Mashrabaمشربة

The commentators side by side

One passage at a time. Each column is a commentator; each row gathers the comments on the same words, so readings and emphases can be compared.

فَصُّ حِكْمَةٍ نَفْثِيَّةٍ فِي كَلِمَةٍ شِيثِيَّةٍ

←→Read ¶9 in the text

9 · 71 words · shading: how many commentators stop on each word

فإنَّهُ لَيْسَ في وُسْعِ المَخْلُوقِ إذا أَطْلَعَهُ اللهُ على أَحْوالِ عَيْنِهِ الثَّابِتَةِ التي تَقَعُ صُورَةُ الوُجُودِ عَلَيْها أَنْ يَطَّلِعَ في هذِهِ الحالِ على اطِّلاعِ الحَقِّ على هذِهِ الأَعْيانِ الثَّابِتَةِ في حالِ عَدَمِها لأنَّها نِسَبٌ ذاتِيَّةٌ لا صُورَةَ لها فَبِهذَا القَدْرِ نَقولُ إنَّ العِنَايَةَ الإلهِيَّةَ سَبَقَتْ لِهذَا العَبْدِ بِهذِهِ المُساواةِ في إِفادَةِ العِلْمِ ومِنْ هُنا نَقُولُ اللهُ حَتَّىٰ نَعْلَمَ وهي كَلِمَةٌ مُحَقَّقَةُ المَعْنَى ما هيَ كما يَتَوَهَّمُهُ مَنْ لَيْسَ لهُ هذا المَشْرَبُ

For it is not within the capacity of the created being, when God gives him insight into the states of his fixed entity, upon which the form of existence falls, to gain insight, in this state, into the Real's insight into these fixed entities in the state of their nonexistence, because they are relations of the Essence that have no form. So it is to this extent that we say the divine solicitude has preceded for this servant through this equality in the conferring of knowledge. And from here God says: "until We know" [Q 47:31]. It is a word whose meaning is realized, not as it is imagined by one who does not have this drinking-place.

al-Qāshānī

﴿فإنه ليس في وسع المخلوق إذا أطلعه الله تعالى على أحوال عينه الثابتة التي يقع صورة الوجود عليها أن يطلع في هذه الحال على اطلاع الحق على هذه الأعيان الثابتة في حال عدمها ، لأنها نسب ذاتية لا صورة لها﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي نسبة الذات الأحدية إلى كل عين نسبة ذاتية ، وهي حضور الذات لها ولما فيها من الأحوال والنقوش . وهذا حضورها لذاتها قبل أن توجد هذه الأعيان في الخارج ، فلا صورة لها في الخارج والضمير في لأنها يرجع إلى الاطلاع أنث لمطابقة الخبر . ولأن الاطلاع نسبة الذات إلى الأعيان

the Real's awareness of these fixed entities in the state of their nonexistence, since they are essential relations (nisab dhātiyya) having no form.] That is, the relation of the Unitary Essence to each entity is an essential relation—namely, the Essence's presence to it and to the states and imprints within it. This is its presence to itself before these entities exist in the external world; hence it has no form in the external world. The pronoun in "li-annahā" ["since they"] refers back to "awareness/apprising" (al-iṭṭilāʿ), rendered feminine to agree with the predicate; or because the awareness is [itself] the relation of the Essence to the entities.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿ليس في وسع المخلوق، إذا أطلعه الله على أحوال عينه الثابتة التي تقع صورة الوجود عليها، أن يطلع في هذه الحال على إطلاع الحق على هذه الأعيان الثابتة في حال عدمها، لأنها نسب ذاتية لا صورة لها﴾

هذا تعليل لقوله

This is an explanation of his statement

Ibn Turka

﴿فإنه ليس في وسع المخلوق إذا أطلعه الله على أحوال عينه الثابتة التي تقع صورة الوجود عليها﴾

بأن يكشف له عن تلك العين في حال وجودها ، ويعلم منه سائر ما انطوت عليه من الأحكام والأحوال ، بعد أن تقع صورة الوجود الكاشفة السائر الصور عليه

that He should disclose to him that entity in the state of its existence, such that he might know from it all that it enfolds of rulings and states, after the form of existence — which discloses the other forms — has fallen upon it,

Jāmī

﴿ليس في وسع المخلوق إذا أطلعه الله﴾

أي أراد اطلاعه على أحوال عينه الثابتة التي تقع صورة الوجود العيني لهذا المخلوق (عليها). أي على تلك الأحوال

— that is, when He wills to show him — the states of his fixed entity upon which the form of concrete existence occurs for this created being (upon them), that is, upon those states,

Bālī Zāde

﴿ليس في وسع المخلوق إذا أطلعه الله﴾

أي وفت اطلاع الله إياه

i.e., at the time of God's apprising him.

﴿فليس في وسع المخلوق﴾

على الصورة أن يطلع على ما لا صورة له ويجوز أن يعود إلى الأعيان الثابتة باعتبار كونها في حال عدمها إلا أن الأنسب حينئذ أن يقول على أن يطلع على هذه الأعيان بدون قوله على اطلاع الحق ولا بد من ذكره إثبات للمساواة فلما لم يطلع العبد على ما ليس في وسعه قال

who is upon the form, to apprehend that which has no form. It is permissible that [the pronoun] refer back to the fixed entities in respect of their being in the state of their nonexistence, except that the more fitting [reading] then would be to say 'to apprehend these entities' without his statement 'the Real's apprehension.' Yet mention of it is necessary to establish the equivalence. Since the servant does not apprehend what is not within his capacity, he said:

Words 9–12 · 1 of 7

على أَحْوالِ عَيْنِهِ الثَّابِتَةِ

Only Bālī Zāde comments here.

Bālī Zāde

﴿علی أحوال عينه الثابتة﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

وهي الوجود العلمي (التي يقطع صورة الوجود) أي صورة الوجود الخارجي (عليها) أي على عينه الثابتة

which is the knowledge-existence (the ʿilmī existence) (upon which the form of existence is cut) i.e., the form of external existence (upon it) i.e., upon his fixed entity.

Ibn Turka

﴿أن يطلع في هذه الحال على اطلاع الحق على هذه الأعيان الثابتة في حال عدمها ، لأنها﴾

- أي الأعيان في حال عدم ها - ( يسب ذاتية إلا صورة لها) في نفسها ، فإنه لايخفى على الواقف بأصولهم أن الكثرة حينما كانت وبأي اسم سمیت - فإنها يسب عدمية واعتبارات خالصة عن شائبة الوجود مطلقا، وهذه النسبة الإطلاقية التي للأعيان قال إنها ذاتية ، فالضمير راجع إلى الأعيان - لاغيرا . وإذا تقرر أن الأعيان لاحظ لها من الوجود، فلا يكون لها حكم ولا حال ولا علم أصلا، بل الكل مستهلك في الذات، استهلاك صورتها فيها، فالحكم حينئذ للذات بإطلاقها، وليس للعبد المحصور تحت أحكام عينه حالة الوجود سعة الإحاطة الذاتية، فلا يمكن له الاطلاع المذكور إلا بسابقة من العناية. والحاصل أن العبد له طرف ضيق تخلف به عن الحق في ذلك ، وطرف سعة به يماثله ويساويه ، (فهذا القدر) من التخلف والضيق الذي للعبد

— that is, the entities in the state of their non-existence — [are but an essential relation (nisba dhātiyya), having no form of their own] in themselves. For it is not hidden from one grounded in their principles that multiplicity, whenever it occurs and by whatever name it is called, is but a non-existential relation (nisba ʿadamiyya) and considerations wholly free of any admixture of existence whatsoever. And this unconditioned relation belonging to the entities — he said it is essential (dhātiyya), the pronoun referring back to the entities, and nothing else. Now once it is established that the entities have no share of existence, they have no ruling, no state, and no knowledge whatsoever; rather, all is subsumed within the Essence (al-dhāt), the subsumption of their form within It. The ruling, then, belongs to the Essence in its unconditionedness, and the servant — confined beneath the rulings of his entity in the state of existence — does not possess the breadth of essential all-comprehensiveness; so the aforementioned apprisal is not possible for him except through a prior [divine] solicitude. The upshot is that the servant has a narrow aspect by which he falls short of the Real in that regard, and a broad aspect by which he resembles and equals Him. (This measure) of the falling-short and narrowness that belongs to the servant

Jāmī

﴿أن يطلع في هذه﴾

الأحوال اطلاع راقية (على) طريقة

states, a showing on the level of (equal to) the manner of

Bālī Zāde

﴿أن يطلع … في هذه الحال﴾

أي حال اطلاعه على أحوال عينه المعروضة لوجوده الخارجي

i.e., the state of his being apprised of the states of his entity as presented to his external existence.

Jāmī

﴿اطلاع الحق على هذه الأعيان الثابتة في حال عدمها﴾

علما و عينة . فقوله : على هذه الأعيان الثابتة يحتمل أن يكون متعلق بقوله : يطلع. وبالاطلاع أيضا يمكن أن يقال : المراد باطلاع الحق ما يطلع عليه الحق من هذه الأعيان وحينئذ لفظة على الأولى متعلقة بيطلع والثانية بالاطلاع . وإنما قلنا: ليس في وسع المخلوق اطلاع مثل اطلاع الحق (لأنها) أي تلك الأعيان يعني الحقائق التي تلك الأعيان صورة معلوميتها

— by way of knowledge and entification. His saying 'of these fixed entities' may be connected to his saying 'is shown'; and by 'showing' one might also say that what is meant by 'the Real's showing' is what the Real is shown of these entities, in which case the first 'of' is connected to 'is shown' and the second to 'the showing.' And we said only that it is not within the created being's capacity to have a showing like the Real's showing (because they) — that is, those entities, meaning the realities of which these entities are the form of their being known —

Bālī Zāde

﴿على اطلاع الحق على هذه الأعيان الثابتة في حال عدمها﴾

أي في حال ثبوتها في علم الله تعالى قبل وقوع صورة الموجود عليها، يعني أن يطلع بعين اطلاع الحق. (لأنها) أي اطلاع الحق تأنيث الضمير باعتبار وقوع الاطلاع على الأعيان الثابتة لذلك جمع

i.e., in the state of their fixity in God's knowledge, Exalted, before the occurrence of the form of the existent upon them — meaning: that he apprehend with the very apprehension of the Real. (Because they) i.e., the Real's apprehension — the feminizing of the pronoun is on account of the occurrence of the apprehension upon the fixed entities, hence the plural.

