد لا يقدح في إطلاقه، إذ به هو هو. فإذا خلص عنها وحصلت المناسبة من هذه الحيثية بينه وبين ربه، حصل التجلي الذاتي، ولا يرى حينئذ سوى صورة عينه في مرآة الحق. وما اشتهر بين الطائفة أن التجلي الذاتي يوجب الفناء وارتفاع الإثنينية، إنما هو إذا كان التجلي الذاتي بصفة (القهر) و (الوحدة) المقتضية لارتفاع الغيرية و انقهارها، ولذلك جاء: (الواحد القهار) في قوله تعالى: (لمن الملك اليوم لله الواحد القهار). أو نقول، إن كلامه ضي الله عنه محمول على حال البقاء بعد الفناء، و حينئذ لا يوجب الفناء مرة أخرى. والمراد ب (الاستعداد) هنا الاستعداد الكلى الذي لعين المتجلى له بعد تخلصها عن مقتضيات النفس وطهارتها عن كدوراتها، لا الجزئي، وإلا يشتبه الأمر. فإن النفس قد يتجلى على الشخص في بعض المقامات وتظهر بالربوبية قبل أن يتخلص عن رق القيود، ويكون شيطانيا لا رحمانيا، وقليل من يميز بينهما. ومن هنا يدعى العبد ويظهر بالربوبية، كالفراعنة

— "al-Aʿṭiyāt" is the plural of "iʿṭiyya," which is [itself] the plural of "ʿaṭāʾ" (gift), so it is a plural of a plural. And "al-minaḥ" is the plural of "minḥa," meaning bestowals. Since it was mentioned at the beginning of the Faṣṣ that "the bestowals are of two kinds: essential and nominal," and their division into two kinds was likened to the division of the request (suʾāl) into two kinds, and having established this, he began to mention the difference between the two, saying: "As for the essential bestowals, they never occur except through a divine self-disclosure" — that is, except from the presence of this name [the Essence] within them. This is because the servant, as long as he remains [subsisting as a servant], is not freed from all restrictions (quyūd); rather, that by which his particular determination (taʿayyun) subsists remains, so complete correspondence (munāsaba) between the two does not occur, and so his vision and witnessing [of the Essence directly] is not possible — just as it is not possible for him to see the location within the polished mirror where the image is seen; for when you see your image in it, you are incapable of seeing [the location of the image] itself, even though you know that your image has appeared nowhere but in it. [This essential self-disclosure occurs through] the comprehensive [name], which is, in one respect, the name of the Essence alone, and in another respect the name of the Essence together with all the attributes, and other than it among the names of the Essence, such as "the Self-Sufficient" (al-Ghanī) and "the Holy" (al-Quddūs) and their like. And self-disclosure from the Essence occurs only in the form of the one to whom disclosure is made — that is, the servant — and according to his preparedness, because the divine Essence has no determined form (ṣūra mutaʿayyina) by which the Essence might be manifested; rather, it is the mirror of the entities (aʿyān), so the form of the one to whom disclosure is made appears within it according to the measure of his preparedness — just as the Real appears in the mirrors of the entities according to their preparednesses and receptivities through the manifestation of His properties (aḥkām) — it is never otherwise, since correspondence between the discloser and the one to whom disclosure is made is necessary. And since the discloser is absolute existence, not restricted by any particular name or determined attribute, likewise the one to whom disclosure is made must be free from bondage to individuating restrictions and servitude to particular names, except for the restriction by which his essence is distinguished from his Lord — for a thing cannot be freed from its own essence except through annihilation (fanāʾ), and at that point the one to whom disclosure is made, along with the discourse [about him], would cease to exist while he yet subsists. So this [remaining] restriction does not impugn his absoluteness, since by it he is what he is. When, then, he is freed from [other] restrictions and correspondence is thereby achieved between him and his Lord from this aspect, the essential self-disclosure occurs, and at that point he sees nothing but the form of his own entity in the mirror of the Real. And what is well-known among the Sufi group (al-ṭāʾifa) — that essential self-disclosure necessitates annihilation and the removal of duality — applies only when the essential self-disclosure occurs by way of the attribute of "overwhelming domination" (qahr) and "oneness" (waḥda), which requires the removal and overwhelming of otherness; and it is for this reason that [the divine name] "the One, the All-Dominating" (al-Wāḥid al-Qahhār) occurs in His saying, exalted is He: "To whom belongs the kingdom this Day? To God, the One, the All-Dominating." Or we may say that his words — may God be pleased with him — are to be understood as referring to the state of subsistence (baqāʾ) after annihilation, in which case it would not necessitate annihilation a second time. And what is meant here by "preparedness" (istiʿdād) is the total, comprehensive preparedness (al-istiʿdād al-kullī) belonging to the entity of the one to whom disclosure is made, after its liberation from the demands of the [lower] self (nafs) and its purification from its impurities — not the particular [preparedness] (al-juzʾī), lest the matter become confused. For the [lower] self may sometimes disclose itself to the person in certain stations and manifest with lordship (rubūbiyya) before he is freed from bondage to restrictions, and this would be satanic, not divine (raḥmānī), and few are those who can distinguish between the two. And it is from this that the servant may be called and manifest with lordship, as with the Pharaohs