Words 28–29 · 1 of 7

الأَعْيانِ الثَّابِتَةِ

Only al-Qayṣarī comments here.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿الأعيان الثابتة﴾

هذا وإن كان من حيث انتقاش العقل الأول بصورة كل ما تحته من الحقائق الكلية الممكنة حقا، لكن الروح الأول أيضا عين متصفة بالثبوت قبل الوجود، فالحضرة التي هي ثابتة فيها هي التي جميع الأعيان ثابتة فيها قبل وجودها، لأن الكل في كونها موصوفة بالعدم الخارجي والثبوت العلمي مشترك. والحق ما بينا من قبل: إن لله تعالى أسماء هي مفاتيح الغيب، ولها لوازم تسمى بالأعيان الثابتة. وكلها في غيب الحق تعالى وحضرته العلمية، وليست إلا شؤونه وأسمائه الداخلة في الاسم الباطن. فلما أراد الحق تعالى إيجادهم ليتصفوا بالوجود في الظاهر، كما اتصفوا بالثبوت في الباطن، أوجد هم بأسمائه الحسنى. وأول مراتب إيجادهم إجمالا في الحضرة العلمية الإلهية التي هي الروح الأول ليدخلوا تحت حكم الاسم الظاهر ويتجلى عليهم أنواره، فهو مظهر للحضرة العلمية، كما أنه مظهر للقدرة الإلهية. وهذه الأعيان، هي التي يتعلق علم الله بها، فيدركها على ما هي عليها ولوازمها وأحكامها. وقد بينا أن العلم في المرتبة "الأحدية" عين الذات مطلقا، وفي "الواحدية" التي هي حضرة الأسماء و الصفات نسبة مغايرة للذات، فما يوجد في العلم، من حيث إنه نسبة، إلا ما أعطته تلك الأعيان، فيكون العلم تابعا للمعلوم بهذا الاعتبار. فإذا عرفت ذلك، فنقول: من هؤلاء، أي من الصنف الذي منعهم عن السؤال علمهم، من يعلم أن علم الله بهذا العبد في جميع أحواله هو تابع لما كان عليه عينه الثابتة حال ثبوتها في الغيب المطلق قبل وجودها العيني، ويعلم أن الحق تعالى لا يعطى العبد بحسب الوجود العيني إلا ما أعطى الحق عين هذا العبد من العلم به. أي بالعبد، فيعلم العبد أن علم الله تعالى به حاصل من عينه الثابتة في الغيب، وإذا علم أن ما يحصل له هو "منه" و "عليه" حتى علم الحق أيضا تابع لعينه، لا يطلب من الحق شيئا. ومن هذا المقام قال بعض أهل الشطح: "الفقير لا يحتاج إلى الله تعالى فإن الذي يعلمه مفصلا

This, although it be true from the standpoint of the First Intellect's being inscribed with the form of every universal possible reality beneath it, yet the First Spirit is likewise an entity qualified by fixity prior to existence. So the Presence in which [all entities] are fixed is that in which all the entities are fixed before their existence, for all of them share in being qualified by external nonexistence and cognitive (ʿilmī) fixity. The truth, as we explained before, is that God, Exalted, has Names which are the keys of the Unseen, and these Names have concomitants called the fixed entities. All of these are within the Unseen of the Real, Exalted, and His cognitive Presence, being nothing but His affairs (shuʾūn) and His Names entering under the Name 'the Nonmanifest' (al-Bāṭin). When the Real, Exalted, willed to bring them into existence, that they might be qualified by existence in the manifest realm just as they were qualified by fixity in the nonmanifest realm, He brought them into existence through His Most Beautiful Names. The first stage of their existentiation, in summary form, is in the divine cognitive Presence which is the First Spirit, so that they enter under the ruling of the Name 'the Manifest' (al-Ẓāhir) and its lights are disclosed upon them; it is thus a locus of manifestation (maẓhar) for the cognitive Presence, just as it is a locus of manifestation for the divine Power. These entities are that to which God's knowledge attaches, so that He apprehends them as they are, together with their concomitants and rulings. We have explained that knowledge in the station of 'Oneness' (aḥadiyya) is identical with the Essence absolutely, while in 'Unicity' (wāḥidiyya), which is the Presence of the Names and Attributes, it is a relation (nisba) distinct from the Essence. So nothing exists in knowledge, insofar as it is a relation, except what those entities gave it; hence knowledge, in this respect, follows the known. Having understood this, we say: among these — that is, among the class whose knowledge prevented them from asking — is one who knows that God's knowledge of this servant in all his states follows what his fixed entity was in the state of its fixity in the absolute Unseen before its concrete existence, and he knows that the Real, Exalted, gives the servant, in respect of concrete existence, only what the Real gave the servant's entity of knowledge of him — that is, of the servant — so the servant knows that God's knowledge, Exalted, of him is derived from his entity fixed in the Unseen. And when he knows that what accrues to him is 'from it' and 'upon it,' to the point that even the Real's knowledge follows his entity, he asks nothing of the Real. From this station one of the folk of ecstatic utterance (shaṭḥ) said: 'The poor one (faqīr) has no need of God, Exalted, for what He knows in detail...'

Jāmī

﴿نسب ذاتية﴾

وشؤون عينية مستجنة في عين الذات قبل العلم بها

and entitative concerns (shuʾūn ʿayniyya) latent within the Essence itself prior to knowledge of them.

Bālī Zāde

﴿نسب ذاتية لا صورة لها﴾

في الخارج إذ لم يكن موجودة فيه بخلاف العبد فإنه مخلوق على الصورة

in the external [world], since they do not exist therein — unlike the servant, for he is created upon the form.

Words 36–38 · 1 of 7

لا صُورَةَ لها

Only Jāmī comments here.

Jāmī

﴿لا صورة لها﴾

تتميز بها لا في العلم ولا في العين ليصح تعتق علم المخلوق بها. فإذا تعلق علم الحق سبحانه بها وحصل لها تمیز وتعين في العلم صح تعلق علم المخلوق بها . علما مفيدة للعلم بأحوالها مساوية لعلم الحق سبحانه في تنك الإفادة

by which it is distinguished, neither in knowledge nor in the entity (al-ʿayn), so that the created being's knowledge could properly attach to it. But when the Real's knowledge, glory be to Him, attaches to it, and it acquires distinction and determination (taʿayyun) in knowledge, then the created being's knowledge can properly attach to it — a knowledge that yields knowledge of its states, equal to the Real's knowledge, glory be to Him, in that yielding.

al-Qāshānī

﴿فبهذا القدر نقول : إن العناية الإلهية سبقت لهذا العبد بهذه المساواة في إفادة العلم﴾

وهو أن تعلم أن علمه تعالى وعلم العبد واحد من معدن واحد ، إلا أن علم العبد لم يكن إلا بعد وجوده وحصول صورته . وعلمه تعالى كان قبل وجوده وبعده ، وعلمه عناية من الله سبقت ، وعلم الله ليس بعناية من غيره سابق ، وظهر الفرق

Namely, that you should know that His knowledge, Exalted is He, and the servant's knowledge are one, from a single source, except that the servant's knowledge did not occur except after his existence and the occurrence of his form, whereas His knowledge, Exalted is He, existed before his existence and after it. So the servant's knowledge is a favor preceding from God, whereas God's knowledge is not a favor preceding from another—and thus the difference became apparent.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿فبهذا القدر نقول، إن العناية الإلهية سبقت لهذا العبد بهذه المساواة في إفادة العلم﴾

ظاهر مما مر. ) ومن هنا يقول الله

is manifest from what has preceded.) And it is from here that God says

Jāmī

﴿فبهذا القدر﴾

من سبق علم الحق بالأعيان على علم العبد بها

i.e., to the extent that the Real's knowledge of the entities (aʿyān) precedes the servant's knowledge of them.

Bālī Zāde

﴿فبهذا القدر … نقول إن العناية الإلهية قد سبقت لهذا العبد بهذه المساواة … في إفادة﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

العين الثابتة (العلم) بالحق والعبد

the fixed entity (of knowledge) upon the Real and the servant.

Ibn Turka

﴿يقول : إن العناية الإلهية سبقت لهذا العبد بهذه المساواة في إفادة العلم … ومن هنا﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

- أي من تحقق المساواة -

— that is, from the realization of this equality —

Jāmī

﴿نقول إن العناية﴾

من الحق سبحانه

is from the Real, glory be to Him.

Jāmī

﴿سبقت لهذا العبد بهذه المساوات﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي بمساراته للحق والباء متعلقة بالعناية

i.e., with his correspondence to the Real; and the letter "bāʾ" is connected to "ʿināya" (solicitous care).

Words 50–52 · 1 of 7

في إِفادَةِ العِلْمِ

Only Jāmī comments here.

Jāmī

﴿في إفادة العلم﴾

أي إفادة العلم بالأعيان الثابتة العلم بأحوالها الجارية %~% متن نص فصوص الحكم : و هي كلمة محققة المعنى ما هي كما يتوهمه من ليس له هذا المشرب . شرح الجامي : عليها في وجوده العيني إلى ما لا يتناهى وتحقيق ذلك أن للحق سبحانه بالنسبة إلى العبد عنایتین. أحدهما : بحسب فيضه الأقدس ، وهي تقتضي تعين عينه الثابتة في مرتبة العلم بحيث يصلح لأن يتعلق به علم المخلوق و استعدادها الكلي لفيضان الوجود عليها ، وأحدهم بحسب فيضه المقدس وهي تقتضي فيضان الوجود عليها في العين واستعداداتها الجزئية ليترتب عليها أحواله التي من جملتها صلاحية انكشاف عينة الثابتة وأحوالها عليه. ولا شك أنه إذا كاشف العبد بعينه الثابتة وعلم بهذا الكشف أحوالها أنه يأخذ العلم بتلك الأحوال من عينه الثابتة . كما يأخذ الحق سبحانه عنها نكن أخذه منها من رزق بهاتين العنايتين من جانب الحق سبحانه وإلى العناية الأولى أشار الشيخ رضي الله عنه . واعلم أنه قد وقع في مواضع من القرآن ما يوهم أن علمه سبحانه ببعض الأشياء حادث كقوله سبحانه : " وَلَنَبْلُوَنَّكُمْ حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ الْمُجَاهِدِينَ مِنْكُمْ وَالصَّابِرِينَ "آية 31 سورة محمد . وقوله تعالى : " ثم بعثهم لنعلم أي الحزبين أحصى لما لبثوا أمدا" آية 12 سورة الكهف. وأمثال ذلك والتقصي عن هذه الأشكال، إما بما ذهب إليه المتكلمون من أن علمه سبحانه قدیم وتعلقه حادث . فمعنى قوله : "حتى نعلم" حتى يتعلق علمنا القديم بالمجاهدين منكم والصابرين. وإما بأن المراد بالعلم الشهود فإن الأشياء قبل وجودها العيني معلومة للحق سبحانه وبعده مشهودة له فالشهود خصوص نسبة العلم. فإنه قد يلحق العلم بواسطة وجود متعلقه نسبة باعتبارها نسميه شهود و حضورا لا أنه حدث هناك علم. فمعنى حتی نعلم حتى نشاهد، وإما بأن يقال المسند إليه في قوله: نعلم ليس هو الحق باعتبار مرتبة الجمع بل باعتبار مرتبة الفرق . فكأنه يقول : حتى نعلم من حيث ظهورنا في المظاهر الكونية الخلفية فتكون الخلقية وقاية له عن نسبة الحدوث إليه . وإما بان يقال : المراد بالتأخر المفهوم من كلمة حتى التأخر الذاتي لا الزماني حتى يلزم الحدوث الزماني وحيث انجر الكلام ههنا إلى أن علم الحق سبحانه بأحوال العبد مأخوذ من عينه الثابتة متأخر عنها بالذات. أشار الشيخ رضي الله عنه إلى أن هذا التأخر هو المصحح لما جاء في القرآن فقال

i.e., the yielding of knowledge of the fixed entities (al-aʿyān al-thābita) yields knowledge of their flowing states. %~% Text of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam: "And it is a phrase verified in meaning, not as is imagined by one who does not have this taste (mashrab)." Commentary of al-Jāmī: ...upon it in its entified existence, unto infinity. The verification of this is that the Real, glory be to Him, has two kinds of solicitous care (ʿināya) in relation to the servant. One is in accordance with His most holy effusion (al-fayḍ al-aqdas), which requires the determination (taʿayyun) of his fixed entity in the level of knowledge, such that the created being's knowledge may properly attach to it, together with its total preparedness (istiʿdād) for the effusion of existence upon it. The other is in accordance with His holy effusion (al-fayḍ al-muqaddas), which requires the effusion of existence upon it in the entity (al-ʿayn) and its particular preparednesses, so that its states may follow upon it — among which is its fitness for the unveiling of its fixed entity and its states to it. There is no doubt that when the servant is granted unveiling through his fixed entity, and through this unveiling comes to know its states, he takes knowledge of those states from his fixed entity, just as the Real, glory be to Him, takes [knowledge] from it. Let his taking from it be [attributed to] one who is favored with these two kinds of solicitous care from the side of the Real, glory be to Him. To the first solicitous care the Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, alluded. Know that there occur in several places in the Qurʾān expressions which give the impression that His knowledge, glory be to Him, of certain things is originated (ḥādith), such as His saying, glory be to Him: "And We will surely test you until We know those among you who strive and those who are steadfast" (Qurʾān 47:31), and His saying, exalted is He: "Then We raised them up that We might know which of the two parties was more precise in reckoning the time they had remained" (Qurʾān 18:12), and the like of that. Extrication from these apparent difficulties [may be achieved] either by what the theologians (mutakallimūn) held — that His knowledge, glory be to Him, is eternal (qadīm) while its attachment (taʿalluq) is originated (ḥādith); so the meaning of His saying "until We know" is "until Our eternal knowledge attaches to those among you who strive and those who are steadfast." Or by holding that what is meant by "knowledge" here is "witnessing" (shuhūd), for things, before their entified existence, are known to the Real, glory be to Him, and after it are witnessed by Him — witnessing being a specific relation (nisba) of knowledge; for knowledge may acquire, by virtue of the existence of its object of attachment, a relation which, in respect of it, we call "witnessing" and "presence," without any new knowledge having occurred there. So the meaning of "until We know" is "until We witness." Or by saying that the subject to which [the verb] is ascribed in His saying "We know" is not the Real considered in respect of the level of the Gathering (jamʿ), but rather in respect of the level of Differentiation (farq); as if He were saying: "until We know from the standpoint of Our manifestation in the loci of manifestation of engendered existence (al-maẓāhir al-kawniyya al-khalqiyya)" — engendered existence thus serving as a shield protecting Him from the ascription of origination to Him. Or by saying that what is meant by the posteriority (taʾakhkhur) understood from the word "ḥattā" ("until") is essential posteriority, not temporal posteriority, so that temporal origination need not follow. And since the discussion here has led to [the conclusion] that the Real's knowledge, glory be to Him, of the servant's states is taken from his fixed entity, and is essentially posterior to it, the Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, alluded to the fact that this posteriority is what validates what has come in the Qurʾān, saying:

al-Qāshānī

﴿ومن هنا يقول الله " حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ " وهي كلمة محققة المعنى ، ما هي كما يتوهمه من ليس له هذا المشرب﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

يقصد الآية" وَلَنَبْلُوَنَّكُمْ حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ الْمُجَاهِدِينَ مِنْكُمْ وَالصَّابِرِينَ وَنَبْلُوَ أَخْبَارَكُمْ (31)" سورة محمد. فإنه ينزه علمه تعالى من سمة الحدوث ، ويجعله صفة زائدة على ذاته قديمة يتعلق بالمعدوم تعلقا حادثا فيجعل الحدوث صفة التعلق لا صفة العلم . وهو معنى قوله

He means the verse: "And We will surely test you until We know the strivers among you and the steadfast, and We will test your reports (31)" (Sūrat Muḥammad). For [the exoteric theologian] declares His knowledge, Exalted is He, incomparable with the mark of temporal origination, and makes it an attribute additional to His Essence, eternal, [which] attaches to the non-existent thing with a temporally-originated attachment; thus he makes temporal origination an attribute of the attachment, not an attribute of the knowledge itself. This is the meaning of his statement

Jāmī

﴿ومن هنا﴾

أي من جهة أن علم الحق سبحانه بأحوال العبد مأخوذ من عينه الثابتة متأخر عنها (يقول الله) سبحانه

That is, from the fact that the Real's knowledge, glory be to Him, of the states of the servant is taken from his fixed entity (ʿayn thābita), being posterior to it — (God says), glory be to Him

Bālī Zāde

﴿ومن هنا﴾

أي ومن إفادة العين العلم للحق

i.e., and from the entity's bestowal of knowledge upon the Real.

﴿يقول الله تعالى "حتى نعلم" وهي كلمة محققة المعنى﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

وذلك المعنی كون ما قبل حتى سببا لما بعدها . فاختبر تعالى عباده بالتكاليف الشاقة ليعلم الصابرين على هذه التكاليف

and that meaning is that what precedes 'until' is the cause of what follows it. So He, Exalted, tests His servants with burdensome obligations that He may know those who are patient under these obligations.

Ibn Turka

﴿يقول الله : "حتى نعلم" وهي كلمة محققة المعنى﴾

Quotes words that differ from our text (wavy underline).