al-Qāshānī

﴿وغاية المنزه أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث في العلم للتعلق ، وهو أعلى وجه يكون للمتكلم يعقله في هذه المسألة ، لو لا أنه أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات ، فجعل التعلق له لا للذات﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي لو لا إثباته العلم زائدا على الذات ليجعل التعلق للعلم لا للذات ، لكان أعلى وجه يكون له ولكان محقق

affirmed knowledge as additional to the Essence] that is: were it not for his affirming knowledge as additional to the Essence, so as to attribute the attachment to the knowledge rather than to the Essence, this would be the highest position he could hold, and it would be verified/realized

Ibn Turka

﴿وغاية المنتزه أن جعل ذلك الحدوث في العلم للتعلق﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

بالحوادث على ما ذهب إليه المتكلمون من أهل السنة ، من أن الأوصاف والأحكام القديمة إنما يعرض لها لوازم الحدوث من جهة تعلقها بالحوادث

to temporal events (ḥawādith), following what the theologians (mutakallimūn) of Ahl al-Sunna held: that the eternal attributes and judgments (aḥkām) only have the concomitants of temporal origination attach to them by virtue of their relation (taʿalluq) to temporal events.

Jāmī

﴿في العلم للتعلق﴾

لا لنفس العلم. فقال : العلم أزلي وتعلقه بالأشياء حادثة حدوث زمانية (وهو)، أي جعل الحدوث للتعلق لا للعلم

not to knowledge itself. So he says: knowledge is eternal (azalī), and its attachment to things is originated with temporal origination. "And this" — i.e., ascribing origination to the attachment rather than to knowledge —

Bālī Zāde

﴿في العلم للتعلق﴾

لا للعلم . (وهو) أي جعل الحدوث للتعلق لا للعلم (أعلى وجه بكون للمتكلم بعقله) أي بنظره الفكري كما كان للمتكلم بمشاهدته ووجد أنه

not to the knowledge [itself]. (And this) i.e., attributing the origination to the relational connection and not to the knowledge (is the loftiest way that can belong to one who speaks by his intellect) i.e., by his discursive reflection, just as [there was another way] for one who speaks by his witnessing; and he found that

Ibn Turka

﴿وهو أعلى وجه يكون للمتكلم ، يعقله في هذه المسألة﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

فإنه ليس للعقل بحسب قوته النظرية فيما وراءه مد خل- وفي قوله : «يعقله» إشارة إلى هذه الدقيقة - فهو غير بعيد عن التحقيق

for the intellect, by virtue of its speculative faculty, has no access to what lies beyond that. In his saying "he rationally grasps it" there is an indication of this subtle point—so it is not far from the truth (taḥqīq)

Jāmī

﴿أعلا وجه يكون للمتكلم … بعقله في هذه المسألة لولا أنه … أثبت العلم زائدا﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

في الوجود الخارجي

in external existence.

Words 16–18 · 1 of 6

في هذِهِ المَسْأَلَةِ

Only Bālī Zāde comments here.

Bālī Zāde

﴿في هذه المسالة﴾

أي في مسألة علم الله بالأشياء فيجعله الحدوث للتعلق . اتصل بأهل الله من هذا الوجه في هذه المسألة

i.e., in the question of God's knowledge of things, attributing the origination to the relational connection — he thereby connects with the people of God (ahl Allāh) from this aspect in this question.

Ibn Turka

﴿لولا أنه أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات ، فجعل التعلق له ، لا اللذات ؛ وبهذا انفصل عن المحقق من أهل الله ، صاحب الكشف والوجود﴾

فإنه يرى العلم عين الذات . لا يقال : فيلزم انتساب الحوادث إلى الذات بضرب من النسبة تعالى عن ذلك ؟ لأن تنزهها عن القدم المقابل للحدوث كتنزهها عن الحدوث عن سائر المتقابلات - على ما مر غير مرة - فلا تغفل عنه فإنه مفتاح لمقفلات كنوز الرموز الختمية ، فإنه مايعرف ذلك التنزيه غير المتحقق بالتوحيد الذاتي المختص بالوراثة الختمية . ومما لابد منه هاهنا أن تعلم أن استفاضة الحقائق لها طريقان : أحدهما نظري عقلي وراء الحجب الكونية والدلائل النظرية ، والحاصل من هذا الطريق إنما هو حصر عقلي على ما لذوي المذاهب الجعلية من الصور الاعتقادية ، وهذا مسلك أهل العقل ، كما يلوح عليه لفظ العقل و العقد . والثاني كشفي قلبي ، إنما يدل عليه الصور الوجودية الأصلية التي لاجعل فيها أصلا ، والحاصل منه إنما هو انشراح علمي وكشف وجودي ، وهو مسلك أهل الله صاحب الكشف والوجود ؛ تحفظ هذا الاصطلاح فإنه له مواضع نفع في هذا الكتاب . الرجوع إلى تحقيق الأعطيات : وإذ قد ابتني هذه التقسيمات كلها على تقسيم الأعطيات أولا ، و انشعب هذه التفاريع من ذلك الأصل ، لابد أن يسترجع إلى تحقيقه حتى يتبين منه جميع الأقسام ، فلذلك قال