أي مطلق على الحقيقة -

— that is, unrestricted, in [very] reality —

al-Jandī

﴿حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ﴾

وهي كلمة محقّقة المعنى ، ما هي كما يتوهّمه من ليس له هذا المشرب " . قال العبد : هو يشير رضي الله عنه إلى توقّف تحقّق النسبة العلميّة من كونها كذلك على حقائق المعلومات وتحقّقها بأعيانها في الوجود ، لأنّ العلم المضاف إلى الحق من حيث الجمعية الإلهية إنّما يتحقّق بتحقّق العلم بجميع الحقائق العينية والشؤون الغيبية . فإنّ للحق ظهورا في كلّ شأن شأن ، فالعلم المضاف إلى الحق من حيث ذلك الظهور بذلك الشأن لا يكون إلَّا بعد تحقّق الشأن بعينه في الوجود ، بخلاف العلم الذاتي الإلهي . فإنّ توقّف العلم على المعلومات ليس من حيث أحديّة الذات ، فإنّ الأحدية الذاتية تقهر الكثرة النسبية العلمية والوجودية العينية ، فلا تظهر لها أعيان أصلا . والعلم والعالم والمعلوم في أحدية الذات أحدية ، وكذلك في الوجود واحد وحدة حقيقة غير زائدة على ذاتية الذات ، ولكن توقّف تحقّق العلم على المعلوم من حيث إنّ العلم نسبة متعلَّقة بالنسب المعلومية المظهرية من حيث هذه الشؤون والحقائق الأسمائيّة التي تحقّقها بحقائق هذه الشؤون. فقوله : " حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ " إشارة إلى توقّف العلم المضاف إلى الحق من حيث أسمائه الحسنى وشئونه ونسبه الذاتية العليا بأحوالها وأحكامها وآثارها وتعلَّقاتها ونسبها وإضافاتها ولوازمها وعوارضها ولواحقها ولواحق اللواحق . من حيث المرتبة والمحلّ والمقام والموطن والحال في الوجود العيني والشهود العياني الكوني ، فهو إذن كلمة محقّقة المعنى ليست كما يتأوّلها بالوهم أهل التنزيه الوهمي . فإنّ الحق لا يستحقّ من الحق ولا يتنزّه عن مقتضيات ذاته ، ومقتضاها من حيث هذه النسب الذاتية أن لا يظهر كلّ منها إلَّا بكلّ منها في كل منها ، فتوقّف تحقّق الحقيقة العلمية على حقيقة المعلوم كذلك كتوقّفه على حقيقة الوجود ، فالتوقّف إذن بين النسب بعضها على البعض . وذلك غير قادح في الغنى الذاتي ، ووجوب الوجود للذات بالذات ، وكون هذه النسب أعني العالميّة والمعلومية والعلم كلَّها ذاتية ، فافهم إن شاء الله تعالى . فإنّ العلم والمعلوم والعالم في أحدية الذات عينها لا غيرها ، والمعلومية كالعالميّة والمظهرية كالظاهرية نسب ذاتية للذات كسائر النسب الذاتية الوجوبية التي العلم من جملتها . فتوقّف العلم على المعلوم إنّما هو من حيث هذه النسبة العلمية من وجه يغاير ذاتية الذات بالخصوصية وفي التعقّل ، ثم التغاير والتمايز بين الحقائق بالخصوصيات وفي تعقّل المتعقّل لها منّا لا يوجب الكثرة والتعدّد والتوقّف والتجدّد والتغيّر ، في الذات الواحدة التي هي عينها ، فافهم . قال الشيخ رضي الله عنه : « وغاية المنزّه » أي بوهمه « أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث في العلم المتعلَّق ، وهو أعلى وجه للمتكلَّم بعقله في هذه المسألة ، لولا أنّه أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات ، فجعل التعلَّق له لا للذات وبهذا انفصل عن المحقّق من أهل الله صاحب الكشف والوجود " . قال العبد : اعلم : أنّه غاية أهل التنزيه الوهمي أن ينسبوا الحدوث في قوله تعالى : " وَلَنَبْلُوَنَّكُمْ حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ الْمُجاهِدِينَ مِنْكُمْ ". إلى التعلَّق العلمي ، فتكون الكثرة والحدوث والتوقّف والتغيّر والتجدّد في التعلَّق ،لا في حقيقة العلم التي هي عين الذات. ولا يرتفع الإشكال بذلك أيضا ، لكون العلم هو المتعلَّق بذلك التعلَّق الحادث ، ولكون التعلَّق من وجه عين المتعلَّق ، ولا سيّما وقد أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات ولا مخلص له في هذا النظر إلَّا أن يعلم أنّ الحدوث والكثرة في المعلوم المتكثّر المتجدّد المتغيّر الحادث ، والتجدّد في التعيّن والمتعلَّق به من حيث هو كذلك . أمّا من حيث العلم الذي هو عين العالم الأزلي فتعلَّق وحدانيّ ، لكون ارتباط النسب المتوقّفة التحقّق على الطرفين في كل واحد منهما بحسبه ، فالكثرة والتغيّر والتجدّد في التعلَّق العلمي الوحداني من حيث ما يرتبط به وهو المعلوم المتكثّر المتغيّر المتجدّد ، والوحدة في التعلَّق أيضا من حيث العلم الذاتي الوحداني كهو ، فافهم . وثمّ نظر آخر وهو أنّ العلم ، له اعتباران : أحدهما من جهة الحق ، وبهذا الاعتبار هو عين الذات كما تقرّر آنفا . والثاني من حيث إنّه نسبة متميّزة عن ذاتيّة الذات بخصوصيتها وعن غيرها من النسب ، وهذه النسبة حقيقة كلَّية أحدية التعلَّق بالمعلومات من شأنه تميّز المعلومات بعضها عن البعض وكشف حقائقها وحقائق أحوالها على سبيل الإحاطة ، فهي من حيث كونها نسبة كليّة لا تحقّق لها إلَّا بين عالم ومعلوم ، فتكون متوقّفة التعيّن على المعلومات . وتعيّن المعلومات في عرصة العلم من حيث هذا الوجه يكون بحسب المعلومات ، ومن حيث إنّ العلم عين الذات يكون تعيّن المعلومات فيه بحسب العلم كذلك أحدية ، فافهم . ولمّا كان المعلوم نسبة والعلم أيضا نسبة ، لم يقدح توقّف النسبة على النسبة من كونها كذلك في العلم الأحدي الذاتي الذي هو عين الذات ، فافهم . ثم اعلم : أنّ الحضرة العلمية تشتمل على حضرات كلَّية كثيرة وهي : حضرة العلم ، وحضرة المعرفة ، وحضرة الحكمة ، وحضرة الخبرة ، وحضرة التقدير . فالعلم كما مرّ هو الكشف الإحاطي التمييزي للمعلومات على ما هي عليه من كل وجه للوازمها ولوازم لوازمها . والمعرفة هي العلم بحقائق المعلومات من حيث حقائقها مجرّدة عن خلقيّاتها وعن اللوازم ولوازم اللوازم وترتّبها في مراتبها لا غير . والحكمة عبارة عن العلم بالمراتب والحقائق المترتّبة فيها وبالترتيب الواقع بين حقائقها ،أي حقائق المعلومات واللوازم والعوارض واللواحق وبالمواطن والأحوال. وحضرة الخبرة هي حضرة العلم بظهور آثار الحقائق وأحكامها بموجب الترتيب الحقيقي المذكور بأسبابه وعلله . وحضرة التقدير هي حضرة العلم بتعيّن أقدار الحقائق وخصوصياتها في العلم بحسبها وعلى أقدارها ، فالتقدير من المقدّر القديم بحسب قدر المقدور وقدره في العلم ، ومن كوشف له بهذه الحضرات كلَّها وأحاط بحقائقها بما به الامتياز وبما به الاشتراك ، كان أكشف المكاشفين ، جعلنا الله وإيّاك منهم ، إنّه قدير . قال رضي الله عنه

and it is a phrase of verified meaning, not as one who lacks this drinking-place (mashrab) imagines." The servant [author] says: He - may God be pleased with him - is pointing to the dependence of the verification of the cognitive relation (al-nisba al-ʿilmiyya), in its being what it is, upon the realities of the known things and their being verified in their entities (aʿyān) in existence. For knowledge ascribed to the Real, from the standpoint of the Divine comprehensiveness (al-jamʿiyya al-ilāhiyya), is only verified through the verification of knowledge of all the entitative realities and the unseen affairs (al-shuʾūn al-ghaybiyya). For the Real has a manifestation in every single affair (shaʾn), so the knowledge ascribed to the Real, from the standpoint of that manifestation through that affair, cannot occur except after the verification of that affair itself in existence - unlike the Divine essential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-dhātī al-ilāhī). For the dependence of knowledge upon the known things is not from the standpoint of the oneness of the Essence (aḥadiyyat al-dhāt), for the essential oneness overpowers the relational cognitive multiplicity and the entitative existential multiplicity, so no entities appear for it at all. Knowledge, the knower, and the known are, in the oneness of the Essence, one; and likewise in existence they are one, a real unity not additional to the essential nature of the Essence. But the dependence of the verification of knowledge upon the known is from the standpoint that knowledge is a relation (nisba) attached to the known-relations that are loci of manifestation (al-nisab al-maʿlūmiyya al-maẓhariyya), from the standpoint of these affairs and the Names' realities whose verification occurs through the realities of these affairs. So His saying, 'until We know,' points to the dependence of the knowledge ascribed to the Real - from the standpoint of His Most Beautiful Names, His affairs, and His high essential relations, with their states, rulings, effects, attachments, relations, ascriptions, concomitants, accidents, and the concomitants of concomitants - from the standpoint of rank, locus, station, abode, and condition in entitative existence and cosmic direct witnessing (al-shuhūd al-ʿiyānī al-kawnī). It is, then, a phrase of verified meaning, not as the people of illusory tanzīh interpret it by fancy. For the Real does not incur obligation from the Real, nor is He declared incomparable (yatanazzahu) with respect to the requirements of His own Essence; and the requirement thereof, from the standpoint of these essential relations, is that none of them appears except through each of them, in each of them. So the dependence of the verification of the cognitive reality upon the reality of the known is, in that sense, like its dependence upon the reality of existence; the dependence, then, is among the relations, some upon others. And this is not detrimental to the essential self-sufficiency, nor to the necessity of Existence for the Essence by the Essence, nor to the fact that these relations - I mean knowingness, being-known, and knowledge - are all essential. So understand, God willing. For knowledge, the known, and the knower are, in the oneness of the Essence, its very self, not other than it; and being-known, like knowingness, and being-a-locus-of-manifestation, like being-manifest, are essential relations of the Essence, like the other necessary essential relations of which knowledge is one. So the dependence of knowledge upon the known is only from the standpoint of this cognitive relation, from an aspect that differs from the essential nature of the Essence by specification and in conceptualization. Then, the differentiation and distinction among the realities by specifications, and in the conceptualization of one who conceptualizes them from among us, does not necessitate multiplicity, plurality, dependence, renewal, or change in the one Essence which is its very self. So understand. The Shaykh - may God be pleased with him - said: 'And the utmost that the one who declares incomparability [by fancy] can do is to place that coming-into-being in the attached knowledge (al-ʿilm al-mutaʿallaq); and this is the highest aspect for one speaking by his intellect on this matter - were it not that he had affirmed knowledge as additional to the Essence, thereby making the attachment belong to it and not to the Essence. And by this he is cut off from the verifier among the people of God, the possessor of unveiling and finding (al-kashf wa-l-wujūd).' The servant [author] says: Know that the utmost that the people of illusory tanzīh can do is to ascribe the coming-into-being in His saying, Most High: 'And We will surely test you until We know those who strive among you,' to the cognitive attachment (al-taʿalluq al-ʿilmī), so that multiplicity, coming-into-being, dependence, change, and renewal occur in the attachment, not in the reality of knowledge which is the very self of the Essence. But the difficulty is not thereby removed either, because knowledge is that which is attached by that occurring attachment, and because the attachment is, from one aspect, identical with the object of attachment - especially since he has affirmed knowledge as additional to the Essence, and there is no escape for him in this view except by knowing that the coming-into-being and multiplicity are in the multiple, renewing, changing, occurring known object, and that the renewal is in the entification (taʿayyun) and in the object attached to it, from that standpoint as such. As for from the standpoint of the knowledge that is identical with the eternal Knower, it is a unitary attachment (taʿalluq waḥdānī), because the connection of the relations whose verification depends on the two terms occurs in each of the two according to itself. So the multiplicity, change, and renewal are in the unitary cognitive attachment from the standpoint of what it is connected to, which is the multiple, changing, renewing known object; while the unity in the attachment is also from the standpoint of the essential unitary knowledge, as it itself is. So understand. There is yet another consideration, which is that knowledge has two aspects: one is from the side of the Real, and by this consideration it is identical with the Essence, as was established just now. The second is that it is a relation distinguished from the essential nature of the Essence by its specificity and from the other relations; and this relation is a universal reality, one in its attachment (aḥadiyyat al-taʿalluq) to the known things, whose function is to distinguish the known things from one another and to disclose their realities and the realities of their states in a comprehensive manner. So it, from the standpoint of being a universal relation, has no verification except between a knower and a known, and thus its entification depends upon the known things. And the entification of the known things in the arena of knowledge, from this aspect, occurs according to the known things themselves; while from the standpoint that knowledge is identical with the Essence, the entification of the known things within it occurs according to knowledge, which is likewise one. So understand. And since the known is a relation, and knowledge too is a relation, the dependence of relation upon relation, in being what it is, does not detract from the one essential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-aḥadī al-dhātī) which is identical with the Essence. So understand. Then know: that the Presence of Knowledge (al-ḥaḍra al-ʿilmiyya) comprises many universal presences, namely: the Presence of Knowledge ('ilm), the Presence of Recognition (maʿrifa), the Presence of Wisdom (ḥikma), the Presence of Experience/Expertise (khibra), and the Presence of Determination/Apportionment (taqdīr). As for knowledge, as mentioned, it is the comprehensive, discriminating disclosure of the known things as they are, from every aspect, of their concomitants and the concomitants of their concomitants. Recognition (maʿrifa) is knowledge of the realities of the known things from the standpoint of their realities abstracted from their creaturely qualities and from the concomitants and concomitants of concomitants and their ordering in their ranks - nothing more. Wisdom (ḥikma) is an expression for knowledge of the ranks and the realities ordered within them, and of the ordering occurring among their realities - that is, the realities of the known things, the concomitants, accidents, and appendages - and of the abodes and states. The Presence of Experience (khibra) is the presence of knowledge of the appearance of the effects of the realities and their rulings, in accordance with the aforementioned real ordering, with its causes and reasons. The Presence of Determination (taqdīr) is the presence of knowledge of the entification of the measures of the realities and their specificities in knowledge, according to them and to their measures. So determination, from the Eternal Determiner (al-muqaddir al-qadīm), is in accordance with the measure of the thing determined and its measure in knowledge. And whoever is unveiled all these presences, and encompasses their realities - both that by which they are distinguished and that by which they share - is the most unveiled of those who have unveiling; may God make us and you among them. Indeed He is Powerful (Qadīr). He - may God be pleased with him - said:

al-Qayṣarī

﴿حتى نعلم﴾

وهي كلمة محققة المعنى، ما هي كما يتوهمه من ليس له هذا المشرب) أي، من حيث إن العلم تابع للمعلوم من وجه. يقول الحق تعالى في كلامه: "حتى نعلم المجاهدين منكم والصابرين ونبلو أخباركم". أي، يتعلق علمه بالأعيان الثابتة التي للمجاهدين والصابرين، فيحصل العلم بأن الأشخاص الإنسانية من يكون منهم مجاهد، أو من يكون منهم صابر، أو من لا يكون كذلك. لا يقال: يلزم منه الحدوث لحصول علمه بعد ما لم يكن حينئذ. لأنا نقول: تعلق العلم بالمعلوم أزلي وأبدى، فلا يلزم ذلك. غاية ما في الباب أنه يلزم تقدم المعلوم على تعلق العلم به، وعلى العلم أيضا، تقدما ذاتيا لا زمانيا ليلزم الحدوث الزماني. وهو حق. لأن العلم من حيث إنه مغائر للذات نسبة ذاتية، فيقتضى العالم والمعلوم، وكل منهما لا بد وأن يكون مقدما بالذات عليها كما مر

— and this is a phrase whose meaning is verified; it is not as one imagines who does not possess this taste (mashrab)) that is, insofar as knowledge follows the known object in one respect. The Real, exalted is He, says in His speech: "until We know those among you who strive and those who are steadfast, and We test your reports." That is, His knowledge is attached to the fixed entities (al-aʿyān al-thābita) belonging to those who strive and those who are steadfast, so that knowledge occurs that among human individuals there is one who strives, and one who is steadfast, and one who is not so. It cannot be said that this necessitates coming-into-being (ḥudūth), since His knowledge occurs after not having been at that time. For we say: the attachment (taʿalluq) of knowledge to the known is eternal a parte ante and a parte post, so this does not follow. The utmost that is required in this matter is that the known must precede the attachment of knowledge to it, and also precede the knowledge itself, a precedence that is essential (dhātī), not temporal, so that temporal coming-into-being would not follow. And this is true. For knowledge, insofar as it is other than the Essence, is an essential relation (nisba dhātiyya), and thus requires a knower and a known, each of which must of necessity be essentially prior to it, as has preceded

﴿حتى نعلم %~%﴾

العلم التفصيلي الذي هو في المظاهر الإنسانية، ولا شك في تجدد العلم فيها، فيكون الحقيقة الإنسانية حينئذ وقاية لربها عن سمة الحدوث ونقص الإمكان، لكن لا يكون من هذا المقام حينئذ. (وغاية المنزه أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث في العلم للتعلق، وهو أعلى وجه يكون للمتكلم بعقله في هذه المسألة. لو لا أنه أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات، فجعل التعلق له لا للذات. وبهذا انفصل عن المحقق من أهل الله صاحب الكشف والوجود( أي، غاية من يتكلم بعقله في هذه المسألة وينزه الحق عن سمة الحدوث ونقائصه، أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث للتعلق، بأن يقول، العلم أزلي وتعلقه بالأشياء حادث حدوثا زمانيا، لئلا يلزم أن يكون الحادث صفة للواجب. وهو أعلى وجه للمتكلم في هذه المسألة بنظره الفكري. وجواب (لو لا) محذوف، تقديره: لو لا أن المتكلم أثبت العلم زائدا مطلقا على الذات، فجعل التعلق له لا للذات، لكان ممن فاز بالتحقيق واتصل بأهله

is the detailed knowledge (al-ʿilm al-tafṣīlī) that is in the human loci of manifestation (maẓāhir), and there is no doubt about the renewal of knowledge within them, so that the human reality would then be a safeguard for its Lord against the mark of coming-into-being and the deficiency of contingency (imkān), but this would then not belong to this station. (The utmost that the one who declares incomparability (tanzīh) can do is to ascribe that coming-into-being to the attachment (taʿalluq) [of knowledge], and this is the highest position attainable by one who speaks according to his reason (ʿaql) on this question — were it not that he affirmed knowledge as something additional to the Essence, thereby ascribing the attachment to it rather than to the Essence. And by this he is set apart from the verifier (muḥaqqiq) among the people of God, the possessor of unveiling (kashf) and finding (wujūd)) — that is, the utmost that one who speaks by his reason on this question, and who declares the Real incomparable with the mark of coming-into-being and its deficiencies, can do is to ascribe that coming-into-being to the attachment, by saying: knowledge is eternal, and its attachment to things comes into being with a temporal coming-into-being, so that it would not follow that the contingent-come-into-being be an attribute of the Necessary. And this is the highest position for the theologian (mutakallim) on this question according to his speculative reasoning. The apodosis of "were it not" (law lā) is elided, its estimation being: were it not that the speaker affirmed knowledge as absolutely additional to the Essence, thereby ascribing the attachment to it rather than to the Essence, he would have been among those who attained verification (taḥqīq) and joined its people