for the latter holds that knowledge is identical with the Essence. It should not be objected that this would entail attributing contingent things to the Essence by some kind of relation—God is exalted above that—because its transcendence (tanazzuh) above eternity (qidam), which is the counterpart of createdness, is like its transcendence above createdness in relation to all other counterparts, as mentioned more than once before. So do not be heedless of this, for it is the key to the locked treasuries of the sealing symbols; for this transcendence is not known except through one who is realized in Essential Unity (al-tawḥīd al-dhātī), which is specific to the sealing inheritance (al-wirātha al-khātimiyya). What must be known here is that the effusion of the realities (istifāḍat al-ḥaqāʾiq) has two paths: one is speculative and rational, behind the cosmic veils and rational proofs, and what results from this path is merely a rational delimitation according to the belief-based forms held by adherents of constructed (jaʿliyya) doctrines—this is the path of the people of reason, as is indicated by the very words 'ʿaql' (intellect) and 'ʿaqd' (binding/knot). The second is the path of unveiling and the heart, which is indicated only by the original existential forms in which there is no construction (jaʿl) at all, and what results from it is only an expansive knowledge and existential unveiling—this is the path of the people of God, the possessors of unveiling and existence. Preserve this terminological usage, for it will be useful in several places in this book. Returning to Verifying the Bestowals: Since all these divisions are built upon the prior division of the bestowals (al-aʿṭiyāt), and these branches have ramified from that root, it is necessary to return to verifying it so that all the divisions may become clear from it. Hence he said:

Bālī Zāde

﴿لولا أنه﴾

أي لولا أن المتكلم بعقله

i.e., were it not that the one who speaks by his intellect

Words 21–22 · 1 of 6

أَثْبَتَ العِلْمَ

Only Bālī Zāde comments here.

Bālī Zāde

﴿أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات فجعل التعلق له … لا للذات﴾

لم ينفصل عن المحقق من أهل الله حذف جواب لولا وهو قولنا لم ينفصل بقرينة قوله : (وبهذا) أي و بإثبات العلم زائدا على الذات

— he would not be separated from the realized one (muḥaqqiq) among the people of God — the apodosis of 'were it not' is elided, namely our statement 'he would not be separated,' [known] by the indication of his subsequent statement: (and by this) i.e., by affirming knowledge as an addition to the Essence,

Words 24–25 · 1 of 6

على الذَّاتِ

Only Jāmī comments here.

Jāmī

﴿على الذات … فجعل التعلق له … لا للذات﴾

إذ لو لم يكن العلم عین الذات لا معنى لتعلق الذات بالمعلومات لا لأنه يلزم أن تكون الذات محل الحوادث، لأن تجدد النسب لا نستلزمه كما عرفت . فقوله : وهو على وجه جواب لولا قدم عليه ، ويحتمل أن يكون جوابه مقدرة هكذا لولا أنه أثبت العلم زائدة على الذات. فجعل التعلق له لا للذات لكان كلامه قريبا من التحقق (وبهذا)، أي بإثبات العلم زائد على الذات وجعل التعلق حادثا بالحدوث الزماني. (انفصل) المتكلم

since if knowledge were not identical with the Essence, there would be no meaning to the Essence's attachment to the objects of knowledge — not because it would necessitate that the Essence be a locus of originated things, for the renewal of relations does not necessitate this, as has been established. As for his saying "and this" (wa-huwa) — it functions as the answer (jawāb) to "were it not" (law-lā), which precedes it; though it is possible that its [proper] answer is elided, thus: "were it not that he affirms knowledge as something additional to the Essence, thereby ascribing the attachment to it rather than to the Essence — his statement would have been close to verification (taḥqīq)." "And by this" — i.e., by affirming knowledge as additional to the Essence and ascribing the attachment as originated with temporal origination — "[the theologian] is set apart"...