al-Tilimsānī

﴿حتى نعلم﴾

(محمد: 31) وهي كلمة محققة المعني ما هي كما يتوهمه من ليس له هذا المشرب. وغاية المنزه أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث في العلم للتعلق وهو أعلى وجه يكون للمتكلم بعقله في هذه المسألة، لو لا أنه أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات فجعل التعلق له لا للذات. وبهذا انفصل عن المحقق من أهل الله، صاحب الكشف والوجود." قلت: الشيخ، رضي الله عنه، قد ألغز ها هنا لغزا وهو أنه قد قدم في الحكمة الأولى التي هي في كلمة آدمية أن الإنسان جامع لحضرة الأسماء الحسنى، فهو حق من وجه، خلق من وجهه. فمن الوجه الذي هو منه حق ثبت للحق تعالی منه أحكام لولا هذا الإنسان الكامل ما جاز نسبتها إليه تعالى. فمن ذلك أن هذا الإنسان يتجدد له العلم، فيصح من هذه المرتبة أن يقول الحق تعالی: "حتى نعلم" لأن الحق تعالی من حضرة إطلاقه لا علاقة بينه وبين شيء وإنما العلاقة تكون في مراتب الإنسان. فما خاطبه الحق تعالی من حضرة إطلاقه بل من حضرة تقييده. ألا ترى أنه لو لم يكن في الوجود عین ثابتة يقال له: أبو لهب، لم يرد في الكتاب العزيز "تبت يدا أبي لهب وتب" سورة المسد آية 1. فمن مرتبة العين الثابتة التي هي أبو لهب نزلت هذه الآية. والمراتب كلها في علمه تعالی فإذن هي نازلة من عند الله تعالى لأن العندية الإلهية عامة لكل عندية جزئية أزلا وأبدا . فإذن هناك علاقة بين الحق تعالی وبين الإنسان وهي كون الإنسان جامعة الأسماء الله الحسنى . فإذا قال الحق تعالی: "حتى نعلم" فمعناه حتى يعلم الإنسان، فيكون نفس تجدد العلم هو للإنسان لكن للإنسان حضرة الإلهية أيضا، فيرجع إليه تعالى من حقيقة "حتى نعلم" حکم ما به صح . قولنا: إن الله تعالى قال في كتابه العزيز: "حتى نعلم" ولما كانت هذه الحضرة المقتضية لتحقق حقيقة "حتى نعلم" هي من الحضرات الذاتية الإلهية من جهة ما للأعيان الثابتة هي معلومات الذات والمعلوم مع العلم في الذات ويشملها أن علم الله تعالى لا يغادر ذاته. فثبت معنی " حتى نعلم" ولم يلحق الذات المقدسة منها تجدد علم إذ كان الإنسان في هذه الحقيقية وقاية لربه تعالی عن نقص هذا الحدوث. ثم إن الشيخ، رضي الله عنه، أردف هذا بذكر ما قاله المتكلمون من قولهم:" إن الله تعالى يعلم الأشياء بعلم زائد على ذاته". وقصدهم أن ينسبوا تجدد العلم إلى التعلق الحاصل" للعلم . كأنهم قالوا: تجدد التعلق لغير الحق تعالى وهو العلم لا له تعالى وهذا يرون أن به بيحصل الانفصال عن هذا الاشكال. فقال الشيخ رضى الله عنه : " إن الصحيح هو الذي اقتضاه الكشف والشهود وهو ما أشير إليه من أن تجدد العلم إنما هو للإنسان وأن الذي ذكره المتكلم باطل. فحصل الفرق بين المتكلمين وبين أهل الله تعالى في هذه المسألة . ووصف أهل الكشف بأنهم أهل الوجود أي أهل شهود وجود الله تعالى . أو أنه أراد بالوجود الوجدان فإن شهودات أهل الله تعالى هي وجدانية لا فكرية. " "" يعني بالوجود :أهل الوجود العارفين شهودهم بنور الله الأزلي الوجود الحقيقي والوجود المستعار ويفرقون بينهم شهودا ووجودا. وليسوا كغيرهم ممن لم يفتح الله بصيرهم وبصرهم يرون الوجود المستعار انه هو كل الوجود او الوجود الحقيقي على الإطلاق. "" قوله: "ثم نرجع إلى الأعطيات " فنقول: إن الأعطيات إما ذاتية أو أسمائية. فأما المنح والهبات والعطايا الذاتية فلا تكون أبدا إلا عن تجل إلهي. والتجلي من الذات لا يكون أبدا إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلى له وغير ذلك لا يكون. فإذن المتجلى له ما رأي سوى صورته في مرآة الحق تعالى، وما رأى الحق ولا يمكن أن يراه. قلت: الأعطيات والعطايا والهبات والمنح كلها بمعنى واحد هنا، فالشيخ ذكر أن هذه الهبات إما ذاتية وإما أسمائية، فشرع في ذكر الهبات الذاتية فنسبها إلى ذات العبد في الحقيقة لا إلى ذاته تعالى . وذلك في قوله: والتجلي من الذات المقدسة لا يكون أبدا إلا بصورة استعداد العبد المتجلى له ، فرد الأمر إلى العبد و استعداد العبد هو من جملة ذاته. فكأنه قال: إن تجلی الحق تعالی يكون مطلقا غیر مقید ولا يرى العبد منه إلا ما قيده له استعداده. فإذن ما يمكن للعبد أن يرى إطلاق الحق تعالى من جهة أن العبد لا يكون إلا مقيدا ولا يرى المقيد إلا ما هو مقيد باستعداده فما رأى الحق تعالی أحد ولا يمكن أن يراه في حضرة إطلاقه. أما كون نور التجلي يصير العبد كالمرآة، فيرى فيه ذاته، فهو أمر قد صح عند أهل الله ولذلك قالوا : "انتهى سفر الطالبين إلى الظفر بنفوسهم". قوله رضي الله عنه: " مع علمه أنه ما رأى صورته إلا فيه كالمرأة في الشاهد إذا رأيت الصورة فيها لا تراها مع علمك أنك ما رأيت الصور أو صورتك إلا فيها. فأبرز الله ذلك مثالا نصبه لتجلية الذاتي ليعلم المتجلى له أنه ما رآه. وما ثم مثال أقرب ولا أشبه بالرؤية والتجلي من هذا. وأجهد في نفسك عندما ترى الصورة في المرأة أن ترى جرم المرأة لا تراه أبدا ألبتة حتى أن بعض من أدرك مثل هذا في صور المرايا ذهب إلى أن الصورة المرئية بين نظر الرآئی و بین المرآة. " قوله رضي الله عنه: "هذا أعظم ما قدر عليه من العلم، والأمر كما قلناه وذهبنا إليه. وقد بينا هذا في الفتوحات المكية وإذا ذقت هذا ذقت الغاية التي ليس فوقها غاية في حق المخلوقات، فلا تطمع ولا تتعب نفسك في أن ترقى في أعلى من هذا الدرج فما هو ثم أصلا، وما بعده إلا العدم المحض." قلت: يعني به علم العبد المتجلي له، أنه ما رأى صورته إلا في الحق تعالی وشبه ذلك بالمرآة فإن الإنسان إذا شاهد الشكل الذي في المرآة لا يكون مشاهدا الجرم المرآة وكأنه يقول إن ذلك قد جرب وهو أن جرم المرآة وهو الصيقل منها الذي يرى الشكل لا يراه أحد حين مشاهدته للشكل لكن يعلم أن الشكل ما ظهر لك إلا في المرآة وبه قوله رضي الله عنه: "واجهد أنك إذا رأيت الشكل في المرآة أن ترى جرم المرآة فهو إرشاد منه، تعالی و تقدس، إلى أدب أهل الله تعالى في الشهود، فإنهم يجتهدون أن يروا المرآة أكثر من اجتهادهم أن يروا الشكل الذي فيها أي يرون الحق تعالی أقرب إلى شهودهم من رؤية نفوسهم التي ظهرت في مرآة تجليه تعالى وأما جرم المرآة ". فقد قال: إنك لا تراه أبدا مع جواز إرادته، رضي الله عنه. أن يقول لك: جرب أنت ما قلناه، هل ترى جرم المرآة في تلك الحالة؟ فإنك تعلم أنك لا تراه أصلا. قال: ومن جملة ما ألجأ بعض الناس أن يقول: إن الشكل الظاهر في المرآة هو بين البصر وبين الجرم الصيقل من المرآة، ما جربوه من أن جرم المرآة المذكور لا يرى، فتوهموا أن الشكل المذكور هو الذي حجب أبصارنا عن إدراك جرم المرآة لما عجزوا عن رؤيته. قال: هذا أعظم ما قدروا عليه من العلم. وباقي الكلام مفهوم مما سبق في الكلمة الآدمية . وينبغي أن يفهم من هذا الكلام الذي ذكره شيخنا، رضي الله عنه، أن الشهود لا يكون إلا للوجود أو لمعانيه وليس غير الأعيان الثابتة المذكورة وأما العدم المحض وهو لا شيء من كل وجه، فلا يشهد ولا يعبر عنه عبارة إلا مجازا للضرورة. قوله رضي الله عنه: " فهو مرآتك في رؤيتك نفسك، وأنت مرآته في رؤيته نفسه وهي أسماؤه وظهور أحكامها و ليست سوى عينه" قلت: هذا مجاز على حكم التشبيه لأن وجود الحق تعالی کالمرآة تظهر فيها نفس المشاهد، وذات المشاهد كالمرآة تظهر فيها أسماؤه تعالى والجميع يرجع إلى أن الأعيان الثابتة معان وهي صور علمه، وعلمه لا يغایر ذاته فليس إلا هو فانبهم الأمر. قوله: "فاختلط الأمر وانبهم." الجميع يرجع إلى أن الأعيان الثابتة معان وهي صور علمه، وعلمه لا يغایر ذاته فليس إلا هو فانبهم الأمر. و قوله: "فمنا من جهل في علمه " قوله رضي الله عنه: والعجز عن درك الإدراك إدراك، ومنا من علم فلم يقل مثل هذا وهو أعلى القول، بل أعطاه العلم السكوت، ما أعطاه العجز. وهذا هو أعلى عالم بالله. وليس هذا العلم إلا لخاتم الرسل وخاتم الأولياء ، وما يراه أحد من الأنبياء والرسل إلا من مشكاة الرسول الخاتم، ولا يراه أحد من الأولياء إلا من مشكاة الولي الخاتم، حتى أن الرسل لا يرونه مني رأوه إلا من مشكاة خاتم الأولياء." فقال رضي الله عنه