al-Qāshānī

﴿وبهذا انفصل عن المحقق من أهل الله صاحب الكشف والوجود﴾

يرى العلم عين الذات ولا يقول بالتعلق بل يقول معنى حتى يظهر علمنا . فإن العلم الظاهر في الأعيان بعد الوجود هو عين علمه ، على ما علمت أن علمه بالأعيان هو الثابت حال عدمها فيه

finding (wujūd)] who sees knowledge as identical with the Essence, and does not speak of attachment, but rather says the meaning is "until our knowledge becomes manifest." For the knowledge that becomes manifest in the entities after [their] existence is identical with His knowledge — according to what you have already learned, namely that His knowledge of the entities is that which is fixed [in Him] during their state of non-existence

al-Qayṣarī

﴿وبهذا انفصل﴾

أي، يجعله زائدا على الذات مطلقا، عن أهل التحقيق، إذ المحقق قائل بأنه عين الذات في مرتبة مطلقا، وفي أخرى عينه من وجه، غيره من وجه آخر، وهي عند كونه نسبة من النسب الذاتية. ولما كان المراد بالمحقق هو الذي انكشف له أحدية الحق وسريانه في المراتب الوجودية الموجبة للتعدد والتكثر الموهمة لوجود الأغيار وشاهد الأمور على ما هي عليها بحسب الكشف والذوق، قال رضي الله عنه

that is, his making it additional to the Essence absolutely sets him apart from the people of verification, since the verifier holds that it is identical with the Essence in one respect, absolutely, and in another respect identical with it from one angle and other than it from another angle, this being when it is [considered as] one of the essential relations (al-nisab al-dhātiyya). And since what is meant by the verifier is the one for whom the unicity (aḥadiyya) of the Real and its pervasion (sarayān) through the existential levels — which necessitates multiplicity and plurality, giving the illusion of the existence of others — has been unveiled, and who witnesses things as they truly are according to unveiling and tasting (dhawq), he — may God be pleased with him — said

Bālī Zāde

﴿انفصل عن المحقق من أهل الله صاحب الكشف والوجود﴾

أي صاحب الوجدان

i.e., the possessor of experiential finding (wijdān).

Jāmī

﴿عن المحقق من أهل الله صاحب الكشف والوجود﴾

الذي انكشف له الحقائق كما هي عليه وجدها بحسب ذوقه ووجدانه من غير نظر فكري. فإن هذا المحقق لا يثبت العلم زائدة على الذات إلا في العقل ويجعله بحسب الخارج عن الذات ويقول حدوث التعلق بذلك الحدوث الذاتي لا الزماني مبالغة في التنزيه. فإنهم لو جعلوا الحدوث زمانية لا فساد فيه أيضا إذ لا يلزم التجدد إلا في النسبة فإن قيل : إذا كان العلم من قوله : "حتى نعلم " ولنعلم مرتبا على حادث زماني كالفعل المفهوم من قوله : "ولنبلونكم" و"ثم بعثناكم " آية 56 سورة البقرة. كيف يصح الحكم بأن حدوثه ذاتي لا زمانی . قلنا: من جعل العلم المرتب حادثة ذاتية لا زمانية لا بد له أن يجعل العقل الذي يترتب عليه العلم أيضا كذلك نقول مثلا قوله : "ولنبلونكم" . معناه : ولنبلونكم أيها النسب الذاتية والشؤون الغيبية المستجنة في غيب الذات بإظهار كم في المرتبة العلمية . حتى نعلم بسبب العلم بكم في هذه المرتبة ما يجري عليكم بحسب الخارج من المجاهدة والصبر فنعلم المجاهدين منكم والصابرين. وقوله : ثم بعثناهم معناه : بعثناه من مرتبة الاستحسان في غيب الذات إلى مرتبة التميز العلمي ليعلم بذلك التمييز ما يجري عليكم من الأحوال التي من حملها أحصى مدة اللبث. على أنه لا يلزم إذا حمل بعض الآية على معنى إشاري أن يجري ذلك المعنى في البعض الآخر منها. إذ كثيرا ما يشير أهل الإشارة في أنه إلى معنى لا يساعد عليه تمام الآية. فإن قيل : ما ذكرتم من بعض بطون الآية وهؤلاء المحققون ل متن نص فصوص الحكم : ثم نرجع إلى الأعطيات فنقول: إن الأعطيات إما ذاتية أو أسمائية. فأما المنح و الهبات و العطايا الذاتية فلا تكون أبدا إلا عن تجل إلهي. و التجلي من الذات لا يكون أبدا إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلي له و غير ذلك لا يكون. فإذن المتجلي له ما رأى سوى صورته في مرآة الحق، و ما رأى الحق و لا يمكن أن يراه مع علمه أنه ما رأى صورته إلا فيه: [/ %~% متن نص فصوص الحكم : و هذا هو أعلى عالم بالله. و ليس هذا العلم إلا لخاتم الرسل وخاتم الأولياء، و ما يراه أحد من الأنبياء و الرسل إلا من مشكاة الرسول الخاتم، ولا يراه أحد من الأولياء إلا من مشكاة الولي الخاتم، حتى أن الرسل لا يرونه متى رأوه إلا من مشكاة خاتم الأولياء: فإن الرسالة و النبوة- أعني نبوة التشريع، ورسالته تنقطعان، والولاية لا تنقطع أبدا. فالمرسلون، من كونهم أولياء، لا يرون ما ذكرناه إلا من مشكاة خاتم الأولياء ، فكيف من دونهم من الأولياء؟ و إن كان خاتم الأولياء تابعا في الحكم لما جاء به خاتم الرسل شرح الجامي : الذي أعطاه العلم السكوت