(Muḥammad: 31) — this is a phrase of verified meaning; it is not as imagined by one who has not tasted this draught. The utmost that the one who declares incomparability (tanzīh) can do is to attribute this coming-into-being (ḥudūth) to knowledge in respect of its relation (taʿalluq), and that is the highest position that can be held by one who speaks with his intellect (ʿaql) on this question — except that he affirms knowledge as something additional to the Essence, and so attributes the relation to it, not to the Essence. By this he is set apart from the verifying knower among the folk of God, the possessor of unveiling (kashf) and existential finding (wujūd)." I [the commentator] say: the Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, has here posed a riddle, namely that he had earlier established, in the first Wisdom — that which pertains to the Adamic Word — that the human being comprehends the Presence of the Beautiful Names, so that he is the Real (ḥaqq) from one respect, and a created thing (khalq) from another respect. So from the respect in which he is the Real, there are established for the Real, exalted is He, from him certain properties (aḥkām) which, were it not for this perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil), it would not be permissible to attribute to Him, exalted is He. Among these is that knowledge is renewed for this human being, and so it is correct, from this level, for the Real, exalted is He, to say: "until We know," because the Real, exalted is He, from the Presence of His absoluteness (iṭlāq), has no relation (ʿalāqa) to anything; rather the relation occurs only within the levels of the human being. So the Real did not address him from the Presence of His absoluteness but from the Presence of His delimitation (taqyīd). Do you not see that had there not existed, in wujūd, a fixed entity (ʿayn thābita) called Abū Lahab, this would not have come in the Mighty Book: "Perish the hands of Abū Lahab, and perish he" (Sūrat al-Masad, verse 1)? So from the level of the fixed entity which is Abū Lahab this verse descended. And all the levels are within His knowledge, exalted is He; therefore they descend from God, exalted is He, because the divine 'withness' (ʿindiyya) is universal, encompassing every particular 'withness,' eternally and everlastingly. So there is, then, a relation between the Real, exalted is He, and the human being, and that relation is the human being's comprehending of the Beautiful Names of God. So when the Real, exalted is He, says "until We know," its meaning is: until the human being knows; so the very renewal of knowledge belongs to the human being — but the human being also possesses the Divine Presence, so there returns to Him, exalted is He, from the reality of "until We know" the property by which our statement is verified: that God, exalted is He, said in His Mighty Book, "until We know." And since this Presence, which necessitates the realization of the reality of "until We know," is one of the Essential Divine Presences — inasmuch as the fixed entities are the objects of knowledge (maʿlūmāt) of the Essence, and the object of knowledge together with the knowledge subsists in the Essence, and it is comprised within the fact that God's knowledge, exalted is He, does not depart from His Essence — the meaning of "until We know" is thereby established, without any renewal of knowledge attaching to the Holy Essence, since the human being, in this reality, is a safeguard (wiqāya) for his Lord, exalted is He, against the deficiency implied by this coming-into-being. Then the Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, followed this by mentioning what the theologians (mutakallimūn) said, namely their statement: "God, exalted is He, knows things by a knowledge additional to His Essence." Their intent was to attribute the renewal of knowledge to the relation (taʿalluq) that occurs 'for' knowledge — as though they said: the renewal of relation belongs to something other than the Real, exalted is He, namely to knowledge, not to Him, exalted is He — and they suppose that thereby the separation from this difficulty is achieved. The Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, then said: 'The correct view is that which unveiling and witnessing (kashf wa-shuhūd) require' — which is what was indicated, namely that the renewal of knowledge belongs only to the human being, and that what the theologian mentioned is false. Thus the difference is established between the theologians and the folk of God, exalted is He, on this question. And he described the folk of unveiling as the folk of wujūd, that is, the folk of witnessing the wujūd of God, exalted is He — or he intended by wujūd 'finding' (wijdān), for the witnessings of the folk of God, exalted is He, are experiential (wijdāniyya), not discursive (fikriyya). *** By wujūd he means: the folk of wujūd, the knowers (ʿārifūn), whose witnessing is by the eternal light of God — the Real Existence (al-wujūd al-ḥaqīqī) and the borrowed existence (al-wujūd al-mustaʿār) — and they distinguish between them in witnessing and in wujūd. They are not like others whose insight and sight God has not opened, who see the borrowed existence as though it were the whole of existence, or as the Real Existence absolutely. *** His statement: "Then we return to the gifts (aʿṭiyāt)" — we say: the gifts are either Essential or Name-related. As for the Essential grants, bestowals, and gifts, they never occur except through a divine self-disclosure (tajallī). And self-disclosure from the Essence never occurs except in the form of the preparedness (istiʿdād) of the one to whom the self-disclosure is made; nothing else is possible. So the recipient of the self-disclosure sees nothing but his own form in the mirror of the Real, exalted is He, and he does not see the Real, nor is it possible for him to see Him. I [the commentator] say: the terms aʿṭiyāt, ʿaṭāyā, hibāt, and minaḥ are all here synonymous. The Shaykh mentioned that these gifts are either Essential or Name-related, and he began by mentioning the Essential gifts, attributing them, in reality, to the essence of the servant, not to His Essence, exalted is He. This is in his statement: the self-disclosure from the Holy Essence never occurs except in the form of the preparedness of the servant to whom the self-disclosure is made — thus he referred the matter back to the servant, the servant's preparedness being part of his own essence. It is as though he said: the self-disclosure of the Real, exalted is He, is absolute and unrestricted, and the servant sees of it only what his preparedness has delimited for him. Therefore it is not possible for the servant to see the absoluteness of the Real, exalted is He, inasmuch as the servant is never other than delimited (muqayyad), and the delimited sees only what is delimited according to its preparedness; so no one has seen the Real, exalted is He, nor can anyone see Him in the Presence of His absoluteness. As for the fact that the light of the self-disclosure turns the servant into something like a mirror, in which he sees his own essence — this is a matter verified among the folk of God, and hence they said: 'The journey of the seekers ends in attaining their own souls.' His statement, may God be pleased with him: "together with his knowledge that he has seen his own form only in Him — like the mirror in the visible world: when you see the form in it, you do not see it [the mirror itself], while knowing that you have not seen the forms, or your own form, except in it." So God brought forth this as an example, set up for the Essential self-disclosure, so that the recipient of the self-disclosure may know that he has not seen Him. There is no example closer or more similar to vision and self-disclosure than this. And strive within yourself, when you see the form in the mirror, to see the substance of the mirror itself — you will never, ever see it — so much so that some who grasped something like this regarding the forms in mirrors went so far as to hold that the seen form lies between the gaze of the viewer and the mirror. His statement, may God be pleased with him: "This is the utmost that he was able to attain of knowledge, and the matter is as we have said and as we have held. We have explained this in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, and if you taste this you will have tasted the ultimate limit beyond which there is no further limit with respect to created things; so do not covet, nor weary yourself in trying to ascend to a rank higher than this, for it simply does not exist there at all, and beyond it there is nothing but sheer nonexistence." I [the commentator] say: he means by this the knowledge of the servant to whom the self-disclosure is made, namely that he has seen his own form only in the Real, exalted is He, and he likened that to a mirror: for when a person witnesses the shape that appears in the mirror, he is not thereby witnessing the substance of the mirror. It is as though he is saying that this has been tested/experienced: that the substance of the mirror — the polished surface in which the shape is seen — is not seen by anyone at the moment of witnessing the shape; yet one knows that the shape has appeared to you only in the mirror. Hence his statement, may God be pleased with him: "And strive, when you see the shape in the mirror, to see the substance of the mirror" — this is guidance from him, exalted and sanctified is He, toward the proper courtesy (adab) of the folk of God, exalted is He, in witnessing: for they strive to see the mirror more than they strive to see the shape within it — that is, they witness the Real, exalted is He, as closer to their witnessing than the vision of their own selves which have appeared in the mirror of His self-disclosure, exalted is He. As for the substance of the mirror, he said: you will never see it at all — though he may well intend, may God be pleased with him, to say to you: test for yourself what we have said — do you, in that state, see the substance of the mirror? You will know that you do not see it at all. He said: among the things that drove some people to say that the shape appearing in the mirror lies between the sight and the polished substance of the mirror, is what they found from experience — namely that the aforementioned substance of the mirror is not seen — so they imagined that the aforementioned shape is what veiled their sight from perceiving the substance of the mirror, since they were unable to see it. He said: 'This is the utmost that they were able to attain of knowledge.' The rest of the discourse is understood from what preceded in the Adamic Word. And it should be understood from this discourse mentioned by our Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, that witnessing pertains only to wujūd or to its meanings, and there is nothing beyond the aforementioned fixed entities; as for sheer nonexistence, which is 'no thing' in every respect, it is not witnessed, nor can any expression be applied to it except metaphorically, out of necessity. His statement, may God be pleased with him: "So He is your mirror in your seeing yourself, and you are His mirror in His seeing Himself and His Names and the manifestation of their properties — which are nothing but His very Entity (ʿayn)." I [the commentator] say: this is metaphorical, in the manner of similitude (tashbīh), because the wujūd of the Real, exalted is He, is like a mirror in which the very self of the witness appears, and the essence of the witness is like a mirror in which His Names, exalted is He, appear — and all of this returns to the fact that the fixed entities are 'meanings' (maʿānī), being the forms of His knowledge, and His knowledge is not other than His Essence, so there is nothing but Him — and thus the matter becomes obscure. His statement: "So the matter became mixed and obscure." All of this returns to the fact that the fixed entities are meanings, being the forms of His knowledge, and His knowledge is not other than His Essence, so there is nothing but Him — and thus the matter becomes obscure. And his statement: "So among us is one who remained ignorant in respect of his knowledge" — his statement, may God be pleased with him: "and inability to attain perception is itself a [form of] perception; and among us is one who knew, and did not say something like this — which is the higher statement — rather, knowledge granted him silence, not inability granted him [silence]. This is the highest knower of God. And this knowledge belongs to none but the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the Saints (khātam al-awliyāʾ), and none of the prophets and messengers sees it except from the niche of the Seal-Messenger, and none of the saints sees it except from the niche of the Seal-Saint — indeed the messengers themselves see it only from the niche of the Seal of the Saints." Thus he said, may God be pleased with him.

Jāmī

﴿"حتى نعلم" وهي﴾

أي قوله : حتى نعلم (كلمة محققة المعنی)، أي معناه الذي هو تأخر العلم وحدوثه أمر محقق واقع. أو معنى حقيقي لا مجازي فإن ذلك التأخر والحدوث هو الذاتي لا الزماني

That is, His statement 'until We know' (is a phrase whose meaning is verified) — that is, its meaning, which is the posteriority of knowledge and its coming-to-be, is something verified and actual; or: a real meaning, not a figurative one, for that posteriority and coming-to-be is essential (dhātī), not temporal (zamānī).

Bālī Zāde

﴿حتى نعلم﴾

31 سورة محمد. وقوله : " لنعلم من يتبع الرسول" 143 سورة البقرة . وقوله : "مرضت فلم تعدني" وغير ذلك من التشبيهات . وأما من لم يكن له هذا المشرب فمنزه فقط من كان الوجوه عن الحدوث والنقصان (وغاية المنزه إذا نزه أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث) الحاصل من المعلوم الحادث

(Q. 47:31), and His saying: 'that We may know him who follows the Messenger' (Q. 2:143), and His saying: 'I fell ill and you did not visit Me,' and other such assimilations (tashbīhāt). As for one who does not possess this draught, he is [one who] merely declares incomparability, holding that [God] is transcendent in every respect above origination and deficiency. (And the utmost that the one who declares incomparability does, when he declares incomparability, is to attribute that origination) — occurring from the originated known thing —

Words 59–62 · 1 of 7

وهي كَلِمَةٌ مُحَقَّقَةُ المَعْنَى

Only al-Qayṣarī comments here.

al-Qayṣarī

﴿وهي كلمة محققة المعنى﴾

في نفس الأمر، ليس كما يظنه المحجوب الذي ليس له هذا المشرب. ويمكن أن يكون المراد من قوله

in the matter itself, not as the veiled one who lacks this taste supposes. It is possible that what is intended by His saying

Ibn Turka

﴿ما هي كما يتوهمه من ليس له هذا المشرب﴾

من المجازات البعيدة ، على ما ارتكبها الظاهريون من المفسرين، فإن العلمين إذا كانا متساويين في الظهور يكون كل منهما متجددا حسب تجدد الآخر ، فلذلك تجدد " كل يوم هو في شأن" حسب تجدد الأعيان في الأزمان . ثم إن المنزهة الرسمية لما لم يكن لهم حظ من هذا الذوق ، اشمأزوا عن سماعه ، حاسبين أنه من التنزيه ، وهو بمرمى بعید منه ، فلذلك نبه إلى مآلهم فيه بقوله

among the far-fetched metaphorical constructions, of the sort committed by the literalist exegetes. For when the two knowledges are equal in manifestation, each of them is renewed according to the renewal of the other. Hence the renewal of "every day He is upon some task" occurs according to the renewal of the entities (aʿyān) in times. Then, since those who formally profess tanzīh (al-munazzaha al-rasmiyya) have no share of this taste (dhawq), they recoiled from hearing it, supposing it to belong to tanzīh, whereas it is far removed from that. Hence he drew attention to their eventual state regarding it by his saying:

Jāmī

﴿ما هي﴾

أي هذه الكلمة لغير هذا المعنى المحقق أو الحقيقي

i.e., this phrase is not for any meaning other than this verified or real meaning.

Bālī Zāde

﴿ما هي﴾

أي ليس حتى (كما) أي مثل الذي

i.e., 'until' is not (as) i.e., like that which

Jāmī

﴿كما يتوهمه﴾

أي كمعنى يتوهمه

i.e., as a meaning imagined by...

Bālī Zāde

﴿يتوهمه من ليس له هذا المشرب﴾

وهو المشرب الصوفي المحقق المنزه في مقام التنزيه . وهو غناؤه تعالى عن العالمين وهو قوله تعالى: "والله الغنى وأنتم الفقراء" 38 سورة محمد. وغير ذلك من الآيات الدالة على التقديس والمشبه في مقام التشبيه وهو ظهوره تعالى بصفات المحدثات . وهو قوله تعالى

draught (mashrab)] — namely, the realized Sufi draught, comprising the one who declares incomparability (munazzih) in the station of declaring incomparability (tanzīh) — that is, His being Independent, Exalted, of the worlds, which is His saying, Exalted: 'And God is the Independent, and you are the poor' (Q. 47:38), and other verses indicating [His] holiness — and the one who declares similarity (mushabbih) in the station of declaring similarity (tashbīh) — that is, His self-manifestation, Exalted, with the attributes of originated things, which is His saying, Exalted:

Words 67–71 · 1 of 7

مَنْ لَيْسَ لهُ هذا المَشْرَبُ

Only Jāmī comments here.

Jāmī

﴿من ليس له هذا المشرب﴾

من المتكلمين وهو أن هذا التأخر والحدوث إنما هو لنسبة تعلق العلم إلى %~% متن نص فصوص الحكم : و غاية المنزه أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث في العلم للتعلق ، و هو أعلى وجه يكون للمتكلم بعقله في هذه المسألة، لو لا أنه أثبت العلم زائدا على الذات فجعل التعلق له لا للذات. و بهذا انفصل عن المحقق من أهل الله صاحب الكشف و الوجود. شرح الجامي : المعلوم لا نفس العلم ولا فساد في تغير النسب وتجددها بالنسبة إلى ذات الحق و صفاتها . وإلى هذا أشار رضي الله عنه بقوله : (وغاية) المتكلم (المنزه) للحق سبحانه تعقله عن سمات الحدوث والنقصان (أن يجعل ذلك الحدوث) الزماني المتوهم من ظاهر مفهوم هذه الكلمة

among the theologians (mutakallimūn) — namely, that this posteriority and coming-to-be pertain only to the relation of the attachment (taʿalluq) of knowledge to — [Text of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam:] The utmost that the one who declares incomparability (munazzih) can do is to place that coming-to-be in the knowledge as pertaining to the attachment [of knowledge], and this is the highest position that the theologian can attain by his reason in this question, granted that he has affirmed knowledge as additional to the Essence, thus making the attachment belong to it, not to the Essence. And by this he is set apart from the verifier (muḥaqqiq) among the people of God, the possessor of unveiling (kashf) and finding (wujūd). [Jāmī's Commentary:] the known object, not knowledge itself — and there is no corruption in the change and renewal of relations (nisab) with respect to the Essence of the Real and His attributes. To this he, may God be pleased with him, alluded by his statement: (And the utmost) that the theologian (who declares incomparability) of the Real, glory be to Him, [can attain] by conceiving Him as free from the marks of coming-to-be and deficiency, (is that he makes that coming-to-be) — the temporal one imagined from the outward sense of this phrase

Sources: where each commentator's text comes from
ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 730/1330), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī (d. c. 691/1291), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350), Maṭlaʿ khuṣūṣ al-kilam fī maʿānī Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka (d. 835/1432), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Muṣṭafā b. Sulaymān Bālī Zāde (d. 1073/1663), Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1274), al-Fukūk fī asrār mustanadāt ḥikam al-Fuṣūṣ

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Licence: OpenITI distributes its texts under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0; ibnalarabi.com states © 1999–2024. The commentary itself is a classical work in the public domain; the edition behind the digital text is unidentified.

The ibnalarabi.com texts sometimes print other hands inside a commentary: Bālī Zāde's glosses inside al-Qāshānī («إضافة بالي زادة»), and notes by the modern editor (al-muḥaqqiq) or compiler (al-jāmiʿ). We cut these out of the commentator's own text and show them as separate entries, each labelled with its author and the line of the file it came from.

Arabic of the commentaries from the OpenITI digital texts (each comment links to its line); Bosnevî's Ottoman Turkish from our collation of two OCRs of the 1873 Istanbul print (each comment links to its page scan at HathiTrust); passages matched to the commentators' quotations automatically.English translations of the commentaries and of the passage are AI (Claude) and marked. Differences are computed by comparing the words each commentator quotes with our working text; they may reflect a different manuscript reading, a paraphrase, or an alignment error. About this text.