who is unveiled to the realities as they are in themselves; he finds them according to his taste and finding, without rational speculation. For this muḥaqqiq does not affirm knowledge as something additional to the Essence except in the intellect, and he assigns it, with respect to what is external to the Essence, [as additional]. He says that the occurrence of the relation [of knowledge] is by that essential occurrence, not a temporal occurrence, as an emphasis in declaring incomparability (tanzīh). For even if they made the occurrence temporal, there would be no corruption in that either, since renewal (tajaddud) is necessarily entailed only in the relation (nisba). If it is said: since the knowledge in His saying 'until We know' and 'that We may know' is ordered upon a temporal occurrence, like the act understood from His saying 'and We will surely test you' and 'then We raised you up' (Q. 2:56) — how can it be correct to judge that its occurrence is essential and not temporal? We say: whoever makes the ordered knowledge an essential, not temporal, occurrence must likewise make the intellect upon which the knowledge is ordered [essential, not temporal]. We say, for example: His saying 'and We will surely test you' means: 'We will surely test you, O essential relations and unseen affairs (shuʾūn) concealed in the unseen of the Essence, by manifesting you in the plane of knowledge, until We know' — that is, by means of the knowledge of you in this plane — 'what will occur to you, with respect to what is external, of striving and patience, so that We know those of you who strive and those who are patient.' And His saying 'then We raised them up' means: 'We raised him from the plane of approbation in the unseen of the Essence to the plane of epistemic distinction, so that by that distinction may be known what states will occur to you' — [states] whoever reckons them will compute the duration of the stay. However, it is not necessary, if part of the verse is carried upon an allusive meaning, that that meaning should run through the rest of it as well, since the people of allusion (ahl al-ishāra) often point to a meaning that is not supported by the totality of the verse. If it is said: what you have mentioned is [only] some of the inner senses (buṭūn) of the verse, and these muḥaqqiqūn — [Text of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam]: Then let us return to the bestowals (aʿṭiyāt) and say: the bestowals are either essential (dhātiyya) or name-derived (asmāʾiyya). As for the essential grants (minaḥ), gifts (hibāt), and bestowals (ʿaṭāyā), they never occur except through a divine self-disclosure (tajallī). And the self-disclosure from the Essence never occurs except in the form of the preparedness (istiʿdād) of the one to whom the self-disclosure is given; nothing else occurs. Thus the one to whom the disclosure is given sees nothing but his own form in the mirror of the Real, and he does not see the Real — nor is it possible for him to see Him — even while knowing that he has seen his own form only in Him: [Text of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam]: And this is the highest knowledge of God. And this knowledge belongs only to the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the Saints (khātam al-awliyāʾ), and none of the prophets or messengers sees it except from the niche (mishkāt) of the Seal-Messenger, and none of the saints sees it except from the niche of the Seal-Saint — to the point that the messengers, when they see it, see it only from the niche of the Seal of the Saints. For messengership (risāla) and prophethood (nubuwwa) — I mean the prophethood of legislation (nubuwwat al-tashrīʿ) and messengership — both cease, whereas sainthood (walāya) never ceases. So the messengers, insofar as they are saints, see what we have mentioned only from the niche of the Seal of the Saints — how much more so, then, those saints beneath them? — even though the Seal of the Saints is, in respect of ruling, a follower of what the Seal of the Messengers brought. [Jāmī's commentary]: [The one to whom] He gave the knowledge that imposes silence [on its possessor]

Words 35–40 · 1 of 6

مِنْ أَهْلِ اللهِ صاحِبِ الكَشْفِ والوُجُودِ

Only al-Qayṣarī comments here.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿من أهل الله صاحب الكشف والوجود﴾

والمراد بالوجود هنا (الوجدان). ومن أمعن النظر فيما مر من المقدمات وتحقق بأسراره، لا يزاحمه الشكوك والشبهات الوهمية التي تقع في مثل هذه المباحث

— what is meant here by "finding" (wujūd) is "experiential apprehension" (wijdān). And whoever scrutinizes closely what has preceded of these premises and is verified in its secrets will not be troubled by the doubts and illusory ambiguities that arise in matters such as these

al-Qāshānī

﴿ثم نرجع إلى الأعطيات﴾

لما قسم العطايا بحسب السؤال انجر الكلام إلى بحث الاستعداد والأعيان . فبحث عن ذلك بقدر ما احتاج إليه هاهنا ، ثم رجع إلى المقصود من بيان القسمين الأولين واستأنف القسمة لطول الكلام بقوله

gifts (aʿṭiyāt)] Since he had divided the gifts according to [whether they come by] request, the discourse was drawn into an investigation of preparedness (istiʿdād) and the entities (aʿyān). He investigated that to the extent needed here, then returned to what was intended, namely the exposition of the first two divisions, and resumed the division — since the discourse had grown long — by saying

al-Jandī

﴿ثم نرجع إلى الأعطيات فنقول : إنّ الأعطيات إمّا ذاتية أو أسمائية . وأمّا المنح والهبات والعطايا الذاتيّة فلا تكون أبدا إلَّا عن تجلّ إلهي . والتجلَّي من الذات لا يكون أبدا إلَّا بصورة استعداد المتجلَّي له ، وغير ذلك لا يكون﴾

قال العبد أيّده الله به : إنّ العطايا والمنح والهبات سواء كانت معاني وحقائق وعلوما ومشاهدات وتجلَّيات إلهيّة كانت أو ربانية أو روحية أو عقلية أو نفسية أو طبيعية أو عنصرية أو مثالية على اختلاف طبقاتها ودرجاتها فإنّها إمّا ذاتية أو أسمائية ، ونعني بالذاتية بحت الوجود ومحض الوجود والجود ، وبالأسمائية ما تكون مخصوصة بصورة حضرة من الحضرات الإلهية . ثم الأسمائية لا تكون إلَّا بحجاب وهو حجابيّة التعيّن الاسمي بما به يمتاز عن الآخر ويغايره لا غير . وأمّا الذاتية فإنّها لا تكون إلَّا عن تجلّ إلهي . ولا تكون أبدا عن الذات الأحدية ، لما عرفت أن لا حكم ولا رسم ولا تجلَّي ولا غير ذلك في الأحدية الذاتية ، فيكون تعيّن التجلَّي الذاتي من حضرة الألوهية ، فيضاف التجلَّي لهذا السرّ إلى ذات الألوهة ، لا إلى مطلق الذات ، فافهم هذا الفرق ، حتى لا يشتبه عليك الحقائق . ثم إنّ هذه العطايا والمنح الحاصلة بالتجلَّي لا تتعيّن أبدا إلَّا بصورة استعداد المتجلَّي له لأنّ الاستعدادات والقابليّات في الأعيان هي المستدعية للتجلَّيات الذاتية والأسمائية ، والمتجلَّي ، له صورة علمية أزلية على هيئة معنوية مخصوصة بتخصّص التجلَّي الوجودي وبتخصّص الفيض الجودي بموجب ما تعيّن وتخصّص في النور العلمي الأزلي الشهودي بحسب خصوص المتجلَّى له ، فافهم . قال رضي الله عنه

The servant, may God support him, said: The bestowals, grants, and gifts—whether they are meanings, realities, forms of knowledge, witnessings, or divine self-disclosures, whether they be Lordly, spiritual, intellectual, psychic, natural, elemental, or imaginal, according to their differing levels and degrees—are either Essential or Namely. By 'Essential' we mean sheer existence, pure existence and pure munificence (jūd); and by 'Namely' we mean that which is specified by the form of one of the divine Presences. Now the Namely never occurs except through a veil, namely the veiling-ness of the entification (taʿayyun) of the Name by which it is distinguished from another and differentiated from it, and nothing more. As for the Essential, it never occurs except through a divine self-disclosure, and it never occurs from the Unitary Essence (al-dhāt al-aḥadiyya), since you have already learned that there is no ruling, no trace, no self-disclosure, nor anything else in the Essential Oneness (al-aḥadiyya al-dhātiyya). Hence the entification of the Essential self-disclosure comes from the Presence of Divinity (ulūha), and so the self-disclosure, in respect of this secret, is ascribed to the Essence of Divinity, not to the absolute Essence—so understand this distinction, lest the realities become confused for you. Then these bestowals and grants that occur through self-disclosure never become entified except in accordance with the form of the preparedness of the one to whom the disclosure is made, because the preparednesses and receptivities in the entities (aʿyān) are what call forth the Essential and Namely self-disclosures. And the one to whom disclosure is made has an eternal knowledge-form (ṣūra ʿilmiyya azaliyya) in a specific meaning-configuration, specified by the specification of the existential self-disclosure and by the specification of the munificent effusion (fayḍ), in accordance with what has been entified and specified in the eternal witnessed light of knowledge, according to the particularity of the one disclosed to—so understand. He, may God be pleased with him, said:

Ibn Turka

﴿ثم نرجع إلى الأعطيات فنقول : إن الأعطيات إما ذاتية أو أسمائية﴾

وإذ قد عرفت أن العطايا قد تكون بلا واسطة و قد تكون بواسطة ، و الواسطة إما صفة أو فعل . فصلها بقوله

and since you have already learned that gifts may come without an intermediary and may come with an intermediary, and the intermediary is either an attribute or an act. He detailed this by saying:

Bālī Zāde

﴿ثم نرجع إلى﴾

تفصيل (الأعطيات) التي ذكرت أولا إجمال

the detailed exposition of (the bestowals) which were mentioned at first in summary.

al-Qāshānī

﴿فنقول : إن الأعطيات إما ذاتية أو أسمائية ، فأما المنح والهبات والعطايا الذاتية ، فلا تكون أبدا إلا عن تجل إلهى﴾

أي ذاتى مطلق لا من الذات وحدها بلا صفة . فإنها لا تتجلى وحدها لشيء بل الذات باعتبار الرحمانية لأن الله اسم الذات المطلقة . وتجلى الذات من حيث هي هي لا يكون إلا لذاته ، أما للعبد فلا يكون إلا بصورة استعداد من تجلى له لا غير . كما قال

that is, an essential self-disclosure absolutely, not from the Essence alone without any attribute. For it does not disclose itself alone to anything, but rather the Essence [discloses itself] under the aspect of the All-Merciful (al-Raḥmāniyya), since "Allah" is the name of the absolute Essence. And the self-disclosure of the Essence as such occurs only for Itself; as for the servant, it occurs only in the form of the preparedness of the one to whom the self-disclosure is made, and not otherwise. As he said

Bālī Zāde

﴿لنقول إن الأعطيات إما ذاتية أو اسمائية فاما المنح والهبات والعطايا الذائية﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

الظاهرة في الوجود الخارجي

manifest in external existence,

Ibn Turka

﴿فأما المنح والهبات والعطايا الذاتية فلا يكون أبدا إلا عن تجل إلهي﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

حتى يمكن أن يظهر الأثر المسمى بالمنح و الهبة والعطاء بصرافة أحدية جمعيته الذاتية . فإن التجلي في كل اسم إنما يظهر بحسب حكمه الخاص و خصوصيته الامتيازية الفارقة ، بخلاف الاسم « الإله » فإن خصوصيته إنما هو الإطلاق وأحدية الجمع الإحاطي ؛ وعبارة « الألوهي » منها مشعرة بهذا الطرف من الجمعية . التجلي لا يكون إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلى له : ثم لما بين حكم التجلي الذاتي وما يقتضيه باعتبار المتجلي ، أراد أن يبين أمره باعتبار المتجلى له بقوله

so that the effect termed grant, bestowal, and gift may appear through the sheer oneness of His Essential all-comprehensiveness (aḥadiyyat jamʿiyyatihi al-dhātiyya). For the self-disclosure in every [divine] Name appears only according to its specific governing property (ḥukm) and its distinguishing particularity, unlike the Name 'God' (al-Ilāh), whose particularity consists precisely in absoluteness and the all-encompassing oneness of comprehensiveness; and the expression 'al-ulūhī' (the divine) suggests this aspect of comprehensiveness. Self-disclosure occurs only in the form of the preparedness of the one to whom it is disclosed: Then, having clarified the governing property of the Essential self-disclosure and what it requires with respect to the one who discloses Himself, he wished to clarify the matter with respect to the one to whom disclosure is made, saying:

Words 57–63 · 1 of 6

فلا تَكونُ أَبَدًا إِلا عن تَجَلٍّ إِلَهِيٍّ

Only Bālī Zāde comments here.

Bālī Zāde

﴿فلا تكون أبدا إلا عن نجلي إلهي﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي عن التجلي الذي يحصل من حضرة الاسم الجامع من حيث الاسم الظاهر . فالمراد به تجلي الفيض المقدس لا الأقدس يدل عليه قوله

i.e., from the self-disclosure that occurs from the presence of the All-Comprehensive Name from the aspect of the Manifest Name. What is meant by it is the self-disclosure of the sacred effusion (al-fayḍ al-muqaddas), not the most-sacred effusion (al-aqdas) — as indicated by his statement:

al-Qāshānī

﴿والتجلي من الذات لا يكون إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلى له غير ذلك لا يكون ، فإذا المتجلى له ما رأى سوى صورته في مرآة الحق وما رأى الحق ولا يمكن أن يراه مع علمه أنه ما رأى سوى صورته إلا فيه﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

ومثله بالمرآة في قوله

He gave the example of the mirror in his statement

Ibn Turka

﴿والتجلي من الذات لا يكون أبدا إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلى له ؛ غير ذلك فلا يكون﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

ضرورة أنه لو كان له ما يزيد على تلك الصورة لم يكن التجلي بصرافته الذاتية

necessarily, because if there were something exceeding that form [of preparedness], the self-disclosure would not be in its Essential purity

Bālī Zāde

﴿والتجلي من الذات لا يكون أبدا إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلي له﴾

فإن التجلي بصورة استعداد المتجلي له لا يكون إلا في الفيض المقدس. فإذا كان المتجلي له قابة لتجلي الذات من حضرة الاسم الجامع تجلي الذات من حضرة الجامعة. فذلك هو المسمى بالتجلي الإلهي الحاصل عنه العطايا الذاتية . وهو قوله : فلا يكون أبدا إلا عن تجلي إلهي وإذا كان قابلا لتجلي الذات من حضرة من حضرات الأسماء . تجلي عن تلك الحضرة فذلك هو المسمى بـ التجلي الصفاتي والأسمائي التي يحصل منه العطايا الأسمائية

— for the self-disclosure in the form of the preparedness of the recipient occurs only in the sacred effusion. So if the recipient is receptive to the self-disclosure of the Essence from the presence of the All-Comprehensive Name, the Essence discloses itself from the All-Comprehensive presence; and that is what is termed the divine self-disclosure from which the essential bestowals proceed — which is his statement: 'they never occur except from a divine self-disclosure.' And if he is receptive to the self-disclosure of the Essence from one of the presences of the Names, [the Essence] discloses itself from that presence; and that is what is termed the attributive and nominal self-disclosure (al-tajallī al-ṣifātī wa'l-asmāʾī), from which the nominal bestowals proceed.

Words 75–78 · 1 of 6

غَيْرُ ذلكَ لا يَكونُ

Only Bālī Zāde comments here.

Bālī Zāde

﴿غير ذلك لا يكون﴾

تأكيد (فإذن المنجلي له ما رأی سوی صورته في مرآة الحق) أي فعلی تقدیر كون التجلي بصورة استعداد المتجلي له ما رأى المتجلي له في أي تجلي كان إلا صورة نفسه في وجه مرآتية الحق له في رؤية صورة نفسه فإضافة المرآة إلى الحق بيانية لذلك قال

— an emphasis. (So the recipient of the self-disclosure sees nothing but his own form in the mirror of the Real) i.e., given that the self-disclosure is in the form of the preparedness of its recipient, the recipient — in whatever self-disclosure it be — sees nothing but the form of himself, by virtue of the Real's being a mirror for him in the seeing of the form of himself. So the annexation of 'mirror' to 'the Real' is explicative (bayāniyya); hence he said:

Sources: where each commentator's text comes from
ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 730/1330), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0730CabdRazzaqKashani.SharhFususHikam.IAC00084-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/qashani.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī (d. c. 691/1291), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0691MuayyadDinJanadi.SharhCalaFususHikam.IAC00080-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/jandi.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350), Maṭlaʿ khuṣūṣ al-kilam fī maʿānī Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0751DawudQaysari.MatlacKhususKalam.IAC00085-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/qaysari.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0690CafifTilimsani.SharhFususHikam.IAC00081-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/tilmasani.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka (d. 835/1432), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0835SainDinTaraka.SharhFususHikam.IAC00087-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/taraka.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0898NurDinJami.SharhMatnFususHikam.IAC00088-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/jami_matn.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Muṣṭafā b. Sulaymān Bālī Zāde (d. 1073/1663), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 1073MustafaSulaymanBaliZadah.SharhFususHikam.IAC00082-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/bali.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1274), al-Fukūk fī asrār mustanadāt ḥikam al-Fuṣūṣ

Digital text: OpenITI barzakh, 0673AbuMacaliQunawi.Fukuk.IAC00079-ara1 (commit 6b19bdc)

Print edition behind it: Not recorded by OpenITI: the barzakh file has no .yml metadata record, and the ibnalarabi.com page it was taken from names no printed edition.

Taken from: ibnalarabi.com/fusus/qunawi.php. The OpenITI file's own header (#META# source) names this page: the text was copied from the Ibn ʿArabī website directed by Dr Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef. Every IAC-coded file used here names a page of that site in its header; barzakh is OpenITI's repository for texts awaiting integration into the corpus.

Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

The ibnalarabi.com texts sometimes print other hands inside a commentary: Bālī Zāde's glosses inside al-Qāshānī («إضافة بالي زادة»), and notes by the modern editor (al-muḥaqqiq) or compiler (al-jāmiʿ). We cut these out of the commentator's own text and show them as separate entries, each labelled with its author and the line of the file it came from.

Arabic of the commentaries from the OpenITI digital texts (each comment links to its line); Bosnevî's Ottoman Turkish from our collation of two OCRs of the 1873 Istanbul print (each comment links to its page scan at HathiTrust); passages matched to the commentators' quotations automatically.English translations of the commentaries and of the passage are AI (Claude) and marked. Differences are computed by comparing the words each commentator quotes with our working text; they may reflect a different manuscript reading, a paraphrase, or an alignment error. About this text.